TABLE OF CONTENTS

BACKGROUND TO THE COUNTRY REPORT .......................................................................................................................... 4

GENERAL COUNTRY INFORMATION ............................................................................................................................................ 5

A. SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF MIGRATION .......................................................................................................................... 6
   A1. Economic Context ........................................................................................................................................................................... 6
      A1.1 Economic Climate .................................................................................................................................................................... 6
      A1.2 Development Reality ............................................................................................................................................................... 8
   A2. Social Context ............................................................................................................................................................................. 10
      A2.1 Demographic Situation ......................................................................................................................................................... 10
      A2.2 Human Capital ...................................................................................................................................................................... 12
   A3. Labour Market Analysis .......................................................................................................................................................... 15

B. ANALYSIS OF THE MIGRATION SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY .......................................................................................... 17
   B1. Migration Patterns: An Overview ........................................................................................................................................... 17
   B2. Immigrants ................................................................................................................................................................................... 19
      B2.1 Total Stocks and Flows ......................................................................................................................................................... 19
      B2.2 Types of Migratory Movements ......................................................................................................................................... 20
         B.2.2.1 Legal Migration .......................................................................................................................................................... 20
         B.2.2.2 Asylum and International Protection .......................................................................................................................... 20
         B.2.2.3 Irregular Migration ....................................................................................................................................................... 24
         B.2.2.4 Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling ............................................................................................................. 24
   B3. Emigrants ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 26
      B3.1 Total Stocks and Flows ......................................................................................................................................................... 26
      B3.2 Types of Migratory Movements ......................................................................................................................................... 26
         B.3.2.1 Legal Migration .......................................................................................................................................................... 26
         B.3.2.2 Asylum and International Protection .......................................................................................................................... 28
         B.3.2.3 Irregular Migration ....................................................................................................................................................... 35
         B.3.2.4 Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling ............................................................................................................. 37
         B.3.2.5 Return migration ........................................................................................................................................................... 39
   B4. Migration and Development ..................................................................................................................................................... 43
      B4.1 Afghan Diasporas ................................................................................................................................................................. 43
      B4.2 Remittances Sent by Afghan Nationals Living Abroad ..................................................................................................... 44
   B5. Institutional and Policy Framework Governing Migration .................................................................................................. 45
      B5.1 Overview of Recent Migration Policy Developments at the National Level ........................................................................ 45
      B5.2 Institutional Framework ....................................................................................................................................................... 47
      B5.3 Regional and International Cooperation ................................................................................................................................ 48

References ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 51

Annex 1: Domestic Legal Framework ............................................................................................................................................... 55

Annex 2: Statistical Data .................................................................................................................................................................... 56
   A. Socio-economic Context of Migration ....................................................................................................................................... 56
   B. Migration Statistics ....................................................................................................................................................................... 61
BACKGROUND TO THE COUNTRY REPORT

The Country Report has been prepared within the project “Fostering Cooperation in the Area of Migration with and in the Silk Routes Region”, implemented under the umbrella of the Budapest Process between September 2011 and November 2013. The overall objective of the project is to facilitate cooperation in the area of migration between the participating countries to the Budapest Process and the countries along the Silk Routes, in particular with a view to ensure orderly migration, to protect migrant rights and to activate the links between migration and development.

This specific report aims at establishing a comprehensive knowledge base on the migration realities in Afghanistan. Policy development in the area of migration strongly depends on the availability of accessible and comparable information, data and statistics. Thus, the development of the country report plays a crucial role in understanding the complex phenomenon of migration and its links to other policy areas at the national, regional and international level and in promoting discussion on development, migration, policy and coordination at inter-state and intra-region levels between the relevant stakeholders.

Gathering a broad range of statistical and analytical information, the Migration Country Report provides an overview of the migration situation in the country and, as such, it offers an empirical basis for policy planning and development. The present version includes country-specific information on the overall socio-economic context of migration, institutional and policy framework, overall migration trends and patterns, as well as more specific data on legal migration, asylum and international protection, irregular migration, return, and migration and development.

After a brief general country information, part A of this Country Report outlines the socio-economic context of migration, in order to understand possible push and pull factors of migration in Afghanistan and how it links with the broader structural factors in the country. It includes discussions on the economic climate and development reality in Afghanistan as well as on its demographic situation and human capital. Part A concludes with a section analysing the labour market in Afghanistan. Part B of the report starts with an overview of migration patterns in the country, which highlights how migration has evolved during the last couple of years in Afghanistan and gives a summary of key migration trends and issues in the last decade. After this introductory segment, the report continues with separate sections on Immigration and Emigration, which present the most recently available data both on total stocks and flows, as well as differentiated by the type of migratory movements, namely on legal migration with a focus on labour migration, asylum and international protection, irregular migration, human trafficking and migrant smuggling, and return. Part B then continues with a separate section on migration and development, which includes data on Afghan diasporas and remittances from Afghan nationals living abroad. Lastly, a sum-up of national institutional and policy framework governing migration is included, as well as main directions in regional and international cooperation. In the annexes, an overview of the key domestic legislation related to migration management and diaspora affairs in Afghanistan is to be found, as well as the statistical tables complementing the text in the previous sections of the Migration Profile.
Official name: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
Capital: Kabul
Area: Total: 652,230 sq km (land: 652,230 sq km, water: 0 sq km)
Land boundaries: Total: 5,529 km (border countries: China 76 km, Iran 936 km, Pakistan 2,430 km, Tajikistan 1,206 km, Turkmenistan 744 km, Uzbekistan 137 km)
Population: 31,108,077 (July 2013 est.)
Ethnic groups: Pashtun 42%, Tajik 27%, Hazara 9%, Uzbek 9%, Aimak 4%, Turkmen 3%, Baloch 2%, other 4%
Languages: Dari (official) 50%, Pashto (official) 35%
President: Hamid KARZAI (since 7 December 2004)
Head of Government: Hamid KARZAI (since 7 December 2004)
Government type: Islamic Republic

A. SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF MIGRATION

A1. Economic Context

A1.1 Economic Climate

Afghanistan’s economy has improved significantly since 2002-03, largely because of the infusion of international assistance, the rapid growth of the service sector and, to some extent, the moderate development of the industry sector. Afghanistan’s 11.2% average growth rate between 2003 and 2011 has become one of the highest among the neighbouring countries. However, these developments are to be seen in the context of the serious set-back suffered by the economy during decades of war and conflict. In addition to the high level of poverty, Afghanistan is a country highly dependent on foreign aid and has many challenges to surpass, such as to provide decent living standards for its population suffering from shortages of housing, clean water, job, medical care and electricity, as well as to extend the rule of law and reduce criminality, insecurity and weak governance to all parts of the country.

It is difficult to draw an accurate picture of the Afghan economy due to the predominance of informal and undocumented economy and severe data limitations in the fragile security situation of the country. Another important feature of the Afghan economy is the increasing aid dependency, the country ranking as the sixth largest recipient in terms of percentage of Official Development Assistance (ODA) to its GDP (35.4%) and the second largest recipient in terms of nominal value ($ 26.6 million) between 2000 and 2009. As seen in the graph in annex 2, the proportion of ODA to GDP in Afghanistan has continued to increase throughout 2010 and 2011. However, although $ 55 billion of aid have been provided for Afghanistan since 2002, the efficient use of it has been put into question.

According to the Afghan Central Statistics Organisation (CSO), the total real GDP (in constant price 2002-2003) amounted to AFN 305,513 million in 2007-08, AFN 312,556 million in 2008-09, AFN 363,382 million in 2009-10, AFN 374,356 million in 2010-11 and was estimated at AFN 409,856 million in 2011-12. This indicates real GDP growth of 16.1% in 2007-08, 2.3% in 2008-09, 17.2% in 2009-10, 3.2% in 2010-11 and an estimated 9.5% growth in 2011-12. Real GDP growth is estimated at 5.7% for 2011-12 and is expected to increase to 7.1% in 2012-13.

---

4 If the small states namely the states with a population of 1.5 million or less are to be excluded from the listing, then Afghanistan becomes the third largest recipient after Liberia and Burundi.
Another relevant macroeconomic indicator, the GDP per capita has been on a constant rise since 2003 (see graph in annex 2). World Bank data provided by the Afghan Investment Support Agency (AISA) recorded the GDP per capita as $169 in 2003-04 and $501 in 2010-11, the equivalent of almost 200% increase over the seven-year period under review. For 2011-2012, AISA estimated the GDP per capita at $542. The following graph shows the evolution of GDP per capita (in US dollars) from 2003 until 2011, based on World Bank data quoted by AISA. At the same time, the average growth rate of the GDP per capita in Afghanistan between 2009 and 2010 has been 8.2% (see graph in annex 2), with an annual growth rate of 17% in 2009 and 5% in 2010.

With regard to the sector shares of GDP in Afghanistan, the three key sectors to observe are agriculture, service and industry as follows. Although only 10-14% of Afghanistan is composed of arable land with a very limited access to irrigation (one third to half of the arable lands), the country’s agriculture sector (including livestock) accommodates almost 70% of employment and traditionally it has been considered the main sector. However, starting with the mid-1990s, the agricultural sector’s share of GDP in Afghanistan started to change due to a combination of several factors, including severe droughts (1998-2002, 2004, 2006), war and war induced conditions, and the relationship between the opium production and legal agriculture. Since 2004 a high demand in the service sector emerged with the donor activities and the presence of international community, especially telecommunications and then restaurants, hotels, aviation and other similar sub-sectors. The service sector is currently the strongest of the economy. Moreover, the years 2000s were characterised by the expansion of the industry sector, mainly driven by construction in the post-Taliban period. Other contributing sub-sectors are textiles, clothes, leather and manufacturing of food and beverages.

Another key issue for Afghanistan, its external debt was calculated as 7.9% of its GDP for the 2011/12 period. Since 2007, Afghanistan has been included to the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative which was launched by the IMF-World Bank in 1996 and also to the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) which was developed by the IMF-World Bank/IDA-AfDf in 2006. In addition to these initiatives, Afghanistan has also benefited extensively from the debt reliefs or reductions on both bilateral and multilateral loan deals. As a result of all these debt reliefs and/or reductions, Afghanistan has received debt relief amounting to $10.5 billion in total under HIPC, yet it still owes $2.3 billion to various countries and international organisations (see graph in annex 2).

17 Barakat, Sultan: Understanding Afghanistan, Synthesis Report, The University of York, November 2008, http://www.york.ac.uk/media/other/understanding%20afghanistan%20report%20nov2008.pdf, p. 15. Different sources claim varying employment share in agriculture sector. NRVA gives it as 59% and some other sources estimates it 80% by embedding the dependent households. However, in each and every calculation, the figure is more than 50%.
Despite the difficult environment of Afghanistan, marked by an exceedingly difficult security situation, poor health, water and sanitation systems and strong vulnerability of people, the country has managed to attract capital and investors and is slowly establishing its investment setting, especially in the construction and service sectors. In order to analyse the investment climate in Afghanistan, the World Bank made two surveys in 2005 and 2008 covering 338 firms in 5 Afghan cities in the first survey and 1,066 firms in 10 Afghan cities in the second one. In comparison with the 2005 survey, the 2,008 survey identifies serious deterioration in the perceptions towards governance with special reference to policy enforcement and crime, theft and disorder.

The informal economy in Afghanistan, which is estimated to be around 80-90% of the total economy, includes all kinds of activities and services such as non-recorded agriculture and livestock (33% of official GDP), opium production and related activities (35% of the official GDP), illegal trade/smuggling (by estimation, between 6.5-8% of official GDP) and the remaining percentage is composed of other non-recorded activities such as barter trade, hawala system and small size manufacturing and commerce (see graph in annex 2). Furthermore, the majority of the labour force in the country has been working in one of these sectors of the informal economy.

A1.2 Development Reality

Since Afghanistan was not able to participate in the formulation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000 due to a period of conflict and war, the government of Afghanistan endorsed the Millennium Declaration as well as the MDGs in 2004. Because of Afghanistan’s unique situation within the Millennium Declaration, the country was requested to adjust the time frame and benchmarks of the MDGs to fit local realities. Regarding its own setting and framework, Afghanistan decided to define the MDGs to be attained by 2020, against a baseline of 2002 to 2005 compared to the timetable of the international community from 1999 – 2015. Following the publication of the first Afghan MDG Report in 2005, Afghanistan has taken several significant steps in order to materialise its vision of 2020 (e.g. ‘Afghanistan Compact’ as agreed in the 2006 London Conference, ‘Afghan National Development Strategy’ in 2008). Demonstrating a strong political will towards achieving these goals, Afghanistan has incorporated the MDGs into the basis of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS).

