

# CLIMATE CHANGE DRIVES MIGRATION IN CONFLICT-RIDDEN AFGHANISTAN

December 2020



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**IMPROVING MIGRATION  
MANAGEMENT** IN THE SILK ROUTES

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Cover photo: IDP camp (Shaiday camp) Herat. Photo: TCRO

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## ACRONYMS

<b>ALCS</b>	Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey
<b>ANDMIS</b>	Afghanistan National Disaster Management Information System
<b>ANDS</b>	Afghanistan National Development Strategy
<b>ANPDF</b>	Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework
<b>CMP</b>	Comprehensive Migration Policy
<b>CORDEX</b>	Coordinated Regional Climate Downscaling Experiment
<b>FAO</b>	Food and Agriculture Organization
<b>FEWSNET</b>	Famine Early Warning Systems Network
<b>HFA</b>	Hyogo Framework Agreement
<b>IDPs</b>	Internally Displaced Persons
<b>IOM</b>	International Organisation for Migration
<b>IPC</b>	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
<b>IPCC</b>	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
<b>MoRR</b>	Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation
<b>NAPA</b>	National Adaptation Programme of Action
<b>NCSA</b>	National Capacity Needs Self-Assessment
<b>NEPA</b>	National Environmental Protection Authority
<b>NGO</b>	Non-Governmental Organisation
<b>PFRI</b>	Policy Framework for Returnees and IDPs
<b>RCP</b>	Representative Concentration Pathway
<b>SDGs</b>	Sustainable Development Goals
<b>SNAP</b>	Strategic National Action Plan
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNDAF</b>	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>UNEP</b>	United Nations Environment Programme
<b>UNHCR</b>	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children's Fund
<b>UNOCHA</b>	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
<b>WFP</b>	World Food Programme
<b>WHO</b>	World Health Organization

## KEY TERMS

- 1. Circular migration:** A form of migration in which people repeatedly move back and forth between two or more countries. Reference: [https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/iml\\_34\\_glossary.pdf](https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/iml_34_glossary.pdf)
- 2. Climate change:** A change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods. Reference: [https://unfccc.int/files/essential\\_background/background\\_publications\\_htmlpdf/application/pdf/conveng.pdf](https://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/background_publications_htmlpdf/application/pdf/conveng.pdf)
- 3. Climate change adaptation:** The process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects. In human systems, adaptation seeks to moderate or avoid harm or exploit beneficial opportunities. In some natural systems, human intervention may facilitate adjustment to expected climate and its effects. Reference: [https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2019/01/SYRAR5-Glossary\\_en.pdf](https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2019/01/SYRAR5-Glossary_en.pdf)
- 4. Climate migration:** The movement of a person or groups of persons who, predominantly for reasons of sudden or progressive change in the environment due to climate change, are obliged to leave their habitual place of residence, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, within a State or across an international border. Reference: Warsaw International Mechanism, Executive Committee, Action Area 6: Migration, Displacement and Human Mobility – Submission from the International Organization for Migration (IOM, 2016); M. Traore Chazalnoël and D. Ionesco, *Defining Climate Migrants – Beyond Semantics* (IOM weblog, 6 June 2016). <https://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms>
- 5. Climate-change mitigation:** Climate Change Mitigation refers to efforts to reduce or prevent emission of greenhouse gases. Mitigation can mean using new technologies and renewable energies, making older equipment more energy efficient, or changing management practices or consumer behaviour. Reference: <https://www.unenvironment.org/explore-topics/climate-change/what-we-do/mitigation>
- 6. Climate-induced migration:** There is no universally agreed definition of climate-induced human mobility, but broadly, it refers to movement of people driven by sudden or progressive changes in the weather or climate. Reference: <https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/10996.pdf>
- 7. Internal displacement:** Refers to the forced movement of people within the country they live in. Reference: <https://www.internal-displacement.org/internal-displacement>
- 8. Internal migration:** The movement of people within a State involving the establishment of a new temporary or permanent residence. Reference: Adapted from International Organization for Migration, *World Migration Report 2015*. Note: Internal migration movements can be temporary or permanent and include those who have been displaced from their habitual place of residence such as internally displaced persons, as well as persons who decide to move to a new place, such as in the case of rural–urban migration. The term also covers both nationals and non–nationals moving within a State, provided that they move away from their place of habitual residence. Reference: <https://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms>
- 9. Loss and Damage:** While there is no commonly accepted definition available yet, here is a working definition of loss and damage as a baseline for common understanding of the concept at local level: Loss and damage refers to negative effects of climate variability and climate change that people have not been able to cope with or adapt to. This definition includes the inability to respond to climate stresses (i.e., the costs of inaction) and the costs associated with existing coping and adaptive strategies (in comparison with erosive coping strategies and maladaptation). Such costs can be monetary or non-monetary. Reference: [https://i.unu.edu/media/jp.unu.edu/news/22401/LossDamage\\_Vol11.pdf](https://i.unu.edu/media/jp.unu.edu/news/22401/LossDamage_Vol11.pdf)
- 10. Permanent migration:** The regulated movement of people to a location where they then settled permanently. In the case of people moving to a new country, they would be permanent migrants when they received legal permission from the destination country, for example, a permanent resident permit. Reference: <https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/factbook-2015-6-en.pdf?expires=1606803061&id=id&acname=guest&checksum=FCB309E07B82BB334F878FB234474DE1>

- 11. Push and Pull factors:** In the study of migration, push factors are those that encourage a population to leave its home, pull factors are those that draw a population to another area or place. Reference: <https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100355608>
- 12. Return migration:** In the context of international migration, the movement of persons returning to their country of origin after having moved away from their place of habitual residence and crossed an international border. In the context of internal migration, the movement of persons returning to their place of habitual residence after having moved away from it. Reference: [https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/iml\\_34\\_glossary.pdf](https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/iml_34_glossary.pdf)
- 13. Reintegration of Refugees:** A process which enables refugees to re-establish the economic, social and psychosocial relationships needed to maintain life, livelihood and dignity and inclusion in civic life. Reference: [https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/iml\\_34\\_glossary.pdf](https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/iml_34_glossary.pdf)
- 14. Seasonal migration:** Movement by a migrant worker whose work or migration for employment is dependent upon seasonal conditions, and is performed only during part of the year. Reference: [https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/iml\\_34\\_glossary.pdf](https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/iml_34_glossary.pdf)
- 15. Social protection:** The set of policies and programmes that aim to reduce poverty and vulnerability and to enhance the capacity of people to manage economic and social risks, such as unemployment, sickness, disability and old age. It includes social assistance programmes, which are not conditional on having previously made contributions (e.g. cash transfers to poor households) – and social insurance programmes, which are conditional on past contributions (e.g., contributory old-age pensions). Reference: <https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/11583.pdf> page 2- Social Protection, migration, and the 2030 agenda for sustainable development
- 16. Vulnerability:** The conditions determined by physical, social, economic and environmental factors or processes which increase the susceptibility of an individual, a community, assets or systems to the impacts of hazards. Reference: United Nations office for Disaster Risk Reduction <https://www.undrr.org/terminology/vulnerability>

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY



Afghanistan is ranked eighth out of 170 countries for its vulnerability to climate change over the next 30 years, with 59 percent of the population affected by climate shocks compared to 19 percent suffering from security-related shocks.<sup>1</sup> For every one million inhabitants, 1,150 people die in Afghanistan every year, half of them from weather-related and geophysical events, according to one natural disaster loss database.<sup>2</sup> The country's low level of socio-economic development, combined with rising levels of insecurity, make people extremely vulnerable to disasters. As a result, it sees frequent loss of lives, property and livelihoods.

**At the end of 2019, Afghanistan had 1,198,000 people displaced internally as a result of disasters, more than any other country.<sup>3</sup>**

The drought in 2018-19 affected more than two-thirds of Afghanistan, displacing over 260,000 people and leaving about 9.8 million people in food crisis.<sup>4</sup> The number of people affected each year by flooding could

more than double by 2050 due to the combined effect of climate change and poor socio-economic growth.<sup>5</sup>

**The climate change predictions for Afghanistan reveal an increase in temperature that will have dramatic impacts on the country's agricultural production, water availability and food security.<sup>6</sup>**

A mean warming of 1.5°C until 2050 will severely affect agriculture, water resources, ecosystems, food security, health and energy production.<sup>7</sup> A higher increase in temperature will likely completely change the environment and current ecosystems, which would devastate the economy and the food security of the rural majority.<sup>8</sup>

**The worsening climatic conditions will negatively affect Afghanistan's socio-economic development, increasing poverty, leaving more people vulnerable to climatic hazards and raising the risk of conflict over natural resources.**

1. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (2018), *Afghanistan – Multi-hazard risk assessment*, The World Bank, Washington D.C.
2. The Munich Re NatCatSERVICE: Geo Risks Research, December 2016
3. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (2020), *Global Report on Internal Displacement 2020*, Geneva.
4. UNOCHA (2019), *Humanitarian Needs Overview Afghanistan 2020*, Kabul, p.10.
5. The World Bank (2017), *Afghanistan Disaster Risk Profile*, The World Bank, Washington D.C.
6. National Environmental Protection Agency & UNEP (2016), *Afghanistan: Climate Change Science Perspectives*, Kabul.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.

The Humanitarian Needs Overview 2020, prepared by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, states, “Conflict remains the main driver of displacement, however natural hazards (both slow and sudden onset) also contribute to, and trigger, population movements...in affected locations. Afghanistan is highly prone to natural disasters, whose frequency and intensity are exacerbated by the effects of climate change.”<sup>9</sup>

There can often be multi-faceted reasons people move in Afghanistan. People are likely to be classed as economic migrants when they move from rural areas to urban centres, seeking better employment and income opportunities. Such a description forgoes further analysis as to why people believe their livelihoods are no longer viable in rural areas. The reasons could be because their land is no longer productive after multiple floods, or their crops have failed for the past few years because of drought. These are impacts of climate change but the resulting displacement may not be attributed to climate change. It is important to understand the “push factors” for those who are classed as economic migrants. It is not always just the “pull” of perceived better economic opportunities in urban areas. Often critical contributing factors, many of which can be linked to climate change, result in migration. This report attempts to provide more context to, and understanding of, migration in Afghanistan to show the link between climate change and migration.

This report is based on the analysis of mostly qualitative information gathered using participatory research methodologies in two migration hotspots in Takhar and Herat provinces.

The qualitative data obtained from group discussions at Khalyan village of Takhar province and Shaiday IDP camp in Herat illustrated the causes of migration resulting from climate change. These included the decrease in agricultural production and the destruction of agricultural land and pastures, resulting from floods, drought, soil erosion and untimely rain. The causes also included depletion of water resources as was evident in the lowering of the water table and the drying up of springs. Those taking part in the participatory research emphasised that none of the consequences of migration were positive—they did not find good jobs, more income or better opportunities after migration. All of the consequences were negative, such as unemployment, family separation, dangerous journeys,

debt and continued hardship. Due to the limited scope of the research, the focus of the report was on internal migration and displacement.

Institutional arrangements in the country for climate-induced migration primarily focus on disaster response and need a vision for addressing the long-term effects of climate change. The emphasis is on the immediate response to climate-induced loss and damage, rather than on climate change mitigation or adaptation. Afghanistan lacks a well-resourced and broad national development programme to address the impacts of climate change and prepare for the future challenges.

Afghanistan has a number of policies for migration, disaster response and the environment. However, the link between climate change and migration is not well-established. Displacement is primarily recognised as due to insecurity and violence. According to the 2020 Global Report on Internal Displacement, Afghanistan is one of the countries showing increased political commitment, with displacement incorporated into development plans.<sup>10</sup> The 2019 Comprehensive Migration Policy has a section on migration and climate-induced migration, with a number of policy responses to address climate change impacts, migration and displacement. This is a positive step and these policies provide opportunities to further integrate climate-induced migration into national focus, if there is sufficient political will to do so.

The past two national strategies for Afghanistan’s development have only mentioned it a couple of times. With the responsibility for measures spread across a broad number of ministries, accountability to adapt to climate change is so widely dispersed that it is not prioritised in government activities. In the absence of comprehensive assessments, there is a lack of adequate information to develop evidence-based solutions to counter environmentally induced displacement and to manage the resettlement of returnees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in an environmentally sustainable manner. However, the recently developed Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework-ANPDF II acknowledges climate change as a serious and present threat to the country, causing temperature rise and changes in precipitation that have severe impacts on Afghanistan’s people and resources. It also acknowledges the differentiated impact of climate change on women.