25 There are serious inconsistencies in the 2008 dated survey while making comparisons with 2005 dated survey such as contradicting statements and evaluations in the perception towards corruption and percentage change in the perceptions of governance and factor market indicators between 2005 and 2008.
29 Ibid., p.7
Despite the urgent need for finding adequate strategies in dealing with extreme poverty, ill health and hunger, Afghanistan defined the lack of security as its most striking challenge, resulting in the adoption of the 9th MDG, ensuring security and recognising the critical role of peace and security in achieving the other MDGs.33 The main targets of the MDG 9 are to reform and professionalise the Afghan National Army and Police until 2010 (the confidence of citizens in the police’s ability to provide security and access to justice in 2008 lies at 70.84%34), reduce the misuse of weapons and the proportion of illegally held weapons by 2010, destroy all emplaced antipersonnel mines by 2013 and all other explosive contaminants by 2015 (the number of high impacted communities reduced from the baseline of 281 to 74 until 200835), destroy all stockpiled antipersonnel mines by 2007 (all 28,895 stockpiled antipersonnel landmines have been destroyed by 2007, though only two out of country’s 34 provinces have been completely cleared of mines36) and all other abandoned or unwanted explosive stocks by 2020, as well as reduce the contribution of opium to the total (licit and illicit) GDP to less than 5% by 2015, and to less than 1% by 2020.37 Afghanistan is regarding most security indicators either on track or achievable38, though not all data is available and the last evaluation was made in 2008.

The only off track goal is the one regarding the decrease in the number of Afghans dependent on opium for their livelihoods (registered 1.03% decrease, as compared to the 2015 goal of 75% decrease).39 Even though significant progress has been experienced in the reduction of poppy cultivation in 29 out of 34 provinces, explosive growth has been registered in the remaining five provinces mainly located in the south of the country (i.e. In 2007, opium production increased by 34% reaching to 8,200 tons).40

Although it does not reflect all relevant areas of human development (only life expectancy at birth, adult literacy and gross enrolment rates in education, as well as GDP per capita), the Human Development Index (HDI) still captures the current state of Afghanistan to a certain extent. In 2011, the HDI value for Afghanistan was calculated at 0.398, ranking 172 out of 187 countries, in the low human development group, below the average for South Asian countries 0.548 and further below the average of 0.682 in the world.41 The progress in HDI values is illustrated by the Human Development Index Trends42 in the graph below.

35 Ibid., p. 28
41 Ibid.
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX TRENDS: 1980-2010

With regard to the two new complementary indices introduced in the 20th Anniversary Human Development Report (HDR) of the UN in 2010, the Inequality-Adjusted HDI (IHDI) measuring ‘actual’ not ‘potential’ human development and the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) identifying multiple deprivations in the same households in education, health and standard of living, Afghanistan has not been examined due to lack of relevant data. As for the third new index which is Gender Inequality Index (GII) reflecting gender-based inequalities in three dimensions of reproductive health, empowerment and economic activity, Afghanistan has a value of 0.707, ranking it 141 out of 146 countries in the 2011 index.

A2. Social Context

A2.1 Demographic Situation

Population Volume and Growth

The last population census available (but incomplete because of the Soviet invasion) dates back to 1979, when only 67% of the districts were covered, due to the occupation, conflict and war which lasted until the fall of the Taliban regime. After 2001 the necessity of a census has become apparent, yet not the first on the list of many priorities. The Afghan government scheduled the first census in thirty years, the ‘Afghanistan Population and Housing Census’, for 2008 and, as preparation, a household listing was carried out between 2003/4-2005 period. However, the planned census had to be postponed to 2010 due to security reasons, and up to the date no official census has been carried through. Existing estimations rely in their calculation on sample surveys and assumptions about future trends, and as such they have to be used cautiously.

43 Ibid.
45 Ibid., p.4
The Afghan Central Statistics Organisation (CSO) estimates the settled population\(^{48}\) size to amount to 23,993,500 in the 2009-2010 period, with a growth rate of 2.03\%.\(^{49}\) This figure was estimated at 24,485,600 for the 2010-2011 period (with the same growth rate of 2.03\%)\(^{50}\) and 24,987,700 for the 2011-2012 period.\(^{51}\) If the nomadic population is to be included, then these estimated figures are expected to increase by 1,500,000. According to the World Data Bank, the population of the country has already past the 30,000,000 threshold since 2006, with a rapid growth rate of 3.00\% annually.\(^{52}\) The population density lies at 39.05 people per km\(^2\) in 2010\(^{53}\) and is expected to increase with right correlation of the increasing population.

**Age Distribution and Urbanisation Rate**

The age distribution for the Afghan population overweighs along the lines of under 15 year olds (see table in annex 2). This reflects the predominantly young population structure of the country and also the enormous emigration rate of working aged Afghan population, especially that of male Afghans.

With regard to urbanisation, the Afghan population is still largely situated in rural areas. Main cities in 11 provinces (namely Herat, Jalalabad, Kabul, Kandahar and Mazar) are considered urban, while the remaining territory rural.\(^{54}\) According to the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) 2007/8, Afghanistan's excessive rural population rate is approximately at the level of 80\%, including the nomadic people.\(^{55}\) Afghanistan's urbanisation rate of 6\% per annum, considered to be one of the highest in Asia, leads to highly populous urban centres paired with further weakening service delivery.\(^{56}\) In 2010, the percentage of urban population was registered as 23\%,\(^{57}\) which mean that almost one quarter of the Afghan population now lives in the cities, the majority of whom are most likely inhabiting urban slums.\(^{58}\)

**Population by Ethnic Origin**

The configuration of the ethnic group distribution is another estimation based on fluctuating numbers. It is presumed that the multinational state of Afghanistan comprises a majority of Pashtuns (42\%), followed by Tajiks (27\%), Hazara and Uzbeks (9\%), Aimaks (4\%), Turkmen (3\%) and Balochs (2\%).\(^{59}\) The Afghan government furthermore recognises all other remaining ethnic groups as Afghan citizens and prohibits any kind of discrimination.\(^{60}\)

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\(^{48}\) Statistical data on Afghanistan gives the estimation of 1.5 million nomadic population.


Fertility and mortality rates

Afghanistan’s fertility rate is estimated to be the highest in South Asia with numbers varying from 5.39 to 6.3 children per woman, according to different sources. Although a decrease of the fertility rate has been already achieved from a decade ago (7.4 children per woman in 2002), this relative reduction is evaluated as insufficient, considering the possible negative outcomes that such a rapid population growth could have with regard to employment, economic growth, quality of public services, life expectancy of women, food scarcity because of limited resources such as arable land and water resources of the country etc.

According to World Bank estimations, also the mortality rates for adult men and women have shown a decreasing tendency between the years of 2002 and 2010. The mortality rate for adult men decreased from 432 deaths per 1000 male in 2002 to 409 deaths per 1000 male adults in 2010. For the same period, the female mortality rate decreased from 402 deaths per 1000 female adults to 377.

A2.2 Human Capital

Building human capital is the main pillar of creating a stable and prosperous future for Afghanistan. The lack of skilled labour is seen by the authorities as a serious problem obstructing the development in the country. Devastated education system due to more than two decades of conflict, poverty, limited access to education, poor physical infrastructure and cultural norms undervaluing girls’ education are the challenges to be faced and overcome.

Levels of Alphabetisation, Schooling and Education

Education in Afghanistan has greatly improved since the Taliban were overthrown in late 2001, but still there is a lot to be done in terms of increasing the literacy rates, the number of students in primary, secondary and tertiary education, the quality of education and most importantly the opportunity to access educational system all over the country.

Afghanistan’s literacy rate, which is estimated at 23.5% (of the Afghan population above 15 years old), is one of the lowest in the world. Moreover, the literacy rate for the female population is estimated even lower, at 12.6%. The NRVA 2007/08 also provides similar figures. The national adult literacy rate, aged 15 and above, is estimated as 26% in total (12% female and 39% men), whereas the literacy rates get much lower in rural areas of the country where the majority of the population reside. These rates are believed to also vary by region.

Attendance to adult literacy courses has also improved significantly, from 22,000 men attending literacy courses in 2001 to 500,000 men and women taking courses in 2010, out of which the majority are women (58%). Therefore, the rate of literacy course attendance is considered to have improved by over twenty-fold in one decade.

According to recent estimates from the Afghanistan’s Ministry of Education, more than 7.3 million students were enrolled in 2011, roughly an eight-fold increase of the enrolment rate from a decade ago. According to the NRVA 2007/08, the table given below shows the net enrolment ratios in primary, secondary and tertiary education levels by sex.

### NET ENROLMENT RATIOS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of education</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Both</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td></td>
<td>52</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NRVA 2007/08

Including the 9,000 schools newly created in order to increase the access to education, in 2011 the total number of general and Islamic schools operational all over the country was roughly 12,500. For the purpose of meeting the enrolment of new students, more than 200,000 new teaching and support staff have been employed in the last nine years. The following table provides the estimated teacher/pupils ratio in primary and secondary schools between 2007 and 2010.

### EDUCATIONAL INDICATORS, 2007-2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pupil-teacher ratio (primary education)</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pupil-teacher ratio (secondary education)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNESCO 2011

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69 Ibid., p.2
Despite the significant progress, there are still about 4.5 million children out of school, the majority of which are girls.\(^{71}\) The Afghan Government together with the international community has developed and implemented several strategies in order to increase the enrolment and retention of students at all levels and fields of education, by paying special attention to female participation both as teacher and student.\(^{72}\) In addition to the special attention given to the girls’ education both by public awareness and advocacy campaigns and by sending female teachers to rural areas as role models, the Ministry of Education has also addressed the issue of education for children found in particularly vulnerable situations, such as minority groups (e.g. Kuchis), working children, Afghan refugee children living at border areas and children with special needs.\(^{73}\)

The Afghan Ministry of Education has also made efforts to follow and support the education needs of refugee children in Iran and Pakistan through Afghan refugee schools functioning there.\(^{74}\) The Ministry has begun to work closely with the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP) to provide literacy and community-based education to returnees and a five year plan has been developed to integrate them into school and literacy programs.\(^{75}\) In addition, the Ministry has been assessing the needs of children in emergency situations, such as those living in insecure areas or affected by natural disasters or displaced ones, and tried to meet their basic education needs by establishing collaborations with other relevant ministries and partner organisations.\(^{76}\) In order to institutionalise the emergency response, the Ministry created a separate unit for education in emergency.\(^{77}\)

According to a national survey done by Integrity Watch Afghanistan in 2010, almost 90% of Afghans said that they had access to primary and secondary education,\(^{78}\) which is similar to the figure quoted in the most recent Human Development Report (2013).\(^{79}\) However, the picture is very different when it comes to tertiary education, where the enrolment rate was calculated at 3.3% in 2012, while for secondary education it was recorded as 46%.\(^{80}\) However, enrolment rates and generally the overall access to education vary for different segments of the society, with particularly the women, nomadic populations and the poorest being at a significant disadvantage. In addition, a different issue from enrolment is the attendance and completion rates, both of which appear very problematic due to a large extent to high insecurity and poverty. Last but not least, the quality of education is also related to teaching quality and available infrastructure, which pose additional challenges.

\(^{73}\) Ibid.
\(^{74}\) Ibid. p.7
\(^{75}\) Ibid.
\(^{76}\) Ibid.
\(^{77}\) Ibid.
A3. Labour Market Analysis

In accordance with the Article 48 and Article 49 of the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan, the Labour Law adopted in 2007 has broad provisions for the protection of workers. Afghanistan has also ratified Conventions 100, 105 and 111 on internationally recognised labour standards.

In order to increase awareness and provide the involvement of key actors, the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled (MoLSAMD) created the Labour Law Consultative Group (LLCG), which bring together representatives of relevant ministries and NGOs in several provinces like Kabul, Balkh, Heart, Kandahar and Nangarhar. However, it is understood that the implementation of these labour standards require further capacity building within all spheres related to labour matters and with the participation of key parties such as MoLSAMD, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Women’s Affairs, employers, employees and civil society.

The lack of skilled labour and infrastructure together with long war and conflict years has turned the training of skilled labour and ‘labour-based reconstruction efforts’ into priority issues for the employment policy in Afghanistan. In 2002, the Afghan Government initiated the National Emergency Employment Programme (NEPP), later restructured under the name of the National Rural Access Program (NRAP), as one of four National Priority Programs aimed at providing social protection to vulnerable people in the whole country and labour intensive public works by improving key rural access infrastructure. However, as the sub-/projects under this scheme are donor-based, only short term employment opportunities have been created.

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83 Ibid.

84 Ibid.

85 Ibid.

In order to facilitate, manage and regulate the labour migration, the Afghan Government has developed the ‘National Employment Policy and Strategy’ (NEPS) in addition to the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), an expression of the Government’s commitment to the development of Afghan labour skills at the marketable levels.87

Article 53 of the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan constitutes the basis of the right to social security in Afghanistan.88 The social security system in the country is centred on providing pension to the people with disabilities, former civil servants and families of martyrs, and also establishing shelters for children.89

Regarding concrete data, there is a general absence of statistics on labour force and labour market in Afghanistan because nationwide and comprehensive surveys on these issues have never been carried out in the country. However, several limited surveys on Afghan labour market have been done by the International Rescue Committee (IRC), the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) and the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU). The Afghan Central Statistics Organisation in cooperation with ILO has been working on developing relevant surveys and, for this purpose, the ‘Labour Market Information and Analysis Unit’ (LMIAU) was created under the MoLSAMD.90

In this context, all the data given below should be approached with caution and taken as based on estimations.