9. UNOCHA (2019), Humanitarian Needs Overview Afghanistan 2020, Kabul, p.10.

10. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (2020), *Global Report on Internal Displacement 2020*, Geneva.



# THE FOLLOWING **RECOMMENDATIONS** ARE MADE TO ADDRESS THE CHALLENGES:

## LOCAL

1. Raise community awareness of the impact of climate change and future projections, and ensure climate change mitigation and adaptation measures are tailored to the context of specific communities.
2. Educate communities on environmental sustainability and community-based resource management as ways of preserving and managing natural resources.
3. Provide consistent capacity development support to Cluster Community Development Councils through the Citizens' Charter national programme to help communities with disaster risk reduction and resilience-building activities, and explore channelling funds to Cluster Community Development Councils post-disaster, for rebuilding lives and livelihoods.
5. Broaden the 2017 Policy Framework for Returnees and IDPs to include climate-induced displacement, as well as conflict-induced.
6. Develop social protection schemes and effective safety nets in areas likely to be most affected according to climatic projections, thereby preventing or reducing protracted displacement from natural disasters. Expand long-term protection measures such as planting trees and vegetative cover, and protecting pastureland, to reduce the impact of natural disasters.
7. Develop a new strategy for natural resource management, which includes the use of water resources, to respond to the forecast climatic changes for the remainder of the century, and support the capacity development of the local-level water-user associations.
8. Develop the capacity of the Office of the State Minister for Disaster Management to model and analyse information with regard to hazards and risks.

## NATIONAL

4. Government policies and development strategies should establish a clearer link between climate change and migration, with a focus on migration resulting from the long-term effects of climate change, rather than only displacement as a result of natural disaster.
9. Create a network of weather stations to inform early warning systems that can be accessed at all levels, down to the village, in local language, and can inform people in advance of extreme weather events and slow-onset changes.
10. Increase investment in programmes for sustainable agriculture that boost commercial opportunities for farmers, and support farmers in developing small businesses and in diversifying income opportunities.



Flood protection wall constructed by NSP Khalyan village.  
PHOTO: TCRO

11. Consider the creation of a Ministry of Climate Change to address the likely impacts of climatic projections, as well as strengthen the focus and potentially increase the allocation of dedicated resources to the issue, or at the very least, support the capacity development of and resource allocation to the Climate Change Department under the National Environmental Protection Authority.

## DATA, RESEARCH AND INFORMATION

12. Create a centralised system for collecting, managing and analysing climate data and modelling, including climate-induced disasters and the number of people affected. Develop technical capacity to monitor and assess the current and future impacts of climate change, including vulnerability analyses by age and gender.
13. Complete the national assessment of migration and the environment, as stated in the Comprehensive Migration Policy, including an assessment of the interlinkages between climate change, environmental degradation and displacement.
14. Prepare vulnerability profiles of both the disaster-prone areas and the areas that will be most affected by the long-term climatic effects to help communities prepare and adapt.
15. Support the Office of the State Minister for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Affairs in establishing and maintaining a centralised database for loss and damage resulting from climate-induced disasters.

## REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL

16. Introduce, or provide a more prominent role to, climate-induced migration in regional cooperation agreements and fora, including the Budapest Process and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Regional fora should develop, agree on and implement common policies, codes and responses to address climate migration, and support the displaced.
17. Share data collection and analysis of climate change and population movement across borders between regional partners to increase knowledge, understanding and evidence.
18. Strengthen regional cooperation and initiatives, including the South Asia Co-operative Environment Programme and the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development. Consider the model of regional cooperation between Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan for water distribution and energy production. Share weather station data across the region.
19. International (and national) media should broaden the coverage of displacement in Afghanistan to include climate-induced displacement, and not just displacement resulting from conflict, in order to increase global awareness of the issue.
20. International donors should increase funding commitments to the Government of Afghanistan for enhanced social protection and safety net programmes, particularly those linked to climate impacts.



Children in Shaiday IDP camp, Herat.  
PHOTO: TCRO

# 1. INTRODUCTION

Afghanistan's geographical location and topography make it prone to natural disasters and climatic hazards. Throughout the twenty first century, Afghanistan has experienced large population movements, including out-migration, return of refugees and significant internal displacement.

On average, 400,000 people are affected by recurrent natural disasters each year, with about half of Afghanistan's districts considered hazard-prone.<sup>11</sup> At the end of 2019, Afghanistan had 1,198,000 people who were internally displaced as a result of disasters, more than any other country.<sup>12</sup> Afghanistan struggles with droughts and floods, which affect agricultural productivity and wipe out household assets. The drought in 2018-19 affected more than two-thirds of the country's population, displacing over 260,000 people and leaving about 9.8 million people in food

crisis.<sup>13</sup> It is anticipated that the number of people affected each year by floods could more than double by 2050 because of the combined effect of climate change and poor socio-economic growth.<sup>14</sup>

With changing climate, Afghanistan is predicted to see an increase in temperature that will dramatically affect its agricultural production, water availability and food security.<sup>15</sup> The main areas of agricultural production will experience decreased precipitation during the critical spring months<sup>16</sup> and drought is forecast to become a regular event.<sup>17</sup> With agricultural productivity and water availability declining, the most vulnerable households that rely on rainfed agriculture will see an increase in debt, poverty and food insecurity. This will affect the country's social development and its ability to achieve health-related goals such as reducing malaria mortality.<sup>18</sup>

11. UNEP and UNOCHA (2016), *Environment and Humanitarian Action, Country Study Afghanistan*, Geneva.

12. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (2020), *Global Report on Internal Displacement 2020*, Geneva.

13. UNOCHA (2019), *Humanitarian Needs Overview Afghanistan 2020*, Kabul.

14. The World Bank (2017), *Afghanistan Disaster Risk Profile*, The World Bank, Washington D.C.

15. National Environmental Protection Agency & UNEP (2016), *Afghanistan: Climate Change Science Perspectives*, Kabul.

16. Ibid.

17. Savage M. et al. (2009), *Socio-Economic Impacts of Climate Change in Afghanistan, A Report to the Department of International Development*, Stockholm Environment Institute, Stockholm.