The World Bank estimates the average annual growth of labour force between 2004 and 2010 around 3.5%, which is higher than both South Asian scale (1.1%) and the low-income group of countries (2.6%).92

89 Ibid., p.7, p.26
90 MoLSAMD; Revised First Draft, “Facilitation of Sustainable Decent Work through Skills Development and Market-Friendly Labour Regulations”, March 2011, pp.13-14
As reflected in the table below, rough estimations regarding the unemployment rate are available from different sources, including the Central Statistical Office, the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank. In addition, it is important to take into account also the dominant extent of the informal sector.

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Statistics Office</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>(15-24 age)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(24-29 age)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Masum, Mohammad, Towson University

**B. ANALYSIS OF THE MIGRATION SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY**

**B1. Migration Patterns: An Overview**

Migration patterns in Afghanistan are marked by huge emigration and refugee outflows, as well as internal migration and displacement. Immigration per se, concerning people without an Afghani background, is rather seldom. As a result of decades of unrest, millions of Afghans have left the country.

Since 2002, after the fall of the Taliban, nearly 6 million refugees have returned to Afghanistan, mainly from the neighbouring Pakistan and Iran, increasing the country’s population by 25%. Most of the returnees have headed towards four main provinces: Kabul (26%); Nangarhar (20%), Kunduz (6%), and Baghlan (5%). The UNHCR-led voluntary return programme to Afghanistan is the largest such operation in the world, assisting around 4.7 million people return from 2002 to date (2013). In 2002 alone, the voluntary return of 1.5 million Afghans from Pakistan in the course of that year marked the single largest refugee return in the world since 1972.

However, the poor prospects for rapid economic and social improvements together with the persistent security concerns in Afghanistan have resulted in a decline in the return rates since 2005. Currently it is estimated that there are still more than 2.7 million Afghan refugees living outside their country (approximately 1.7 million in Pakistan and around 1 million in Iran). This figure covers only those that are registered. This means that, out of every four refugees in the world, one is from Afghanistan. Yet it is believed that the capacity of Afghanistan to absorb much more returnees is stretched. In the areas of highest return, as many as one in three people is a returnee, which puts a strain on receiving communities struggling to cope with already limited resources. Moreover, while reconstruction and development efforts have advanced, security has remained problematic.

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95 “Voluntary returns to Afghanistan - over 60,000 this year,” UNHCR Briefing Notes, 28 October 2011, http://www.unhcr.org/4ea8ad99.html
In addition to seeking international protection, many Afghans leave the country due to socio-economic concerns, forming part of seasonal migration and traditional movements to and through Pakistan and Iran. In mid 2009, a daily average of 40,000 persons transited official crossing points with Pakistan in either direction with minimal, if any, formal processing.\(^98\) This includes Afghans registered as refugees in Pakistan, persons seeking employment, medical care or engaging in family visits as well as those in need of protection. In addition, it is estimated that over 4,000 Afghans cross daily into Iran.\(^99\)

Afghanistan experienced a general worsening of conflict-related violence as the Taliban insurgency re-grouped in 2005, with 2009 being the starting point of an extremely volatile period, marked by geographical and intensity-wise extension of the conflict on the whole.\(^100\) Individual experiences of war and human rights violations such as forced labour and kidnapping, combined with insecurity, widespread poverty, political instability, poor educational prospects and a declining hope for a brighter future are all fuelling the flows.

In the ‘Country Strategy Paper on Afghanistan: 2007-2013’, the European Union acknowledges that in relation to the Afghan refugee situation, the emphasis has changed from responding to an immediate humanitarian crisis to one of tackling the more long-term development and migratory challenges of displaced populations.\(^101\)

With regard to data, a general caution must be expressed. Due to the lack of reliable statistics, administrative records, surveys and censuses, it is very difficult to calculate reliable estimations for Afghanistan. Therefore, often very rough estimations are made and it is not uncommon to find different figures for the same indicator, according to the source used.

According to UNDESA, Afghanistan’s net migration rate per 1000 population is reported as -6.5 for 1995-2000, 1.2 for 2000-2005 and -5.6 for 2005-2010 periods.\(^102\) As for the net number of migrants per annum including both sexes (thousands), the following figures are given, also by UNDESA: -619,000 in 1995-2000, -137,000 in 2000-2005, and -739,000 in 2005-2010 periods.\(^103\) The net number of migrants was estimated at 137,157 in 2002, -739,334 in 2007 and -399,999 in 2012.\(^104\)

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\(^{98}\) Ibid.
\(^{99}\) Ibid.


\(^{103}\) Idem

B2. Immigrants

B2.1 Total Stocks and Flows

Afghan migration in general is marked by massive emigration and refugee outflows and since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001 a constant resettlement into Afghanistan as well as internal migration and displacement. Immigration per se, concerning people without an Afghani background, is rather seldom and finding specific information on immigration in the Afghan context is also quite difficult.

According to statistics from the UN Department Economic and Social Development (UN DESA), in 2010 there were an estimated 91,000 international migrants (foreign-born) in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{105} According to the World Bank and UN Data Bases, international migrant stock of Afghanistan in total, including refugees, is 75,917 in 2000, 86,451 in 2005 and 90,883 in 2010.\textsuperscript{106}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IMMIGRATION STATISTICS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INDICATOR</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<tr>
<td>Males</td>
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<tr>
<td>Females</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percentage of female migrants (%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Migrants as percentage of total population (%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Annual rate of change (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net migration of foreign born</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: UN DESA 2011\textsuperscript{107}

Detailed information on the immigrants such as country of birth, age and duration of stay is not available due to lack of available data.

According to the data provided by the World Bank, the total stock of immigrants in Afghanistan was reported as 57,686 in 1990, 70,205 in 1995, 75,917 in 2000, 84,451 in 2005 and 90,883 in 2010, almost doubling within 20 years.\textsuperscript{108} In 2010, it is estimated that the stock of immigrants as percentage of the population is 0.3% by taking the population of the country as 29.8 million and the female as percentage of immigrants is 43.6%.\textsuperscript{109}

\textsuperscript{106} The World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SM.POP.TOTL
B.2.2 Types of Migratory Movements

B.2.2.1 Legal Migration

There are no exact statistics of foreign workers in Afghanistan.

However it is known that, particularly post-2001, Afghanistan’s limited pool of skilled human resources has necessitated the active recruitment of foreign nationals. Particularly the private sectors invested heavily by the foreign companies, such as mining, telecommunication, financial services, banking, service and construction, require skilled and trained people that Afghanistan has limited capacity to offer. Moreover, the significant amounts of foreign aid that have poured into Afghanistan have also been accompanied by a strong presence of both international and national NGOs in the country, both of which employ primarily foreign staff.

In addition, government organisations also tend to employ foreign consultants that provide technical assistance to the Afghan government. Under the Civilian Technical Assistance Programme (CTAP), international technical experts and capacity development advisors have been allocated for each ministry in the country. According to an independent recent research held in 2012, more than 5,000 foreigners have been working in Afghanistan as consultants. Among these consultants, more than 60% are allocated to the presidential office whereas the remaining is engaged with either ministries or the military section.

Furthermore, approximately 102,000 NATO troops from 50 contributing nations have been serving in the country in December 2012, most of which are scheduled to leave the country by the end of 2014. Additional 1,575 international staff members were working in UN civilian duty stations in Afghanistan in April 2010.

According to the Labour Law in Afghanistan, all foreign labourers must obtain work permit issued by the MoLSAMD. According to MoLSAMD data, more than 18,000 issued work permits have been issued to foreign labourers.

B.2.2.2 Asylum and International Protection

Refugees and Asylum Seekers

According to the MoRR statistics; there are 37 refugees and 12 asylum seekers residing in the country in January 2010 and this figure has risen to 6,434 refugees and 30 asylum seekers by January 2011. Data available from the UNHCR Population Database (2012 values) is presented in the following table. According to the latest UNHCR Fact Sheet, by September 2013 there were 72 refugees, 75 asylum seekers and 16,791 refugees and persons in refugee-like situation residing in Afghanistan.
The majority of the refugees and asylum seekers come from the neighbouring Iran and Pakistan, as well as from Iraq. According to the UNHCR Global Report, in 2012, 40% of the refugees in Afghanistan were women, and 27% were under 18 years old.\(^{119}\)

At the end of 2012, the MoRR prepared a draft ‘Refugee Law for Afghanistan’, in follow-up to the newly adopted ‘Regional Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees’ (SSAR) agreed during the quadripartite consultations among Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan and UNHCR.\(^{120}\)

**Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)**

The situation of IDPs in the country has been since long a serious issue and still remains so to date. Given that the country has been at the centre of conflict and war for decades, as well as suffering from frequent and severe natural disasters such as floods and droughts, the IDP population is very high and displacement is widespread in the country. According to interviews conducted with more than 700 Afghans for a study in 2009, a total of 76% of the respondents had been forced to leave their homes. Overall, 41% of the respondents had been displaced internally, 42% externally and 17% both internally and externally.\(^{121}\) Another characteristic of displacement in the Afghan context is its continuous nature and frequency, due to the difficulty of finding a stable safe place in a context of on-going conflict.
For the purpose of distinguishing among different categories of IDPs, the National IDP Task Force employs two concepts: on the one hand it uses ‘persecution and conflict-induced IDPs’ for displacement caused by on-going armed conflict, serious and systematic human rights violations, violent form of clashes and disputes over ethnic, tribal matters, inter alia, land and other natural resources; and on the other hand it uses ‘protracted IDPs’ for displacement that took place before December 2002 due to conflict, violence and natural disasters.\(^{123}\)

The exact number of IDPs is not known and figures differ from one source to another. Already during the Soviet invasion approximately 2 million persons were displaced and more than 5 million emigrated.\(^{124}\) UNHCR and ICRC estimate that, between 2006 and 2008, the number of IDPs was in the range of 500,000-550,000.\(^{125}\) In 2009, UNHCR reported 120,000 new displacements and 102,000 additional ones in 2010.\(^{126}\) For the same period of time, MoRR data accounts for 378,857 internally displaced persons in total in 2010\(^{127}\) and 351,907 in total in January 2011.\(^{128}\) As of December 2011, UNHCR reports the number of IDPs as 447,547/69,854 families.\(^{129}\) However, the real number of IDPs is believed to be much higher, because this figure does not include the persons who settled in urban and semi-urban areas or in inaccessible rural areas in the insecure areas of the country.\(^{130}\)

[Image: IDPs 2001-2013]

Source: UNHCR SOPD 2013\(^{131}\)


\(^{129}\) UNHCR Statistical Snapshot. http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/teixis/vtx/page?page=49e496eb68&Submit=G#0


At the end of August 2013, a total of 590,184 persons were in situation of displacement as a result of conflict in Afghanistan. Among them 70,590 individuals were recorded as newly displaced in 2013, largely in the Southern and Western regions of the country. In 2012, a total of 203,457 conflict induced IDPs had been recorded in Afghanistan. This includes 46% (94,299) who were displaced in 2012 and 109,158 individuals who were displaced in earlier years.\(^\text{132}\)

The “normalisation period” that followed the fall of the Taliban was marked with the return of refugees and IDPs. During this period, 85% of the IDPs left the camps within 3 years either to return to their homes or to resettle somewhere else; however, the returns got interrupted with the deteriorating security situation as of 2006.\(^\text{133}\) Between 2002 and 2008, the Government of Afghanistan worked together with UNHCR on two groups of IDPs: the first group comprised persons who had been displaced before 2003 and then lived in IDP camps, and the second group comprised refugee returnees who had to settle in a new place due to unfavourable conditions in their places of origin.\(^\text{134}\) Since 2009, UNHCR and the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriations (MoRR) have been working actively under the National IDP Task Force on registering all IDPs within the country through Provincial Departments of Refugees and Repatriation (DORRs) of the Ministry in all 34 provinces and they are entitled to support them in their return, resettlements and restarting their livelihoods.

\[\text{RETURNEE S IDPS, 2001-2013}\]

![Graph showing returnees IDPs, 2001-2013](image)

Source: UNHCR SOPD 2013\(^\text{135}\)

With regard to disaster-induced IDPs, the most recent estimation is 74,480 people/10,640 families by January 2012, with drought being named as the main reason of displacement, followed by flooding.\(^\text{136}\)

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\(^\text{136}\) National IDP Task Force (NIDP TF) Minutes, Kabul, 17 January 2012, p.1
B2.2.3 Irregular Migration

There are two main ways in which migrants become irregular. They may either enter the country in a way that does not obey the law or, although they may have crossed the border legally, once inside the territory of the country, their legal status may change as a result of personal decision or as a consequence of changes in the laws regulating the migration process. The difference being that, in the first case, people may find themselves in an irregular situation from the first moment in the country, while in the second case, a person who has previously held a legal reason to be in the country becomes irregular at a given point in time. Similarly, a person in an irregular situation, may become “regular” at another point in time, when and if there is a change in the legal regulations governing the migration process in that specific country. There is no reliable data on the number of irregular immigrants in Afghanistan, due to the inherent difficulty of counting persons that may be found in this situation. This section presents the data related to irregular migration that is available in Afghanistan, while highlighting the limitations that such data may have.