18. Ibid.

Afghanistan is now entering its fifth decade of conflict and insecurity, which are recognised as the main causes of migration and displacement. The combination of conflict and natural disaster has resulted in the population suffering from high levels of poverty and vulnerability. As the conflict endures, economic growth is constrained and political instability further undermines the development of the country. Households become less resilient, so climatic shocks and hazards can often push them deeper into poverty. Rapid-onset natural disasters can displace families, and those who have lost their homes, assets and agricultural land are less likely to return to their places of origin and will look to start a new life elsewhere.

Afghanistan also presents a number of specific challenges in terms of climate change assessments and projections. Projections are compromised by the lack of available historic meteorological data, as records were lost and data could not be collected for many years during the past four decades of conflict. Afghanistan also has a unique topography and geography, resulting in large variations, particularly in precipitation, from regional trends.

With so many inter-linked risks and shocks affecting Afghan households and a variety of factors influencing their decision to move, it can be simplistic to allocate one specific reason for migration. In fact, identification of the main drivers of climate-induced migration is much more complex, particularly when insecurity is also a contributing factor influencing the decision to move.

There is also an important difference between those who migrate and those who are displaced. Afghanistan has an incredibly high number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). This report considers displacement resulting from natural disasters. Assessments are more able to identify the primary cause of displacement—particularly when it is rapid onset—whether it occurred as a result of insecurity or natural disaster. But it is much harder to unveil the underlying climatic reasons. This is because in case of migration resulting from climate change, when it is slow onset resulting from falling agricultural productivity or reducing water availability, the migrants are often categorised as economic migrants, rather than climate migrants. This categorisation negatively affects both those who are forced to move because of climatic events and the Government's policy to respond to climate change and its impact in Afghanistan.

The primary research explores the complex web of causes resulting in migration and the condition of migrants.

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## 1.1 Methodology

The collection of qualitative data for this report followed the Module for Facilitating Participatory Research on Climate-induced Migration and Displacement.<sup>19</sup>

Khalyan village in Chahab district of Takhar province and Shaiday IDP camp in Herat province were chosen as the locations for data collection. Khalyan is a migration hotspot on account of its regular heavy flooding, and Shaiday displacement camp is a destination for many people displaced by floods and droughts. The two locations have different topography. While Khalyan is mountainous, Herat is in the plains. Khalyan is a rural, agricultural area, whereas Herat is an urban destination.

The qualitative data collection comprised the participatory methods of problem-tree analysis, mobility mapping, matrix scoring and paired comparisons, which took place in both the locations (see Table 1 below). The problem-tree method was used to identify the causes of the communities' vulnerability to disasters, both direct and indirect, and the consequential actions taken as a result. Mobility mapping sought to identify specific locations where people moved to from Khalyan village, or where the residents in Shaiday IDP camp had moved from in order to seek the essential needs of life. Matrix scoring provided the drivers of preference for moving to certain locations (e.g., jobs, income and family relations) and the respondents' perceptions of whether these things were available in each location. The paired-comparison exercise was used to determine the support migrant communities were looking for and how they prioritised this support.

Due to cultural sensitivities, separate exercises were held with the male and female groups. One of the limitations of the primary research was that the female groups said they did not know who had moved away from the village or to the IDP camp, due to their own limited mobility, so they did not feel able to undertake the mobility-mapping and matrix-scoring exercises.

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19. ActionAid, CANSA & Praxis (2019), *Module for Facilitating Participatory Research on Climate-induced Migration and Displacement*.

In-depth interviews also took place in both locations for the purpose of informing illustrative case studies. Another limitation in data collection was the changing schedules of the key informants in government positions. This made it challenging to undertake interviews in Takhar and Herat.

Interviews with key informants were also conducted in Taloqan and Herat cities, the capitals of Takhar and Herat provinces, and in Kabul. The key informants were representatives of government at the district, provincial and national levels; representatives of NGOs working in the data collection locations; and medical personnel from hospitals near the data collection locations.

**Table 1:** Qualitative data collection tools

Method	Kabul	Takhar	Herat
Problem-tree analysis		38 participants (25 male & 13 female)	42 participants (23 male & 19 female)
Mobility mapping		25 male participants	23 male participants
Matrix scoring		25 male participants	23 male participants
Paired comparison		38 participants (25 male & 13 female)	42 participants (23 male & 19 female)
Case studies		3	2
Key informants	4	8	7
Interviews			



Men from Khalyan village.  
PHOTO: TCRO

## 2. COUNTRY PROFILE

Germanwatch's Global Climate Risk Index 2020 places Afghanistan at the 24th position for countries that suffered from weather-related loss events in 2018. In fact, Afghanistan held the same position for loss events from 1999 to 2018.<sup>20</sup>

The European Commission's 2019 Index for Risk Management ranks Afghanistan as the fourth highest-risk country out of the 191 countries profiled.<sup>21</sup> This index identifies countries at risk from humanitarian crises and disasters that could overwhelm national response capacity. Its "hazard and exposure" risk dimension ranks Afghanistan second for hazardous events that could occur and the scale at which people and assets could potentially be affected by them. For human hazard Afghanistan is given a rating of 10 out of 10 and for natural hazard 6.1.

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### 2.1 Mainstay of the economy

Agriculture is the largest economic sector, contributing between one-third and one-half of Afghanistan's GDP.<sup>22</sup> About 85 percent of the Afghan population is either directly or indirectly dependent on agriculture for their livelihoods, and 85 percent of the country's food comes from irrigated farming.<sup>23</sup> Employment in agriculture dominates the labour market. About 44 percent of all jobs in the country are in the agriculture sector, and 43 percent of all workers are agricultural workers.<sup>24</sup> The agriculture sector is estimated to have grown by 7.5 percent in 2019, mainly driven by the production of cereals.<sup>25</sup> Higher rainfall and snowfall in the north-central provinces during the 2019 planting season resulted in increased rainfed cultivation of wheat as well as growth in fruit production.

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20. Germanwatch, Global Climate Risk Index 2020, December 2019.

21. <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Inform%202019%20WEB%20spreads.pdf>

22. <http://www.fao.org/fao-stories/article/en/c/11111046/>


23. Ibid.

24. Central Statistics Organization (2018), *Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey 2016-17*, Kabul.

25. The World Bank (2020), *Afghanistan Development Update, January 2020: Navigating a Sea of Uncertainty*, The World Bank, Washington D.C.