With regard to irregular immigration, the reality in Afghanistan is that, due to the difficulty of checking the country’s porous borders, the lack of necessary institutional instruments within the country, as well as the different priorities of the country found in such challenging circumstances, the Afghan Government is not in a position to identify and monitor the presence of migrants in irregular situation.

However, although there are no official figures regarding foreign nationals working irregularly, the MoLSAMD estimates their number to be in the area of thousands and their main areas of employment to include the media, banking, higher education and private companies.137 In April 2012, the MoLSAMD identified 130 foreign nationals working without work permits and handed over them to the relevant law enforcement authorities.138

Regarding irregular immigration routes, the country’s borders to all six neighboring countries are porous and with inefficient border control mechanisms. The special case of circular cross-border migration between Afghanistan and Pakistan is discussed in the following.

B.2.2.4 Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling

Even though there is no any official data on the extent of the phenomenon, Afghanistan is considered to be a country of origin, transit and destination for trans-national trafficking in persons, in addition to internal trafficking, which is believed to be prevalent.139

With regard to internal trafficking, the majority of victims are children trafficked for labour exploitation in carpet factories, brick factories, domestic servitude, forced begging, commercial sexual exploitation, drug smuggling within the country and even as child soldiers for insurgent groups.140 Often traffickers bring villagers to big cities in Afghanistan by using the pretence of high-paying employment opportunities, and then make them subject to either forced labour or forced prostitution.141

140 Ibid.
141 Ibid.
Concerning foreigners victims of trafficking, as in other countries, labour recruiting agencies attract foreign workers with the claim of job opportunities with high salaries in Afghanistan. Upon their arrival in Afghanistan, the victims, predominantly from Pakistan, Tajikistan, China, Kyrgyzstan, India, Iran, Sri Lanka, Philippines and Nepal, are forced into prostitution or forced exploitation.\textsuperscript{142}

There is hardly any data available about Afghanistan as a destination country for human trafficking, because of conceptual confusion between trafficking and other criminal acts such as smuggling, abduction and abuse (due to the synonymous wording for these different cases in Dari); the lack of capacity of the government institutions in combating human trafficking despite the increased political will since the adoption of the Law on Countering Abduction and Human Trafficking/Smuggling in 2008; and as a consequence of the deficient mechanisms for prosecution, protection and prevention.\textsuperscript{143} The little data that exists is from IOM’s programmes of identification and assistance for the victims of trafficking.

Between 2006 and 2007, 115 persons were identified as having been trafficked in the country and assisted by the IOM.\textsuperscript{144} Among the victims, almost in their entirety females (94%), 83 were 25 years old and/or above, 6 were between 18-24 years and 16 were below 18.\textsuperscript{145} With regard to their nationalities, 79% were Chinese, 6% Iranian, 3% Pakistanis and 12% Afghan nationals.\textsuperscript{146} The great majority of these victims were trafficked for the purpose of sexual exploitation, followed by forced labour.\textsuperscript{147} In 2011, 199 victims of trafficking, the majority of whom were boys, were identified and assisted by the IOM.\textsuperscript{148} In the same year, 8 Pakistani victims of trafficking were identified by the relevant Government authorities.\textsuperscript{149}

Afghanistan adopted the “Law Countering Abduction and Human Trafficking” in 2008 prescribing penalties of life imprisonment for sex trafficking and “maximum term” imprisonment for labour trafficking, which in practice is between 8 and 15 years.\textsuperscript{150} However, according to the 2011 Trafficking in Persons Report of the US Department of State, the ‘Elimination of Violence against Women’ (EVAW) Law dated July 2009 can be used to decrease the penalties outlined in Afghanistan’s anti-trafficking law.\textsuperscript{151} The lack of capacity for law enforcement, together with the difficulty in identifying and protecting victims of trafficking, as well as the development of necessary preventive measures are seen as serious deficits despite the existence of the Law.\textsuperscript{152} Furthermore, there is no legislation on the issues of migrant smuggling and data protection.\textsuperscript{153}

\textsuperscript{142} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{143} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{144} Mehlmann, Isabel; “Migration in Afghanistan: A Country Profile 2011”, Maastricht Graduate School of Governance, http://arno.unimaas.nl/show.cgi?fid=24858, p.69
\textsuperscript{145} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{146} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{149} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{151} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{153} Lillesaar, Wiiv: IOM Report on “Migration Management and Its Legal Basis in Afghanistan”,
B3. Emigrants

B3.1 Total Stocks and Flows

Historically Afghanistan has been a country of trade between the East and the West and a key location on the Silk Road trade route. For this reason, migration and mobility has always been an integral part of Afghan living and livelihood. Furthermore, the past 30 years of conflict, insecurity, persecution, environmental hazards, drought and poverty have contributed extensively to the various incentives for emigration. This mix of factors is referred to as the “migration-displacement nexus”, since the classical clear-cut migration categories do not necessarily fit for the Afghan situation. Afghan migrants move because of one or more of the above mentioned reasons, as well as in order to reunite with their families, or they may be subject to human trafficking, or a mixture of all. There is seldom just one reason for migration in a country like Afghanistan and constrained categories need to be revised to be able to meet the demands of Afghan reality.\(^{154}\)

Mixed-migration and circular migration to neighbouring countries, asylum seeking and return have been the main types of movements experienced by Afghanistan nationals since the Soviet invasion in 1979. Due to geographical, social and cultural proximity, Pakistan and Iran are the main target destinations for Afghan migration in terms of cross border migration, refugees and asylum seekers and seasonal work migration. Compared to the millions of Afghans who have either moved permanently or back and forth between the neighbouring countries, migration to western countries has been relatively scarce.

Due to the general lack of national demographic statistics, almost all of the data on Afghan population and migration is provided as estimations by the major international institutions. In general, as the war and conflict dominated the country for almost 30 years, Afghan emigrants have not been recorded as regular or labour migrants, rather as ‘refugee, people in refugee like situations, border migrants and seasonal migrants.’ According to UNHCR, there are around 2.9 million Afghani people live in refugee or refugee-like situations worldwide.\(^{155}\) This figure increased to 3.5 million in 2010 and to further 4.4 million in 2011.\(^{156}\) Altogether, the Afghan community abroad is estimated to add up to over 5 million people.\(^{157}\)

B3.2 Types of Migratory Movements

B3.2.1 Legal Migration

As mentioned earlier, Pakistan and Iran are the main target destinations of Afghan migration. In Iran, migration from Afghanistan to Iran has been registered since the late 19th century, with Afghans visiting Iran as migrant workers, pilgrims and/or merchants.\(^ {158}\) Additionally, the Shia Hazaras of Afghanistan had moved to Iran during the late 19th and early 20th centuries because of the rise of Sunni Pashtuns in Afghanistan and settled there permanently and became a recognised ethnic group under the name of ‘Khavari’.\(^ {159}\) This very long history of migration was up to change in nature with the Soviet invasion in 1979.

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\(^{159}\) Ibid.
Also with Pakistan, due to the long standing historical, cultural and ethnic ties between the two countries, there has been a history of economic migration from Afghanistan to Pakistan well before the Soviet invasion, mainly because of the nature of the border and the presence of tribal communities. More recently, newly educated urban Afghans have increasingly migrated to Pakistan because of the slower pace of the industrialisation process in Afghanistan, compared to its neighbour Pakistan. Considering the emergence, with the time, of long standing social networks between the two countries, it was not surprising that the major migration and refugee flows would head towards Pakistan once Afghanistan became politically unstable.

Specifically regarding labour migration, in Afghanistan there is no any effective mechanism of sending labour migrants abroad at present, though there are ongoing efforts to formulate an effective and functioning policy framework to this end. Based on the existing legislative framework provided by the 2007 Labour Code and the ‘Regulation for Sending Afghan Workers Abroad’, Employment Service Centres (ESCs) have been created in 2008, and bilateral agreements were signed with Etisalat UAE for the Graduate Trainee Induction Program in 2010 as well as a technical labour dispatch protocol with Qatar in 2010. Furthermore, although currently the number of Afghan migrant labourers in Gulf countries is relatively small, the Government of Afghanistan expressed its intention to strengthen its labour base in the region, in order to get the full advantage of employment opportunities there. However, despite these movements, there is a general lack of data available to record the extent and characteristics of the flows.

Regarding student emigration, there have been several scholarship programs either completed or ongoing for Afghan high school graduates run by countries in the region (Pakistan, Iran and India) as well as outside it. A total of 31,000 Afghan students are estimated to have graduated from Pakistani universities in the past years, either self-financed or funded by a scholarship program. In 2012, about 1500 Afghan students have been reported as doing higher degrees at Pakistan’s top universities and some 1,273 Afghan students were reported to be enrolled in one of the madrassas in Pakistan. In addition, also in 2012, the number of Afghan students in India was estimated at around 6,000. On the other hand, with regard to scholarship programmes in Western countries, the US-initiated YES youth exchange program, which began in 2004 by inviting hundreds of Afghan students to the US, was suspended after nearly half of the participating students fled to Canada in order to claim asylum.

The Afghan Government has also been sending 500 high school graduates to Turkish and Indian universities each year. In April 2012, the Afghan Government announced that it will increase this number to 1000 students.

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162 Ibid.
167 Ibid.
B.3.2.2 Asylum and International Protection

Refugees and Asylum Seekers

According to UHCR data, there are 2,664,436 refugees and persons in refugee-like situation and 37,801 asylum seekers from Afghanistan recorded to be living outside their state borders, adding up to a total of 2,702,239 in 2011.168

A table with an overview of the number of worldwide Afghan refugees and persons in refugee-like situations by main country of residence (with more than 100 migrants per country) from 2005 to 2011, is provided in annex 2. As mentioned above, Pakistan and Iran are the main target destinations for Afghan refugees and asylum seekers. The following graph sums up the overall development of outflows of Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran.

![TOTAL AFGHAN REFUGEES WORLDWIDE, IN COMPARISON TO AFGHAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN AND IRAN, 2001-2010](image)

Source: UNHCR SOPD169

Outflows to Pakistan

The first massive Afghan inflows came after the Soviet invasion in 1979 and resulted in the creation of Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees (CAR) under the Federal Government Orders in 1979, with its head office in Islamabad (Chief CARR or CCAR, in short) along with sub-offices in each province of Pakistan, as well as in the establishment of 334 official camps in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Baluchistan and Punjab provinces of Pakistan between 1981-1990. These initial movements have been followed by further flows, triggered by the struggle for the control of Afghanistan among different Mujahedeen groups after the 1989 Soviet pull-out, the Taliban attacks on major Afghan cities and then the complete takeover of Afghanistan by Taliban forces, as well as the US attacks on al-Qaeda and Taliban targets after 9/11.170

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Due to the increasing security concerns in Afghanistan in 2006, the refugee numbers drastically increased roughly with an additional 1 million Afghan refugees in 2007 (see graph below, as well as table in Annex 2).171 However, as the situation became relatively calmer, gradual reductions in the number of refugees were noted during the next few years, with the exception of 2010, when for a short while the number of refugee registrations saw a slight increase. In addition to the official figure given for the registered Afghan refugees, it is estimated that another roughly 1 million Afghans have been living in Pakistan illegally.172

AFGHAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN, 2000-2012

Source: UNHCR, 2013173

Between 1979 and late 2000, the CAR office in Peshawar registered Afghans arriving in Pakistan and issued identity cards known as ‘ration pass’, which was followed by an individual screening and registration period in the camps from August 2001 to January 2002.174 In 2005, a country-wide census of Afghans in Pakistan was conducted by the Government of Pakistan (SAFRON, CCAR, PCO) and UNHCR, in order to collect credible information on Afghan population in Pakistan for planning durable solutions in the future. As a result, 1.7 million ‘Proof of Registration’ (POR) cards with an initial validity period until 31 December 2009 were distributed during 2006-2007 to 2.15 million Afghans who had been registered in the 2005 census.175 The refugee census showed that, in 2005, 57.7% of the total number of 3,049,268 registered Afghan refugees (1,758,860 persons) lived outside of the camps, whereas 42.3% of them lived in the camps (1,290,408 persons).176 Among the registered Afghan refugees, approximately 64% lived in KP, 21% in Balochistan, 11% in Punjab and Islamabad and the remaining 4% lived in other parts of Pakistan.177

177 ‘Afghan Refugees in Pakistan to get new registration cards’, The Express Tribune, op. cit.
According to the census, more than 55% of the Afghan refugee population was below 18 in 2005, suggesting that a large proportion of the Afghan population had most likely been born in Pakistan. The census also revealed that 82.6% of the Afghan refugees declared to have no intention to return. In total there were some 531,710 persons who expressed their intention to return (or 17.4% of the total number of registered refugees), the majority of which were living outside of the camps. (See also section B3.2.5 on Return)

By 2010, the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) of Pakistan in collaboration with UNHCR offered to convert the old PVC-based PoR cards into ‘Secure Cards for Afghan Citizens (SCAC),’ a model of ‘smart cards’ with updated identification features. The Government opened 11 centres all over the country for processing the applications and 44 centres for issuing the cards (22 in KP, 12 in Balochistan, 6 in Islamabad, 2 in Karachi, 1 in Lahore and 1 in Sargodha). Serving as proof of the legal right to stay in the country for the bearer of the card, these cards have vital importance for Afghan refugees against possible detention or deportation situations. In the case of the arrest of a PoR card holder, UNHCR has a 24-hour hotline for intervention. For unregistered Afghans and other nationals, whenever it is needed, UNHCR either prepares an asylum seeker certificate or a protection letter, which is generally respected by the Government authorities. Furthermore, the Pakistani Government has also initiated the establishment of 17 centres in order to distribute birth certificates to Afghan children, who will also be recognised by the Afghan Government. Through these certificates, which are their main source of identification, Afghan refugee children will have better access to basic services such as health and education.