Afghanistan's economy grew by an estimated 2.9 percent in 2019, driven mainly by strong agricultural growth. This growth marked recovery from the drought in 2017-18 (see Figure 1 below).<sup>26</sup> The World Bank forecasts that with further recovery from the drought and increased private sector confidence (following the declaration of the 2019 election results), growth could reach 3.3 percent in 2020.<sup>27</sup> In the medium-term, the growth projection is around four percent, provided that the security does not deteriorate further and international development support continues.

**Figure 1: Real GDP Growth by Sector (Percent)**



Source: World Bank Group, Afghanistan Development Update, Navigating a Sea of Uncertainty, January 2020

With international grants financing 75 percent of its public expenditure, Afghanistan is absolutely dependent on finance from donor countries.<sup>28</sup>

Growth in the industry and services sectors remained nearly flat in 2019. The industry sector growth reduced by half a percent in comparison to 2018 (from 2.5 to 2 percent), constrained by weak investor confidence.<sup>29</sup> In the service sector also investor confidence remained weak, though improved agricultural incomes helped the sector grow a bit.

Poppy cultivation and opium production are other crucial elements in rural livelihoods, especially in the southern region. In 2018, the opium economy in Afghanistan—which includes heroin production and drug trafficking—was worth six to 11 percent of Afghanistan's GDP.<sup>30</sup> This exceeded the value of the country's officially recorded licit exports of goods and services.<sup>31</sup>

## 2.2 Human development indicators

Afghanistan ranks 170th out of 189 countries in the Human Development Index, with the gross national income per capita of USD 1,746 and 3.9 mean years of schooling.<sup>32</sup> Poverty levels are high, with more than half (55.9 percent) the population living in multidimensional poverty and a fourth in severe multidimensional poverty.<sup>33</sup> Women are particularly disadvantaged. They have 1.9 mean years of schooling, far less participation in labour force and estimated gross national income per capita of USD 1,102, less than half of that of men.<sup>34</sup> The human development index for women ranks Afghanistan even lower at the 182<sup>nd</sup> position.

Although Afghanistan has registered significant improvements in education, maternal health and water and sanitation, the indicators for poverty, food security and employment have fluctuated over time, as captured in successive National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment surveys and reported in the Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey (ALCS) for 2016-17.<sup>35</sup> Afghanistan has a very young population, with 47.7 percent of its people less than 15 years of age.<sup>36</sup> As a result, an increasing number of people are entering the workforce, far outpacing the capacity of the labour market to absorb them. The rapid population growth also puts pressure on health and education systems and arable land.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2019), *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, Challenges to sustainable development, peace and security*, UNODC, Kabul.

31. Ibid.

32. UNDP (2019), *Human Development Report 2019*, UNDP.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Central Statistics Organization (2018), *Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey 2016-17*, Kabul. It surveyed 19,838 households and 155,680 persons across Afghanistan, with data collected in each of the 34 provinces.

36. Ibid.

Analysis of the ALCS data shows that Afghanistan's labour market is already under considerable stress, with a fourth (24 percent) of the labour force unemployed. Of the total employed population, 20 percent are underemployed (in need of more work) and 80 percent of all jobs are classified as vulnerable employment, characterised by job insecurity and poor working conditions.<sup>37</sup>

Close to 16 million people (54.5 percent) in Afghanistan are living below the national poverty line, ALCS reports.<sup>38</sup> The poverty gap,<sup>39</sup> the measure for the

intensity of poverty, more than doubled between 2007-08 and 2016-17, increasing from seven to 15 percent.<sup>40</sup> Although poverty has increased, inequality in the country has declined, as reflected in the Gini Index.<sup>41, 42</sup>

Food insecurity is on the rise, with 44.6 percent of the population considered food insecure, up from 30 percent in 2011-12.<sup>43</sup> Of these, 27.5 percent are considered severely or very severely food insecure. Living conditions of the people too are poor. In urban areas, 72 percent of the residents live in slums or inadequate housing.<sup>44</sup>

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37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. The poverty gap measures the intensity of poverty as the average distance between the per-capita expenditure levels of the population and the poverty line – assuming the non-poor have a zero shortfall – and is expressed as a percentage of the poverty line.

40. Central Statistics Organization (2018), *Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey 2016-17*, Kabul.

41. The Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of consumption among individuals or households differs from a perfectly equal one. A value of 0 represents absolute equality with everybody consuming the same amount; a value of 1 represents absolute inequality, where all consumption is concentrated in one person.

42. Central Statistics Organization (2018), *Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey 2016-17*, Kabul.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.





### 3. COUNTRY OVERVIEW OF DISASTERS

Afghanistan is extremely prone to intense and recurring natural disasters, including droughts, earthquakes, avalanches, landslides, floods and flash floods.<sup>45</sup> Since 1980, disasters caused by natural hazards have affected nine million people and resulted in over 20,000 fatalities in Afghanistan.<sup>46</sup> Floods and earthquakes have caused over 16,000 fatalities since 1990.<sup>47</sup>

What makes the country especially vulnerable to disasters is a combination of its low socio-economic development and rising insecurity. Despite huge inflows of international development assistance, decades of conflict have increased Afghanistan's vulnerability to disasters and undermined its protective capacity. As a result, hazards often turn into disasters with large humanitarian and economic consequences.

#### Floods

Flooding is the most frequent natural hazard in Afghanistan, with 2,245 incidents of flooding over the past nine years.<sup>48</sup> Afghanistan is prone to river flooding because of steep slopes in headwaters. Flooding of rivers is usually a result of either heavy rainfall or rapid snowmelt. The sources of most of the country's rivers are in the mountains, fed by snow and glaciers. The denudation of mountains and the lack of vegetation further contribute to flood hazards. On average, floods affect 101,000 people in a year, causing USD 54 million of damage.<sup>49</sup> Floods in May 2014 affected 90,000 people, displacing 20,000 of them, in the 14 northern provinces. Damage thus caused exceeded USD 100 million.<sup>50</sup> The number of people affected each year by

45. The Munich Re NatCatSERVICE: Geo Risks Research, December 2016

46. Central Statistics Organization (2018), *Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey 2016-17*, Kabul.

47. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (2018), *Afghanistan – Multi-hazard risk assessment*, The World Bank, Washington D.C.

48. Afghanistan National Disaster Management Information System. Most up-to-date statistics provided for the period 15/06/2010 – 12/05/2019.

49. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (2018), *Afghanistan – Multi-hazard risk assessment*, The World Bank, Washington D.C.

50. The World Bank (2017), *Afghanistan Disaster Risk Profile*, The World Bank, Washington D.C.

flooding could more than double by 2050 due to the combined effect of climate change and poor socio-economic growth.<sup>51</sup> Urban areas are also affected by floods resulting from heavy rainfall and inadequate drainage systems, causing extensive damage to both commercial and residential properties.

## Droughts

Afghanistan suffers from recurring droughts with varying timeframes and levels of severity. Droughts have affected 6.5 million people since 2000, with four major droughts occurring in the years 2000, 2006, 2008, 2011<sup>52</sup> and 2018. In the past nine years 496 incidents of drought were recorded in the Afghanistan National Disaster Management Information System (ANDMIS). On average, droughts cause USD 280 million worth of economic damage to agriculture each year, and extreme events could cost over USD 3 billion.<sup>53</sup>

The drought in 2018-19 affected more than two-thirds of Afghanistan and devastated the agriculture sector. Food and income were heavily affected in areas where livelihoods depend on rainfed cultivation of staple crops and livestock rearing, with incomes reportedly reduced by half in some areas.<sup>54</sup> The drought displaced over 260,000 people. At a UN conference on Afghanistan in Geneva, the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General in Afghanistan, Toby Lanzer, stated that 3.6 million people were, "one step away from famine".<sup>55</sup> The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) reported that the drought left 3.9 million people in need of food and livelihood.<sup>56</sup> More than five million people were assisted during the drought response in 2018-19,<sup>57</sup> but an estimated double the number were facing food crisis and emergency.<sup>58</sup>

The estimated national wheat production for 2018 was 16 percent lower than in 2017 and 25 percent lower than the five-year average. The estimated national barley production declined by 40 percent, compared to 2017. For pastoralists, fodder prices doubled and milk production decreased by 30 percent compared to previous years. Animal deaths and reduced livestock productivity were reported by 48 percent of pastoralists.<sup>59</sup> Village headmen interviewed for the Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018 confirmed the impact of the drought. About 74 percent of them stated the crops in their village had been affected by environmental hazards or diseases.<sup>60</sup>

## Landslides

Landslides in Afghanistan are common because of the mountainous terrain, covering 60 percent of the country, and unstable soil. They can be triggered by earthquakes and heavy rainfall. It is estimated that over 3 million people and over USD 6 billion worth of assets are exposed to landslides in Afghanistan.<sup>61</sup> In 2014, a landslide resulting from heavy rain in the north-eastern province of Badakhshan caused at least 350 and possibly 2,000 deaths.<sup>62</sup> Population growth alone could double the number of people affected by landslides by 2050.

## Earthquakes

According to the United States Geological Society, Afghanistan is one of the most seismically hazardous regions on the planet.<sup>63</sup> Earthquakes cause the highest number of fatalities in the country, with more than 10,000 people killed and 250,000 affected since 1980.<sup>64</sup> The Afghanistan Spatial Data Center estimates that 24 million people, of an estimated 33.5 million population, are affected by earthquakes.<sup>65</sup>

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51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid.

54. UNOCHA (2018), *Humanitarian Needs Overview Afghanistan 2019*, Kabul.

55. <https://www.unmultimedia.org/avlibrary/asset/2319/2319122/>

56. UNOCHA (2019), *Humanitarian Needs Overview Afghanistan 2020*, Kabul.

57. Ibid.

58. UNODC & GoIRA, *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, Challenges to sustainable development, peace and security*.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.

61. The World Bank (2017), *Afghanistan Disaster Risk Profile*, The World Bank, Washington D.C.

62. Ibid.

63. [afghanistanearthquakes.org/](http://afghanistanearthquakes.org/)

64. The World Bank (2017), *Afghanistan Disaster Risk Profile*, The World Bank, Washington D.C.

65. [afghanistanearthquakes.org/](http://afghanistanearthquakes.org/)

## Avalanches

From 2000 to 2015, over 153,000 people were affected by avalanches.<sup>66</sup> The worst avalanche event took place in 2015, when 310 people died after a series of 40 avalanches in Panjshir province.

## Others

Heavy rainfall and harsh winter conditions feature in the ANDMIS top 5 recorded incidents over the past nine years, with 724 and 423 incidents respectively. The Afghanistan National Disaster Management Commission reported 926 deaths in February 2008, with 321 people injured and more than 1,000 houses damaged or destroyed as a result of the harsh winter conditions.<sup>67</sup>

For the impacts of various climatic hazards in Afghanistan refer to Annex 3.

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<sup>66.</sup> The World Bank (2017), *Afghanistan Disaster Risk Profile*, The World Bank, Washington D.C.

<sup>67.</sup> <https://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/02/15/afghanistan.cold/>



Flood Damage in Khalyan Village.  
PHOTO: TCRO

## 4. CLIMATE CHANGE TRENDS, IMPACTS AND VULNERABILITIES

Afghanistan has a unique geography and complex topography, incorporating the glaciated peaks of the Hindukush mountain range and the arid deserts in the south. It has a range of altitudes from 250 metres above sea level to over 7,000 metres above sea level.<sup>68</sup> Afghanistan's climate ranges from arid to semi-arid, with large temperature differences between the warm and cold seasons, and across the different altitudes. It is a generally dry and characteristic continental climate, with the Indian subcontinent monsoon bringing some moist maritime air from the southeast in the summer. The majority of the country experiences cold winters and hot summers. Precipitation is limited mainly to the months between October and May. The arid deserts receive less than 100 mm precipitation in a year and the mountains receive considerable precipitation above

1,000 metres, with most of it falling as snow during the winter.<sup>69</sup>

Savannah, shrubland and grassland cover close to 73 percent of the Afghan territory, and sparse or barren vegetation, snow and ice, 15 percent of the territory.<sup>70</sup> This fragile natural environment has been subjected to impacts by people and their livestock for thousands of years. Today there are no parts of the country, apart from high alpine areas, that have not been affected by humans.<sup>71</sup> The balance between precipitation and primary production is precarious. Poor land management, together with conflict, insecurity, migration, drought and poverty, has left Afghanistan highly vulnerable to land degradation and desertification (see Figure 2).