With regard to the right to work, Afghan refugees are not granted the National Aliens Registration Authority (NARA) cards, which allow access to the labour market. As a consequence, it is estimated that most of the Afghan refugees have been working with less than the minimum wage level of Pakistan in one of the informal sectors such as agriculture or mining. This situation has been tolerated despite the legal prohibition on the hiring of illegal labourers under the Foreigners Act. For the ones running small businesses, they need a Pakistani partner whose name will be necessary in every step of formal processes, such as for holding immovable property or owning a business. For instance, in NWFP, even though refugees do not hold the legal right to own a truck, they dominate the transportation sector in that area. In April 2008, Pakistan ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which recognises the general human right to work.

179 Ibid., p.7
180 Ibid.
182 The Express Tribune, 22 September 2010, op. cit.
183 Anjum, Shakeel (2010), op. cit.
185 Ibid.
186 The Express Tribune, 22 September 2010, op. cit.
188 Ibid.
189 Ibid
190 Ibid
In Pakistan, education is open to all Afghans and the Government of Pakistan supports Afghan schools in camps with lessons in Dari and Pashtu languages, where Afghan curriculum and culture has been taught, in an attempt to facilitate the returns to Afghanistan in the future.\textsuperscript{192} Notwithstanding, the majority of Afghans in Pakistan is illiterate and a part of this huge refugee population never went to school.\textsuperscript{193} Moreover, the Government of Pakistan closed down all the schools for Afghan refugee children in the KP province in March 2006, because of budget constraints. However, upon the request of the local Afghan refugee community, these schools were re-opened in April 2006 on a self-help basis and necessary funding has been provided later, in October 2008, by a foreign donor country (Germany).\textsuperscript{194} Furthermore, it must be noted that Non-Afghan refugees/asylum-seekers and Afghans in urban settlements do not have access to public schools, instead they must send their children to private schools.\textsuperscript{195}

To the Islamic Republic of Iran

Similar to the migration movement to Pakistan, Afghan citizens started to flee to Iran after the Soviet invasion by settling continuously until 1990 amounting to almost 3 million refugees.\textsuperscript{196} The open door refugee policy of Iran during 1980s allowed the arrival of Afghans to this country and also be granted refugee status on a prima facie basis with the distribution of “blue cards” confirming their status as mohajerin or people seeking exile on religious grounds.\textsuperscript{197} However, since Iran regards its hospitality towards these Afghan refugees as religious and humanitarian duty rather than legal obligation as a signatory of 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol, it did not accord the Afghans arriving in its own country the status of refugees.\textsuperscript{198}

The blue registration cards distributed by Iran provided all Afghan refugees access to basic health care and social services, free education, adult literacy training, and employment opportunities in one of the 16 designated occupations,\textsuperscript{199} in addition to the generous subsidies on petrol, gas, electricity and basic food items.\textsuperscript{200} However, this situation began to change slowly after the final withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan. “Blue registration cards” were not distributed anymore and a profound repatriation program was initiated by the Iranian government in 1992.\textsuperscript{201} Two track policies were followed by the Iranian Government since then: the prevention of further inflows and the encouragement of repatriations. To this end, there have been attempts to document and register Afghans on Iranian territory in order to facilitate repatriation, to reduce education and health services to Afghans, as well as to restrict employment opportunities.\textsuperscript{202} In December 1992, Iran signed a three-year repatriation agreement with the government of Afghanistan and UNHCR by also issuing temporary registration cards to undocumented or newly arriving Afghan refugees.\textsuperscript{203} The returns of some 600,000 Afghans from Iran, half of this under the assisted repatriation program throughout 1993, came to a standstill because of new turmoil, civil war, in the lands of Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{204}

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\textsuperscript{193} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{194} Commissionerate Afghan Refugees (CAR) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa/Peshawar. Education. http://carkpk.org/projects.php?project_id=4#pahse3

\textsuperscript{195} US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, World Refugee Survey 2009: Pakistan, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{196} Koepke, Bruce; “The Situation of Afghans in the Islamic Republic of Iran Nine Years After the Overthrow of the Taliban Regime in Afghanistan”, Middle East Institute, 4 February 2011 http://www.refugeecooperation.org/publications/afghanistan/pdf/03_koepke.pdf, p.1


\textsuperscript{198} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{199} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{200} Koepke, Bruce; “The Situation of Afghans in the Islamic Republic of Iran Nine Years After the Overthrow of the Taliban Regime in Afghanistan”, Middle East Institute, 4 February 2011 http://www.refugeecooperation.org/publications/afghanistan/pdf/03_koepke.pdf, p.2

\textsuperscript{201} BAA/CGVSRA (2010): Afghans in Iran and Pakistan. A joint report by experts from Austria and Belgium, op. cit.


\textsuperscript{203} Ibid.

As of 1994, new flows of Afghan refugees began to pour into Iran. This situation continued until 2002, when the Taliban regime was overthrown and the Afghanistan Interim Authority (AIA) was created. Iranian authorities began to hold comprehensive registration exercises in 2000 (Amayesh), and, starting from 2003, renewable registration cards also known as ‘Amayesh cards’ have been issued by the Bureau of Aliens and Foreign Immigrants’ Affairs (BAFIA). Then the assisted repatriation program of UNHCR for the Afghans in Iran scheduled to take place within one year began with extensions until March 2005 and March 2006. According to September 2004 data, one million Afghans are reported as returned under the repatriation programs, whereas 568,000 Afghans returned without getting any assistance. In late 2005, UNHCR estimates that there were 716,000 Afghan refugees who had been living in mostly poorer neighbourhoods of the major Iranian cities (only 2% live in camps) by getting relatively little assistance from the international community. With the above mentioned figure, Iran became the country hosting the third largest refugee population in the world.

In 2012 Iran started a regularisation programme for undocumented Afghans, which meant moving away from an irregular status to a labour migrant status. Thousands of Afghans applied for Afghan passports and Iranian visas either in Iran or in Afghanistan and received a regular status in the country. However, currently deportations of undocumented Afghans from Iran, especially of unaccompanied children, continue to be an issue of concern.

Afgan Refugees and People in Refugee Like Situations in Iran, 1979 - 2010

Source: UNHCR SOPD 2011

205 Koepke, Bruce; “The Situation of Afghans in the Islamic Republic of Iran Nine Years After the Overthrow of the Taliban Regime in Afghanistan”, Middle East Institute, 4 February 2011 http://www.refugeecooperation.org/publications/afghanistan/pdf/03_koepke.pdf, pp.2-3
206 Ibid.
207 Ibid.
208 Ibid.
209 Ibid.
Afghan refugees have been among the largest such group in Europe since the late 1980s. The highest influx in refugee inflows was measured in 1990 and 2001, when almost 51,000 asylum applications were received. Since 2001 these numbers significantly decreased until 2005 counting only 7,482 applications, but growing again until 2009 up to 22,696 applicants.211

**AFGHAN ASYLUM APPLICATIONS IN THE EU 27, +CH, N, LI, ICE 1990-2010**

During the past 20 years, a total of 334,673 Afghan people sought refuge in Europe, applying for asylum mostly in Germany, UK, Netherlands, Austria and Denmark. These countries together received almost three quarters of all Afghan asylum applications in Europe (see graph in annex).213 There are great differences between the countries in the acceptance of Afghan asylum seekers. The refugee status recognition rate is especially high in Austria and France where 30% of the cases the refugee title was granted.214

**RECOGNITION RATE “REFUGEE STATUS” OF AFGHAN APPLICANTS IN EUROPE, 2009**


213 Ibid.

214 Ibid.

215 Ibid.
Unaccompanied Minors

The number of unaccompanied and separated children of Afghan origin applying for asylum in Europe saw a sharp increase over the recent years, and due to the high number of risks they face, they have been increasingly recognised as a particularly vulnerable group.

According to Eurostat, asylum applications from Afghan unaccompanied minors increased by two thirds between 2008 and 2009, rising from 3,835 to 6,350 applications in the EU 27+4 (Norway, Switzerland, Iceland and Liechtenstein). In 2009, the largest group of unaccompanied minors seeking protection in Europe came from Afghanistan, representing 38% of all applications from minors. The main receiving countries for Afghan minor applicants were Sweden, Great Britain, Norway and Germany. It is likely that these numbers reflect the difficult security situation in Afghanistan during those years. In 2010, the applications dropped again to 4,425.

The age distribution among the 4,600 unaccompanied minors from Afghanistan representing 23% of the overall asylum applications from Afghanistan in the EU-27 registered in 2009 were 365 children aged between 0 – 13 years, 1,690 applicants aged 14-15 years and 2,010 aged 16 – 17 years. In Sweden and Denmark, more than 40% of the asylum applicants from Afghanistan were unaccompanied minors while the share of the unaccompanied minor asylum seekers was being reported 36% in Denmark and 25% in the Netherlands.

Overall, the recognition rates of applications from Afghan unaccompanied minors are significantly higher than the recognition rates of applications from adult Afghan asylum seekers. UNHCR gives the following recognition rates: Finland (100%), Norway (99%) and Sweden (90%), Germany (77%), the UK (73%) and Switzerland (53%).

Source: Eurostat 2011

217 Ibid., p.31
218 Ibid., p.31
219 Eurostat (2011) Asylum applicants considered to be unaccompanied minors by citizenship, age and sex Annual data (rounded), http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do
221 Ibid.
222 Ibid.
223 Eurostat (2011) Asylum applicants considered to be unaccompanied minors by citizenship, age and sex Annual data (rounded), http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do
B.3.2.3 Irregular Migration

There are two main ways in which migrants become irregular. They may either enter the country in a way that does not obey the law or, although they may have crossed the border legally, once inside the territory of the country, their legal status may change as a result of personal decision or as a consequence of changes in the laws regulating the migration process. The difference being that, in the first case, people may find themselves in an irregular situation from the first moment in the country, while in the second case, a person who has previously held a legal reason to be in the country becomes irregular at a given point in time. Similarly, a person in an irregular situation, may become “regular” at another point in time, when and if there is a change in the legal regulations governing the migration process in that specific country. There is no reliable data on the number of irregular immigrants in Afghanistan, due to the inherent difficulty of counting persons that may be found in this situation. This section presents the data related to irregular migration that is available in Afghanistan, while highlighting the limitations that such data may have.

Nearly one million Afghan migrants are estimated to be living in Pakistan without any legal documentation, 400,000 of whom in Peshawar alone. This has been source of tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan governments on various occasions.\(^{224}\) The repeated warnings of Pakistan on sending these persons back to Afghanistan are dealt with at the highest possible level in Afghanistan, given the current assessment of limited absorption capacity of the authorities themselves.

In Iran, estimations of the Iranian Government put the number of undocumented Afghans living in the country roughly between 1.5 to 2 million.\(^{225}\) Of these, around 340,000–480,000 live in the Tehran province alone.\(^{226}\) The majority of the undocumented migrants are young single Afghan males, originating from across all of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces where there is high unemployment. They intend to leave Afghanistan temporarily (mostly for one to two years) and come to Iran for a short stay in order to work as unskilled manual labourers in the construction, brick-making, stone-cutting and agriculture sectors.\(^{227}\)

In the Gulf region it is estimated that more than 100,000 Afghan labour migrants are working irregularly, most of them using fake Pakistani passports or visas.\(^{228}\) Also in the U.A.E, more than 50,000 Afghan workers using Pakistani passports are hired to be employed in different sectors.\(^{229}\) Afghan irregular migrants generally work as unskilled manual labourers in low-paid sectors. For instance, in Pakistan and in Iran, they work in the construction, brick-making, stone-cutting and agriculture sectors.

In Europe, according to Eurostat data, the number of Afghan nationals found to be illegally present in the EU Member States (and Norway) was 34,065 in 2012, a 25% decrease from the previous year (45,480 in 2011).\(^{230}\) The table in annex 2 shows the number of Afghan citizens found to be illegally present in Europe from 2008 to 2012.

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\(^{225}\) Koepke, Bruce; “The Situation of Afghans in the Islamic Republic of Iran Nine Years After the Overthrow of the Taliban Regime in Afghanistan”, Middle East Institute, 4 February 2011 http://www.refugeecooperation.org/publications/afghanistan/pdf/03_koepke.pdf, p.2

\(^{226}\) Ibid., p.5

\(^{227}\) Ibid., p.2, p.5

\(^{228}\) Overfeld, Guenter and Zumot, Michael; “Economic Development and Security for Afghanistan: Increasing Jobs and Income with the Help of Gulf States”, The EastWest Institute, January 2010, p.4

\(^{229}\) Ibid.

Moreover, 1,500 Afghans have been refused entry along the borders of European countries between 2008 and 2010, the majority of whom were rejected along Italy’s border. Within the same time frame, other 140,940 Afghans have been apprehended inland within the European Union (including Norway and Switzerland), the majority of whom had stayed irregularly in France, Greece, the UK and Austria.

Afghans ranked among the top nationalities both with regard to the illegal border crossings and illegal stays in Europe. According to the data provided through interviews during the Frontex Joint Operation Poseidon Land 2011, it was identified that more than 60% of Afghan migrants apprehended in Greece were refugees residing in Iran either legally or illegally.

According to the data on the website of Frontex, Afghans trying to illegally enter into the EU have used primarily the Eastern Mediterranean Route (Afghanistan is rates first, with 19,618 persons), Central Mediterranean Route (Afghanistan rates third with 2,274 persons) and Western Balkan Route (Afghanistan is ranks first, with 981 persons). Greece (Evros) is the main gateway to Europe.

Since the Afghan-Iranian border crosses several deserts and marshlands in the western provinces of Heart, Farah and Nimruz in Afghanistan, irregular emigrants use several ways to enter into Iran. However, since Iran has serious concerns at its eastern border because of drug traffickers (more than half of opium is being smuggled across Afghan-Iranian border) and armed groups infiltrating into its borders, irregular migrants crossing that border face a constant risk of being while trying to enter into Iran.

For Pakistan, Chaman and Torkhum are the preferred land border crossings for Afghan migrants to get into Pakistan irregularly. Moreover, both for Pakistan and Iran, irregular cross-border migration on circular/temporary basis is very common (see section below).

Informal circular migration between Pakistan and Afghanistan

A special case is represented by the issue of informal cross-border migration between Pakistan and Afghanistan for economic, social and service-receiving purposes, which has become an important issue in recent years. Within the framework of a study commissioned by UNHCR, a total of 2,023 interviews were conducted in 2008 with migrants crossing the Torkham and Spin Boldak borders between Afghanistan and Pakistan, in both directions. The interviews reveal the main reasons for travelling to/from Pakistan, which are summed up in the following graph.

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232 Ibid.
In general, cross border movements involve a mix of motivations, including opportunities for employment, small-scale trade, visits of relatives or friends, as well as reasons related to education or health. Furthermore, the study highlights local perceptions of the current Afghan-Pakistani border as an imposing, artificial crossing dividing two major tribes that live along the border region on both sides, which helps to explain the reluctance of the population to accept it as state line.

The study also revealed that official records substantially under-represent cross-border flows. For instance, while on a given day the independent counting showed 23,934 exits, the official records showed only 138 exits for the same period of time.

**B.3.2.4 Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling**

In addition of being transit and destination country, Afghanistan is also source country of trafficking in men, women and children. Trafficking of Afghans, takes place mostly to neighbouring countries such as Pakistan, Iran and India but also to Greece, the Gulf States and possibly Southeast Asian countries for the purpose of sexual exploitation, forced marriage, forced labour, forced begging, drug smuggling, child soldier, domestic servitude and organ removal are the facts known by the Afghan authorities.

It is considered that sometimes families act as traffickers. However, no data is available on the extent of human trafficking from or through Afghanistan. It is believed that that one of the routes being used by traffickers transporting Iranian women from Iran to Pakistan is transiting through Afghanistan.
With regard to smuggling, even though the risks are very high, those who can afford to pay huge amounts ranging up to more than $20,000, depending on the destination country/city and smuggling type, try to get smuggled to Western countries in Europe, North America and Australia, while those who can afford to pay only a few hundred dollars try to get smuggled to neighbouring countries, such as Iran and Pakistan.\textsuperscript{242}

Last but not least, there are serious data problem in both issues not only because of inadequate legal and policy tools but, also due to terminological confusions, as ‘darashkhas’ means both trafficking and smuggling in Dari language.\textsuperscript{243}

**Unaccompanied minors**

A recent UNICEF study on unaccompanied minors offered some glimpses into the situation and characteristics of this group.\textsuperscript{244} According to the study, the hope for a better future drives children to western countries and gives them then strength to survive the hazardous journey towards Europe; at the same time they often have little or no education and feel insecure about their future in the country.\textsuperscript{245}

As a result of the interviews, are several routes were identified from Afghanistan to Europe.

**UNACCOMPANIED MINORS SMUGGLED TO EUROPE (ROUTES)**

Source: UNHCR\textsuperscript{246}

\textsuperscript{242} “Afghan asylum bids at 10-year high, human smuggling rife as troops begin to leave”, Associated Press, 24 January 2012, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refdaily?pass=463ef2123&id=4f1fa6645


\textsuperscript{245} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{246} Ibid., p.20
The Southern route starts leading through Iran (two main crossings: Islam Qala and Zaranj) towards Turkey and into the EU by Greece, and from there continues into Italy-France - Belgium - Denmark - Sweden – Norway or Italy – France – Belgium – Germany – Netherlands - Norway, or they take the northern route through Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan, into Russia and then either towards Scandinavia (Sweden-Norway) or into Europe (Hungary – Austria – Germany – Denmark – Sweden – Norway) through Ukraine. The destination country is not always defined when leaving Afghanistan and may change along the journey route through further information about the country or through the smuggler who decides the route and the destination country.

When deciding that their child would leave towards Europe, families hire a broker who engages a smuggler and holds a so-called ‘handshake agreement’ with them for three attempts in general. Accordingly, if the child reaches the destination but then is immediately deported, the family still pays because the agreement is based on reaching the destination country. Nowadays it is possible to find brokers in almost every city of Afghanistan.

The costs of smuggling are very high and demand a great deal of financial indebtedness from the families of the children, and the children themselves, placing them in a high risk of becoming victims of trafficking in order to pay off their debt. According to the same UNICEF study, smuggling costs may vary between $7,000 and $20,000. Families take on credits and sell land or housing to be able to afford a down payment and the children remain indebted to their families, trying to make a living in western countries and support their families at home.

### B.3.2.5 Return migration

With the overthrown of Taliban regime, the return of large numbers of Afghan refugees living in Pakistan and Iran started. However, it is important to note the difference between forced, assisted and voluntary return migration as well as deportation. In the case of Afghans returning to Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban regime, it is not always clear whether they did do voluntarily, because this decision has been affected by a number of different factors. Indeed, many returnees who had lived in refugee camps for the past decade or two have been longing to return home; but at the same time refugees in Pakistan and Iran had also concerns about the stability of the security situation, Afghanistan’s capacity to absorb the returnees, as well as the conditions under which their homes were found (if at all) after the years of wars that have destroyed housing, land and infrastructure.

#### A. From Pakistan

After the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan and till date (2002-2013), UNHCR assisted 3,842,496 million Afghans to return from Pakistan to their homeland. In 2002 alone, the voluntary return of 1.5 million Afghans in the course of that year marked the single largest refugee return in the world since 1972. By 2007, it was estimated that an additional 1 million Afghans had returned independently, without UNHCR assistance.

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247 Ibid., p. 20
248 Ibid., p.6, p.57
249 Ibid., p.15
250 Ibid., p.16
251 Ibid., p.16
252 Ibid., p.53
253 Ibid., p.56
255 UNHCR Pakistan Factsheet, September 2013, op. cit., p.1
257 Idem
### UNHCR Assisted Returns from Pakistan to Afghanistan, 2002-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Value</td>
<td>1,569,248</td>
<td>375,526</td>
<td>424,477</td>
<td>461,118</td>
<td>143,019</td>
<td>365,663</td>
<td>274,200</td>
<td>51,290</td>
<td>109,383</td>
<td>52,096</td>
<td>83,423</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: UNHCR, 2013*

After the massive repatriation program which took place between 2002 and 2005, there were still around 2 million registered Afghans in Pakistan. Since then, the poor prospects for rapid economic and social improvements together with the persistent security concerns in Afghanistan have resulted in a decline in the return rates since 2007.

Another important fact to take into account was that, in 2003, the Government of Pakistan started to close down the temporary refugee camps, leading to a dramatic decrease in the number of camps and, later in 2004, the old refugee camps in the tribal regions nearby the Afghan border have also been closed, because of security concerns, namely the necessity of eliminating safe havens for militants crossing the border. The refugees living in these camps were given a choice between relocation elsewhere in Pakistan or voluntary repatriation to Afghanistan.

The closure of the refugee camps became a serious issue between Afghanistan and Pakistan over the years, due to the fact that these closures have mostly been perceived as a step to accelerate the repatriation process despite the still existing security concerns. However, after several suspensions, Pakistan succeeded to close most of the camps over the last decade. In 2006, 145 camps remained out of the 334 camps opened between 1981-1990, or the 203 camps still found on its territory in early 2000s. In 2008, it was recorded that more than 80 refugee camps remained open in the country, including 71 in KP, 12 in Balochistan and 1 in the Punjab provinces of Pakistan.

Even though the intention of completing the repatriation of Afghan refugees in Pakistan by the end of 2009 was voiced by several related ministries and authorities of Pakistan, it was not put into practice. In August 2008, the Government of Pakistan announced its decision to extend the validity of the PoR cards until 30 December 2012 under the Tripartite Agreement between Afghanistan-Pakistan-UNHCR, referring to the ongoing insecurity and low absorption capacity in Afghanistan. The Afghans who arrived after 2007 were not deemed eligible to obtain PoR cards, and those who left the country lost the rights provided by these cards. Since then, the expiry date was extended once again extended until June 2013, and recently the new Pakistani Minister for States and Frontier Regions announced that the right of PoR-holding Afghan refugees to reside in Pakistan will be further extended until 31 December 2015.

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264 Australian Government Refugee Review Tribunal, Country Advice: Afghanistan, p.4
267 “UNHCR welcomes extension of stay for Afghan refugees in Pakistan”, UNHCR Briefing Note, 2 July 2013, op. cit.; UNHCR Pakistan Factsheet, September 2013, op. cit., p.2
B. From Iran

The number of returns from Iran has been on a constant increase since 2008. This increase is explained with the increasing pressures by the Iranian Government, especially in economic terms and the cut of subsidies on basic goods and services, which had been given in the previous years.268

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNHCR ASSISTED RETURNS FROM IRAN, 2002-2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>376,247</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNHCR SOPD 2012269

According to UNHCR 2009 data, the following table gives information with regard to age and gender characteristics of the returnees.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RETURNEES ACCORDING TO GENDER AND AGE, MARCH 2002 – END JANUARY 2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AGE GROUP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mehlmann270

The Ministry of Refugees and Repatriations states on its website that in 2010 there were 378,253 returnees, whereby two thirds of this return migration had been forcefully induced.271

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268 UNHCR (2011) Voluntary returns to Afghanistan - over 60,000 this year, Briefing Notes, http://www.unhcr.org/4eaa8ad99.html
REPATRIATIONS IN 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REPATRIATION DURING THE YEAR 2010</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>110,370</td>
<td>voluntary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>17,283</td>
<td>voluntary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Countries</td>
<td>6,850</td>
<td>voluntary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forced Return</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pakistan, Iran and other countries)</td>
<td>243,750</td>
<td>forced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>378 253</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MoRR 2011\textsuperscript{272}

Once Afghan migrants return home, it does not necessarily indicate the end of the migration process. Many Afghan refugees who returned through the voluntary return programs initiated by the Pakistani and Iranian governments and UNHCR inspect the situation in Afghanistan themselves before deciding to stay. This suggests the occurrence of informal circular migration processes.