68. National Environmental Protection Agency & UNEP (2016), *Afghanistan: Climate Change Science Perspectives*, Kabul.

69. Ibid.

70. Earthtrends (2003), *Forests, grasslands and drylands—Afghanistan*. [http://earthtrends.wri.org/pdf\\_library/country\\_profiles/for\\_cou\\_004.pdf](http://earthtrends.wri.org/pdf_library/country_profiles/for_cou_004.pdf).

71. Ibid.

**Figure 2:** Assessment of vulnerability to desertification. Red indicates highly vulnerable



Source: US Department of Agriculture—taken from the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and UNEP (2008), *Desertification, Rangelands and Water Resources Working Group Final Thematic Report*

## 4.1 Trends

Afghanistan is ranked eighth out of 170 countries for its vulnerability to climate change over the next 30 years, with 59 percent of the population affected by climate shocks (compared to 19 percent suffering from security-related shocks).<sup>72</sup>

Overall, Afghanistan's mean annual temperature has increased by 1.8°C since 1950, with significant regional variation.<sup>73</sup> In the southern region, the mean annual temperature has increased by 2.4°C.<sup>74</sup> In the Hindukush region, the warming has been around 1°C, and in the eastern region, 0.6°C.<sup>75</sup> Precipitation does not appear to have changed significantly when considered for the

whole of Afghanistan. However, spring precipitation has decreased by almost a third,<sup>76</sup> which is significant in a country where the majority of the households rely on rainfed agriculture for their livelihood. The primary agricultural production regions in the Central Highlands, East and North are most affected by the decrease in spring precipitation. The decrease was almost 40 percent in the Central Highlands between 1950 to 2010. Winter precipitation has increased in most parts of the country.<sup>77</sup>

Afghanistan's National Environmental Protection Authority (NEPA), together with the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), used the CORDEX framework and data for its climate change projections for the country, which were published in 2016.<sup>78</sup> According to both the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios, the mean temperature increase in Afghanistan will be significant

72. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (2018), *Afghanistan – Multi-hazard risk assessment*, The World Bank, Washington D.C.

73. National Environmental Protection Agency & UNEP (2016), *Afghanistan: Climate Change Science Perspectives*, Kabul.

74. Ibid.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid.

77. Ibid.

78. Afghanistan's climate projections are based on the IPCC's Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP) for Green House Gas emissions, adopted for the Fifth Assessment Report.


(see Figure 3 below). The optimistic scenario (RCP 2.6) projects a warming of 1.4°C until 2050 and 2.6°C until 2100.<sup>79</sup> The pessimistic scenario (RCP 8.5) projects an increase in temperature of around 2°C until 2050 and of 6.3°C until 2100.<sup>80</sup> Under both scenarios, the warming will be most severe in the Central Highlands and the Hindukush region.

A compilation of the key messages for South Asia, taken from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's (IPCC's) Fifth Assessment Report, states that the districts in South Asia with poor infrastructure and rapid population growth are the areas of maximum vulnerability, with "extreme events expected to be more catastrophic in nature for the people living in such districts".<sup>81</sup> The Assessment Report identifies flood damage to infrastructure, livelihoods and settlements; food and water shortages; and heat-related mortality as the key climate-related risks for South Asia.<sup>82</sup>

## 4.2 Impacts

The consequences of warming, projected in both the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios developed by NEPA and UNEP, will be drastic. A mean warming of 1.5°C until 2050 will severely affect agriculture, water resources, ecosystems, food security, health and energy production.<sup>83</sup> The more extreme warming projected by the pessimistic scenario will likely completely change the environment and current ecosystems. The current agricultural system would not be able to adapt to such temperature increases, which would devastate the economy and the food security of the rural majority.<sup>84</sup> In Figures 3 and 4, grey indicates a base period, green indicates a scenario with limited greenhouse gas emissions, and red indicates a scenario with uncontrolled greenhouse gas emissions.

**Figure 3:** Projected changes in temperature in °C for the climate regions of Afghanistan



Source: Afghanistan: Climate Change Science Perspectives, NEPA & UNEP, 2016

79. National Environmental Protection Agency & UNEP (2016), *Afghanistan: Climate Change Science Perspectives*, Kabul.

80. Ibid.

81. Overseas Development Institute and Climate and Development Knowledge Network (2014), *The IPCC's Fifth Assessment Report, What's in it for South Asia?* (p5).

82. IPCC (2014), *Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Technical Summary*


83. National Environmental Protection Agency & UNEP (2016), *Afghanistan: Climate Change Science Perspectives*, Kabul.

84. Ibid.

Uncertainty for precipitation is higher in comparison to temperature in climate modelling. However, in comparison to the overall annual precipitation for Afghanistan, the decrease in precipitation during the spring months from March to May (see Figure 4) is statistically significant. The areas most affected by

decreased spring precipitation—the North, Central Highlands and the East—are the regions accounting for most of Afghanistan’s agricultural production. Combined with increased temperatures, this will have a severe effect on agricultural production.

**Figure 4:** Projected changes in spring precipitation (March to May)



Source: Afghanistan: Climate Change Science Perspectives, NEPA & UNEP, 2016

The climate models show that Afghanistan will be confronted by increased climatic hazards. The most likely impact of climate change will be drought-related, including the associated impact of desertification and land degradation. “Drought is likely to be regarded as the norm by 2030, rather than as a temporary or cyclical event.”<sup>85</sup> Floods will increase because of a more rapid spring snowmelt, resulting from higher temperatures in areas of high altitude. Downstream land degradation, land mismanagement and loss of vegetative cover will further increase the impact of floods.

The worsening climatic conditions will negatively affect Afghanistan’s socio-economic development, increasing poverty, reducing food security, leaving more people vulnerable to climatic hazards and increasing the risk of conflict over natural resources. When the effects of climate change are combined with poverty and inequality, sustainable development objectives—such as poverty reduction, food and livelihood security, access to clean water and health—will be much more difficult to achieve. The IPCC Assessment Report concludes that there is a very high probability that climate change will exacerbate and further entrench poverty.<sup>86</sup> With

85. Savage M. et al. (2009), *Socio-Economic Impacts of Climate Change in Afghanistan, A Report to the Department of International Development*, Stockholm Environment Institute, Stockholm.