A. From Europe

Return migration from European countries does not compete with the wave of regional returnees. Yet the fact that these flows have become increasingly involuntarily, turns the situation into a rather challenging one.\textsuperscript{273}

Immigration policies have become stricter in Western societies over the past years, especially in Europe. By the end of 2006, the Afghan refugee population was estimated at 73,000 in Europe and 36,000 in North America and Australia.\textsuperscript{274} By 2009, 20,455 Afghan refugees remained in the Europe; for 2010 Eurostat reported a slightly higher number of returnees, 20,590.\textsuperscript{275}

In 2003-2006, UNHCR monitored the return of approximately 5,000 Afghans from Western countries and IOM monitored around 4,000. According to UNHCR, only 38% of them were forcibly removed during this period. Between 2008 and 2010, 12,710 were ordered to leave the EU 27 including Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein, both voluntary and forced. The strongest year of Afghan deportations from European countries was in 2009, with an estimated 6,745 returnees, largely from the United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{276} In 2011, return decisions for 27,274 Afghan citizens, were issued by the Member States excluding France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden.\textsuperscript{277} In the same year, 3,180 Afghan citizens were subjected to forced return.\textsuperscript{278}

\textsuperscript{274} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{275} Eurostat 2011, Asylum and new asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex Annual aggregated data (rounded), http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do
\textsuperscript{276} Eurostat 2011, Third country nationals returned following an order to leave - Annual data (rounded), http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/setupDown-loads.do
\textsuperscript{278} Ibid., p.58
B4. Migration and Development

B4.1 Afghan Diasporas

There are no accurate numbers regarding Afghan diasporas. Indicatively, as reported in the Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011, the most recent World Bank estimate for the total stock of Afghan emigrants is of 2.35 million (2010 data). However, as in the case of other basic indicators for Afghanistan, due to the general lack of reliable aggregate data, caution is needed when using this figure, as it is believed that the real figures are much higher (see section B3.1 on total emigrant stocks and flows).

AFGHAN IMMIGRATION FLOWS TO OECD COUNTRIES BETWEEN 1990 AND 2007
(BASED ON OECD 2009 DATA)

Source: MGSoG


Since the biggest Afghan displacements have taken place regionally, the Afghan diaspora outside of Iran and Pakistan is comparatively small. However, this relatively small number of Afghans emigrants to Europe, North America, Australia and the Gulf region in the 1980s and 1990s is very significant for Afghanistan, due to two reasons: firstly, the amount of remittances that they have been sending to their relatives living either in Afghanistan or in a neighboring country such as Iran and Pakistan, and secondly, their comparatively higher level of education and skills. These few hundred thousands of emigrants most commonly belong to wealthy, well-educated and middle class urban families from the Tajik and Pashto communities, and they are considered to be the main source of remittances to the country.

In comparison, Afghan communities living in neighbouring states such as Pakistan and Iran are predominantly from rural areas and less educated. Most commonly, they are shopkeepers, bazaar craftsmen, small farmers, village artisans and occasionally civil servants. Often they are living in refugees camps or in precarious situations, and are to a large extent dependent on international assistance and remittances received from other family members.

### B4.2 Remittances Sent by Afghan Nationals Living Abroad

The general lack of reliable aggregate data makes difficult the analysis of remittance trends and their implications for development. The little information that exists on remittances sent by Afghan diasporas is calculated based on various fragmented estimations and small scale studies. As such, although it serves as an indication, it cannot be considered to be fully reliable, nor to reflect the true extent of remittance flows. Moreover, it is believed that a significant percentage of remittances are transferred to Afghanistan via informal channels (hawala) that are not monitored and therefore not included in formal transfer statistics.

The World Bank, provides information on remittance trends in Afghanistan only from 2008 onwards. The following table sums up the available estimates regarding annual migrant remittance flows to Afghanistan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANNUAL MIGRANT REMITTANCE INFLOWS - AFGHANISTAN (US$ MILLION)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: WB, 2013

Note: * Data not available.

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For Afghanistan data is available only from 2008 onwards.
On the other hand, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) reports that, in 2006, remittances to Afghanistan amounted to an estimated $2.5 billion, the equivalent of 30% of the country’s GDP in that year.285

With regard to the use of remittances, a 2008 study on Afghan migrants in Iran commissioned by UNHCR and ILO (Nassim Majidi of Altai Consulting) found that, for more than a third of recipient households in Afghanistan, the wages remitted by family members working in Iran was their exclusive source of income, while for an additional third of recipients remittances represented more than three quarters of their household income. Being such a valuable source of household income, remittances are primarily used for consumption oriented expenditures in order to meet either daily needs and secondly for investing in small business activities.

However, seen from a different perspective, if the population at large is considered and not just migrant workers, then the picture regarding the remit of remittances changes significantly. The 2011 Migration and Development Afghanistan survey found that only 14 out of the total 2,005 households that were surveyed reported receiving remittances from someone living abroad. On the other hand, 115 households reported receiving remittances from a household member living elsewhere in Afghanistan and approximately 3% of the households reported further remitting to other households in Afghanistan the money they had initially received (“chain remittances”).

B5. Institutional and Policy Framework Governing Migration

B5.1 Overview of Recent Migration Policy Developments at the National Level

This section briefly discusses recent policy developments that impact on migration management in Afghanistan, particularly with regard to refugees, trafficking in persons and labour migration. This section complements the relevant information included under each section of the Country Report, respectively. In addition, an overview of key domestic legislation is presented in Annex 1.

The necessity to develop a comprehensive national migration policy has been raised as a serious issue by the Afghan Government authorities on different occasions. For instance, the Presidential Decree 45 which was signed on 26 July 2012 also underlines this necessity and entitles the MoRR to work on this issue (see details in the table on domestic legal framework in annex 1).

For the purpose of creating such a policy, coordination among relevant ministries is highly important, notably among the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation (MoRR), the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyred and Disabled (MoLSAMD), the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Ministry of Education (MoE), the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH), the Ministry of Borders and Tribal Affairs (MoBTA) and the Ministry of Interior (MoI). However, despite the awareness of this need also from the part of authorities themselves, given the general lack of consensus on how to move forward in this regard, there have not been any solid developments to this end.

On the other hand, discussions among the Afghan Government authorities and a wide array of stakeholders revolving around the MDGs in the country resulted in the creation of the ‘Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy’ (I-ANDS), which was approved at the London Conference in 2006. The subsequent ‘Afghanistan National Development Strategy’ (ANDS) of 2008 was created around three pillars, namely security, governance and socio-economic development, and it covers 17 sectors, including issues related to refugees, returnees and IDPs. Later in 2009, as the Afghan Government recognised the limited progress with respect to the ANDS 2008, in order to meet these challenges, it decided to develop the ‘National Priority Programmes’ (NPPs) among the cluster ministries working in the same or related sectors. The NPPs were approved at the Kabul Conference in 2010.

Specifically regarding the situation of Afghan refugees in the neighbouring countries, quadripartite consultations among Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan and UNHCR were initiated in 2011, which resulted in a new strategy paper known as the ‘Regional Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees’ (SSAR). The Strategy was introduced in the ‘International Conference on the Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees to Support Voluntary Repatriation, Sustainable Reintegration and Assistance to Host Countries’, which took place on 2-3 May 2012 in Geneva, and was co-hosted by Switzerland and UNHCR. This is considered to be a significant step towards moving forward from the status-quo in this regard, by paying attention to the different concerns and priorities of each of the three countries: for Afghanistan – to facilitate the successful reintegration of Afghan refugees; for Iran – to provide sustainable returns to Afghanistan; and for Pakistan – to repatriate Afghan refugees as well as to be assisted as host community of refugees.

As a follow-up to its pledge in 2011, the MoRR prepared a draft ‘Refugee Law for Afghanistan’ at the end of 2012, as well as agreeing to develop a national policy on IDPs aimed at preventing displacement, responding to needs and providing sustainable durable solutions for displaced people.

Currently, there are plans to establish an Afghan Migration Board, comprising of high-level representatives of ministries and other government authorities working in the area of migration and to be chaired by the Vice-President. It shall act as an advisory body strengthening inter-ministerial cooperation.

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### B5.2 Institutional Framework

The key institutional actors involved in migration management in Afghanistan are summed-up in the following table:292

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTOR</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Interior (MoI)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation (MoRR)</td>
<td>The MoRR is the key policy unit in the migration field in Afghanistan. According to its mission, the Ministry is entitled to deal with every aspect of refugee and IDP issues. However, the capacity of the MoRR is still not adequate in terms of setting policy framework, planning and coordinating activities in this area, due to several interrelated factors such as the poorly developed current system and lack of sufficient human capacity. MoRR staff are present at all five voluntary repatriation centres in Afghanistan, play an active role in identifying and assisting the most vulnerable and are active in the development of policy and implementation of sustainable refugee reintegration activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultative Group on Returnees and IDPs</td>
<td>The Consultative Group on Returnees and IDPs was created in order to assist the MoRR in its work of coordinating and facilitating the return and reintegration of refugees and IDPs, as well as to provide support to other relevant ministries (such as the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development-MRRD and Ministry of Urban Development-MoUD), in the area of reintegration. In addition, the Consultative Group is intended to act as focal point to UNHCR in providing necessary information and operational support. Lastly, it supports other UN agencies and International Organisations (UNAMA, UNICEF, UNDP, WFP, IOM) in their expertise areas, as well as local and international NGOs on the implementation side.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyred and Disabled (MoLSAMD)</td>
<td>The MoLSAMD has responsibility in all issues of social protection of refugees and unaccompanied minors. It is mandated to work on labour affairs, social protection and welfare and providing services for persons with disabilities and families of martyrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National IDP Task Force</td>
<td>The task force, which is co-led by the MoRR and UNHCR, has been registering all IDPs within the country through Provincial Departments of Refugees and Repatriation (DORRs) of the Ministry in all 34 provinces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA)</td>
<td>In addition to having a leading role in negotiating and concluding bilateral and tripartite agreements, the MoFA deals with all issues regarding Afghan refugees in neighbouring countries. Recently, this Ministry has also assumed a leading coordinating role when it comes to inter-agency cooperation in the area of migration in the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD)</td>
<td>The MRRD deals specifically with the issues of social and economic welfare of the returnees, as well as the economic development of the areas/villages where they are living.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Borders and Tribal Affairs (MoBTA)</td>
<td>This Ministry has the responsibility of coordinating tribal affairs along the borders and of promoting the rights of minority tribes by integrating them into education and other social sectors. It is mandated to facilitate the resolution of disputes between tribes and ethnic groups, with a view to ensure national unity.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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292 This list is non-exhaustive.
With regard to inter-institutional cooperation, the 2008-2013 ‘Afghanistan National Development Strategy’ (ANDS) makes prescriptions for more involvement of relevant ministries such as MoFA and the MRRD, MoLSAMD, Mol, MCN, MD, MoUD, MoE, MoPH, MoHUD, as well as of provincial authorities, in addition to the international organisations active in the field.\(^{293}\)

In addition, it must be emphasised that, in Afghanistan, UN agencies and other international organisations, together with local and international NGOs, have considerable importance in the policy planning as well as in the implementation process. Regarding cooperation with NGOs active in Afghanistan, the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR) plays an important role as one of the major NGO coordination bodies. ACBAR, as an Afghan national NGO, has 114 members in total (69 international, 45 local) currently. As the NGO coordination body, ACBAR facilitates coordination of foreign humanitarian aid.

In addition to ACBAR, other NGO Coordination Bodies include: ANCB (Afghan NGO Coordination Bureau), AWN (Afghan Women’s Network), SWABAC (Southern and Western Afghanistan and Balochistan Association for Coordination), ACSF (Afghan Civil Society Forum), CSHRN (Civil Society Human Rights Network), TJCG (Transitional Justice Coordination Group) and CSDC (Civil Society Development Center).

NGOs (via the NGO Coordinating Body) and INGOs (there is no coordinating body for the INGOs active in Afghanistan) are consulted by the MoRR and other ministries. Regular coordination meetings are held once a month among the relevant Afghan Ministries, ACBAR and INGOs in Kabul. For the INGOs located outside of Kabul, provincial directorates of the MoRR act as contact points. In the recent years, coordination between the MoRR and INGOs has improved through the efforts and willingness of the Afghan Government authorities to allow them to play a bigger role in decision-making. The general tendency is for each INGO to inform the ministry and ask for comments and approval for their projects under development. The MoRR holds the right of rejection, but so far there are no records of any project proposal being rejected by the MoRR. In addition, the National IDP Task Force joins once a month the meetings organised under the chairmanship of the MoRR.

**B5.3. Regional and International Cooperation**

**International**


According to the MoRR, no readmission agreement has been signed so far due to the current difficult circumstances in the country, especially taking into account the ambiguity in the post-2014 period.

The Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) is a platform where Afghanistan is participating actively at global level.

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Regional

In relation with its signature to the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, Afghanistan has signed several tripartite agreements on the return of Afghan refugees with neighbouring countries, EU countries, Norway and Australia, including the UNHCR as a third party. Tripartite agreements signed with neighbouring countries are the main denominators for future cooperation in the regional scale. In this context, it can be assessed that more confidence-building is necessary in order to facilitate and further the dialogue among the neighbouring countries.

**Tripartite Agreements with neighbouring countries:**

In 1992, Joint Programme between Iran, Afghanistan and the UNHCR for Voluntary Repatriation of Afghan Refugees and Displaced Persons and in April, 2002 it was renewed.

In March 2002, Agreement between Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the UNHCR for Governing the Voluntary Repatriation of Afghan Citizens in Pakistan and it was renewed in the beginning of 2011.

**Tripartite Agreements and the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with EU countries, Norway and Australia:**

In September 2002, the Agreement between France, Afghanistan and the UNHCR

In October 2002, the MoU between the UK, Afghanistan and the UNHCR

In March 2003, the MoU between the Netherlands, Afghanistan and the UNHCR

In October 2004, the MoU between Denmark, Afghanistan and the UNHCR

In August 2005, the MoU between Norway, Afghanistan and the UNHCR

In December 2007, the MoU between Sweden, Afghanistan and the UNHCR

In January 2011, the MoU between Australia, Afghanistan and the UNHCR.

Since 2011, Afghanistan has also been part of the quadripartite consultative process initiated together with Iran, Pakistan and UNHCR.

As far as labour migration is concerned, two key regional cooperative mechanisms must be mentioned for Afghanistan:

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295 Ibid. pp.117-118
The Colombo Process, which was established as a consultation mechanism among the labour-sending countries in 2003

The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), with its 12th Summit where the ‘Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers’ was adopted, together with the ASEAN committee on Migrant Workers (ACMW) which was established in order to implement the Declaration.

In 2010, Afghanistan also joined the Budapest Process as a participating state and has been playing an active role since then, in particular in activities related to the Silk Routes Region.

Afghanistan is also member of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), where migration issues are also taken into the agenda of these organisations.

**Bilateral Agreements**

Although there are large numbers of Afghan labour migrants to neighbouring countries and to the Gulf region, labour migration from Afghanistan to these countries has remained largely unregulated (see section B3.2.1 on legal emigration). As emphasised on various occasions by the government itself, there is a pressing need for further regulations in this area, particularly through bilateral agreements. So far, the following bilateral documents have been signed with Qatar, Pakistan and Iran:

**In April 2008, Bilateral Agreement on Labour Migration with Qatar**

**In 2009, Joint Declaration between Afghanistan and Pakistan on Directions of Bilateral Cooperation targeting more contacts and exchanges of intellectual elite, civil society and media**

**In 2011, Afghanistan-Iranian Dialogue on migrant labourers, counter-narcotics and railway-building.**

Furthermore, the MoLSAMD informed in a recent statement that a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) had been sent to the UAE.

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299 Ibid.
REFERENCES


UNdata (2011) Per capita GDP at current prices – US$, http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=afghanistan+datamart[IFS%2cWDI%2cLABOURSTA%2cMDG%2cUNIDO%2cSNAAMA%2cSNA%2cPopDiv%2cUNESCO%2cUNHCR]&d=SNAAMA&f=grlID:101;currID:USD;pcFlag:1;crlID:4&c=2,3,5,6&s=_crEngNameOrderBy:asc,yr:desc&v=1


UNHCR (2013) Voluntary returns to Afghanistan - over 60,000 this year. Briefing Notes, http://www.unhcr.org/4eaa8ad99.html


UNHCR (2010) Number of voluntary returns to Afghanistan this year tops 100,000, http://www.unhcr.org/4c77b03f6.html


UNHCR/ European Union (2009) Study on Cross Border Population Movements between Afghanistan and Pakistan,
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendocPDFViewer.html?docid=4ad448670&query=labo%20migrants%20afghanistan


The following section presents an overview of existing domestic legislation relevant for migration management in Afghanistan, particularly as it regards refugees, trafficking in persons and labour migration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEGISLATION</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘Afghanistan National Development Strategy’ (ANDS) 2008-2013</td>
<td>The ANDS is centred around three pillars, namely security, governance and socio-economic development. The strategy covers 17 sectors and, with regard to refugees, returnees and IDPs, it defines the scope and objectives of the work in this field. Moreover, the strategy makes prescriptions for more involvement of relevant ministries such as MoFA and the MRRD, MoLSAMD, MoI, MCN, MD, MoUD, MoE, MoPH, MoHUD, as well as of provincial authorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘National Priority Programmes’ (NPPs)</td>
<td>The NPPs were created in 2009, in response to the limited progress registered with the ANDS (see above), which had been adopted the previous year. The NPPs were approved in the Kabul Conference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Decree 297</td>
<td>The Decree addresses the “Dignified Return of Refugees” and it was signed by the President Hamid Karzai on 3 June 2001 during the Afghan Interim Administration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Decree 104</td>
<td>The Decree is on “Land Distribution for Housing to Eligible Returnees and IDPs” and was issued on 6 December 2005, on the basis of the Council of Ministers’ approval no. 30 on 16 August 2005.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Decree 45</td>
<td>The Decree signed on 26 July 2012 has two specific articles on migration issues. Article 30 on MoLSAMD stipulates that:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Within 6 months, a national policy of employment in coordination of employment offices will be prepared and submitted to the cabinet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Within 6 months, a system for electronic employment permission for foreigners will be prepared and the report will be submitted to the cabinet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Within 6 months, a report on skill development programmes and also job creation possibilities for new employment opportunities will be prepared and submitted to the cabinet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Article 30 on the refugee issue stipulates that:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Within 6 months, the MoRR will submit a plan on the employment and education of refugees and the construction of refugee townships to the Cabinet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Within 6 months, the MoRR will submit a policy paper on dignified return of Afghan refugees from Iran and Pakistan to the Cabinet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law Countering Abduction and Human Trafficking</td>
<td>Adopted in 2008, the law prescribes penalties of life imprisonment for sex trafficking and &quot;maximum term&quot; imprisonment for labour trafficking, which in practice is between eight and fifteen years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Code</td>
<td>The new Labour Code was adopted in February 2007 and contains specific provisions on labour migration. As such, it sets the basis for the ‘Regulation for Sending Afghan Workers Abroad’ (see below).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulation for Sending Afghan Workers Abroad</td>
<td>Was approved in February 2007 and aims to reduce unemployment in Afghanistan by sending temporary migrants to other countries. The Regulation stipulates that the Afghan Government has to develop programmes to promote employment abroad. Moreover, it also prescribes that the MoLSAMD must establish labour migration offices abroad in order to facilitate the labour exporting process via issuance of passports and visas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship laws</td>
<td>With regard to the citizenship in Afghanistan, there is still ambiguity over which citizenship law is in use in Afghanistan. Retrospectively, there are two laws regulating citizenship in the country, the first one was issued in 1936 and the second one was passed in 2000 when the country was under the rule of Taliban.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, it should be mentioned that, in Afghanistan, there is no legislation on the issues of migrant smuggling and data protection.\(^{300}\)

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\(^{300}\) Lillesaar, Wiiu: IOM Report on "Migration Management and Its Legal Basis in Afghanistan".
ANNEX 2: STATISTICAL DATA

Socio-economic Context of Migration

LARGEST AID RECIPIENTS OVER THE PERIOD 2000-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Average ODA/GDP</th>
<th>Total ODA received (billion US$, net)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>62.8</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Micronesia, Fed. Sts.</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall Islands</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>Congo, Dem. Rep.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo, Dem. Rep.</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>China</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AISA301

AFGHANISTAN'S FOREIGN AID, AS REAL VALUES AND % OF GDP (2003-2011)

Source: The Economist302

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302 Ibid.
### SECTOR SHARES OF GDP (IN PERCENT OF GDP AT CURRENT PRICES)

![Graph showing sector shares of GDP](source)


### TOTAL EXTERNAL DEBT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>539</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>763</td>
<td>11,939</td>
<td>11,971</td>
<td>2,012</td>
<td>2,061</td>
<td>1,147</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| DEBT-TO-GDP RATIO (%) FOR THE SAME PERIODS | 13.0 | 14.0 | 14.5 | 190.4 | 169.6 | 23.0 | 19.7 | 9.2 |

Source: World Bank

---


AFGHANISTAN DEBT HISTORICAL (1966-2008) / FIGURES IN US MILLION DOLLARS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Creditors</th>
<th>Committed Debt (US$ million)</th>
<th>Debt Stock (US$ million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia (RU)</td>
<td>11,034.39</td>
<td>937.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Development Bank (ADB)</td>
<td>820.28</td>
<td>595.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Development Association (IDA)</td>
<td>542.14</td>
<td>414.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank (IBRD)</td>
<td>127.68</td>
<td>114.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government of United States (GOUS)</td>
<td>107.34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government of Dutch Republic (GOED); Germany</td>
<td>89.83</td>
<td>18.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Fund for Development (SFD)</td>
<td>81.07</td>
<td>46.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Development Bank (IDB)</td>
<td>56.97</td>
<td>11.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria (BG)</td>
<td>56.58</td>
<td>51.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait Fund for Economic Development (KFED)</td>
<td>29.86</td>
<td>21.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak Republic (SK)</td>
<td>29.34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA)</td>
<td>19.75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peoples Republic of China (PRC)</td>
<td>14.61</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran (IR)</td>
<td>10.75</td>
<td>10.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>9.50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID)</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>1.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Denmark (KDN)</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government of Croatia (GOC)</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>13,028</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,292</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Afghanistan Ministry of Finance

AFGHANISTAN’S INFORMAL ECONOMY, BY SECTOR

- **Source:** World Bank (2004)
- **Note:** Per cent figures refer to share of sector in total GDP; shadings to very rough estimates of the percentage of the informal economy in the sector.

## AFGHAN POPULATION BY SEX AND AGE, 2011-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGE</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>24,987,700</td>
<td>12,728,000</td>
<td>12,205,700</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-4</td>
<td>4,879,182</td>
<td>2,033,708</td>
<td>2,505,474</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9</td>
<td>3,744,680</td>
<td>1,902,185</td>
<td>1,842,495</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-14</td>
<td>2,897,639</td>
<td>1,524,594</td>
<td>1,842,495</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-19</td>
<td>2,368,063</td>
<td>1,250,690</td>
<td>1,117,373</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>2,027,792</td>
<td>1,038,565</td>
<td>989,227</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>1,674,245</td>
<td>826,931</td>
<td>847,314</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>1,395,516</td>
<td>664,820</td>
<td>730,696</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>1,225,447</td>
<td>585,981</td>
<td>639,466</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-44</td>
<td>1,058,169</td>
<td>535,176</td>
<td>522,993</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-49</td>
<td>917,456</td>
<td>485,347</td>
<td>432,109</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-54</td>
<td>774,191</td>
<td>426,538</td>
<td>347,653</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-59</td>
<td>623,315</td>
<td>353,268</td>
<td>270,047</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-64</td>
<td>481,068</td>
<td>276,037</td>
<td>205,031</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>920,937</td>
<td>538,160</td>
<td>382,777</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CSO Afghanistan 2010

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>8082</td>
<td>7908</td>
<td>4990</td>
<td>4933</td>
<td>5664</td>
<td>5518</td>
<td>4826</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>2391</td>
<td>3664</td>
<td>4191</td>
<td>5387</td>
<td>6401</td>
<td>7359</td>
<td>8636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>716</td>
<td>706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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Source: UNHCR SOPD 2012\(^{310}\)

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AFGHAN REFUGEES AND PERSONS IN REFUGEE LIKE SITUATIONS IN PAKISTAN 1979 - 2010

Source: UNHCR SOPD 2011311

UNHCR SUPPORTED REPATRIATIONS TO AFGHANISTAN, 2001-2010

Source: UNHCR SOPD 2011312


312 UNHCR SOPD (2011) Returned Refugees (Repatriation) - > Total - > Repatriated from - > World - > Repatriated Refugees from -> Islamic Rep. of Iran - > Pakistan http://apps.who.int/globalatlas/dataquery/viewdata.asp?LINK=1&PRG=UNHCR&RAGR=distinct&SALVL=0_P&LST=false&YSTART=2001&YEND=2010&L=E&RPTTYP=1&INDID=1020206@1020206&INDSG=21523@21575&INDCT=460101000000@460101000000&INDLV=L=3@3&INDPRD=Y&Y@IOSCTRY=AF
ASYLUM APPLICATIONS OF AFGHAN CITIZENS TO THE EU, 2008-2011

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<th>2011</th>
<th>Share of total</th>
<th>% change from previous year</th>
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Source: Frontex313

DISTRIBUTION OF AFGHAN ASYLUM APPLICATIONS IN THE EU 27, +CH, N, LI, ICE, 1990 – 2010

Source: Wagner 2011314

### Afghan Citizens Found to Be Illegally Present in the EU 27, +Norway

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<th>2012</th>
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Source: Eurostat, 2013

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### DETECTED ILLEGAL BORDER CROSSINGS OF AFGHAN CITIZENS BETWEEN BORDER CROSSING POINTS

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<th>% change from previous year</th>
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Source: Frontex

### DETECTED ILLEGAL STAY (TOP TEN NATIONALITIES)

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<th>% change on previous year</th>
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Source: Frontex

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316 Ibid., p.47
### ILLEGAL BORDER CROSSINGS BETWEEN BORDER CROSSING POINTS (2009-2011)

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<td>3 345</td>
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<td>2 610</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Circular route from Albania to Greece</strong></td>
<td>40 250</td>
<td>35 297</td>
<td>5 269</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>32 451</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>21</td>
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<tr>
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<td>833</td>
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<tr>
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<td>39</td>
<td>606</td>
<td>1 454</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1 043</td>
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Source: Frontex[^318]