86. Overseas Development Institute and Climate and Development Knowledge Network (2014), *The IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report, What’s in it for South Asia?*

agriculture a key driver of economic growth in South Asia, projections indicate that floods, droughts and changes in seasonal rainfall patterns could negatively affect crop yields, food security and livelihoods in vulnerable areas.<sup>87</sup>

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## 4.3 Vulnerabilities

### Agriculture

Increased temperatures and changes in rainfall patterns and snowmelt make the agriculture sector highly vulnerable. Agricultural productivity will be severely affected by reduced rainfall during peak cultivation seasons, reduced river flow due to earlier snowmelt and increased soil evaporation with higher mean temperatures. Rainfed agriculture will suffer and there will be much less water available for irrigation at the required times. This will affect both the productivity and the choice of crops to grow. Crop failures will likely increase, together with the amount of potentially productive land no longer cultivated. Water-intensive staple crops will become less attractive to farmers, who may prefer more drought-tolerant crops, including opium poppy. Irrigated agriculture, dryland farming and livestock herding are considered the most susceptible to the impacts of climatic hazards. The existing irrigation system is operating at only 25 percent efficiency, providing a lot of scope to decrease water wastage. Without significant investment in water management and irrigation, large parts of the agricultural economy could become marginal by 2060.<sup>88</sup>

### Water

The increase in winter and spring temperatures will result in earlier and more rapid snowmelt, which will increase the risk of flash floods. Droughts will harden the soil, reducing its permeability and increasing the impact of flash floods. More frequent and intense droughts will have both immediate and cumulative consequences, reducing the availability of groundwater and the volume of water in reservoirs. This could leave the water supply to the entire communities vulnerable in the arid regions of the country. Uncontrolled and poor water

management further increases vulnerability, already made worse by the control of some water resources by the armed and powerful. Water disputes will affect Afghanistan domestically and regionally as communities and countries try to increase their share of water use.

### Energy

The climatic changes to precipitation and snowmelt will have the most impact on Afghanistan's small hydropower plants. There will likely be stronger flow peaks in winter, resulting from earlier snowmelt and increased winter precipitation, but less flow in the summer as a result of lower precipitation and higher evaporation. This will affect the supply of electricity to many small and remote rural communities, as well as the vital flow of electricity to irrigation systems at critical times in the agrarian calendar.

### Social development

Climate change will have the most serious impact on the poor, those dependent on rainfed agriculture for their livelihoods and food security. Poverty and vulnerability will increase as agricultural productivity declines and food prices rise. When resilience is limited or reduced, climatic shocks can potentially tip large numbers of the population below the poverty line. Social development will also be affected by more prevalent diseases. According to a study for the UK's Department for International Development, "Climate change will undermine Afghanistan's ability to achieve its goals in reducing malaria morbidity and mortality by 50 percent—80 percent within 5 years."<sup>89</sup>

### Debt

Floods have wiped out assets and droughts have significantly reduced agricultural productivity. When crops fail, prices and food insecurity increase. Rural households that depend on agriculture for their main income fall further into debt and poverty, as they sell any remaining assets and take loans to buy food, seeds or fertiliser. The more vulnerable households suffer the greatest, but households previously considered well off also fall into poverty or are brought to the brink when disaster strikes.

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87. Ibid.

88. Savage M. et al. (2009), *Socio-Economic Impacts of Climate Change in Afghanistan, A Report to the Department of International Development*, Stockholm Environment Institute, Stockholm.

89. Ibid.





A family living in Shaiday IDP camp, Herat.  
PHOTO: TCRO

## 5. MIGRATION PROFILE

Migration and mobility have shaped Afghanistan's history for centuries, and the migration patterns in Afghanistan are complex. In the past four decades, conflict and insecurity have been the main drivers of both transboundary and internal migration. However, traditional and regular migration flows—encompassing cycles of seasonal, circular and permanent migration—still continue. Besides, a significant number of nomadic people move throughout the year in search of pastures for their livestock. These traditional and regular migration flows are now mixed with one of the world's largest and most protracted refugee and displacement crises.

The 2020 Global Report on Internal Displacement, prepared by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, makes a distinction between those displaced as a result of disasters and those displaced because of conflicts.

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**As of 31 December, 2019, Afghanistan had 2,993,000 people internally displaced by conflict and violence and 1,198,000 by disasters, the highest numbers on record.<sup>90</sup>**

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At the end of 2019, Afghanistan had the highest number of people internally displaced as a result of disasters. The country also had the fifth highest number of new internal displacements from conflict and violence (461,000 of total 578,000) in the year 2019.<sup>91</sup>

Displacement on a big scale started in Afghanistan with the Soviet invasion in 1979. By the end of 1990, over six million people had been seeking refuge outside Afghanistan.<sup>92</sup> The refugee movement continued with people fleeing the rule of the Taliban since 1994. The International Organization for Migration's (IOM's) Migration Profile for Afghanistan reports that between 2002 and 2014 over six million people had returned to Afghanistan, the majority repatriated from Pakistan and Iran.<sup>93</sup>

Climatic shocks and natural disasters are also driving population movement. The accumulative impact of climatic hazards, particularly floods and droughts, are eroding the productive capability of rural households and forcing them to leave their homes in search of livelihood.

The challenge with assessing and analysing Afghanistan's displacement and migration lies in identifying the root cause. The conditions and circumstances in the

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90. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (2020), *Global Report on Internal Displacement 2020*, Geneva.

91. Ibid.

92. International Organization for Migration (2014), *Afghanistan Migration Profile*, Kabul.

93. Ibid.

country mean that there can be multiple reasons for displacement, incorporating both sudden- and slow-onset events. Displacement due to sudden-onset natural disasters, such as flash floods, avalanches, landslides and earthquakes, is clearly distinguishable, together with the link between weather-related hazards and climate change (with the exception of earthquakes). Slow-onset displacement, resulting from increased competition for natural resources—water, agricultural land and pastures—which has occurred due to the impact of climate change on the natural resource base is much harder to distinguish and categorise.

As the resilience of communities diminish, the cumulative effect of insecurity, shrinking resources and erosion of livelihoods can reach a tipping point, triggering migration. In such cases it is hard to accurately categorise the primary reason for displacement or migration. The practice of recording a single reason—whether a person has moved due to insecurity, natural disaster or economic opportunity—risks missing the total context. Such data emphasises single issues, rather than considering “push and pull” factors more holistically. People are likely to be classed as economic migrants when they move from rural areas to urban centres, seeking better employment and income opportunities. But such a description fails to explain why people believe their livelihoods are no longer viable in the rural areas. It could be because their land is no longer productive after multiple floods, or because there is no longer sufficient pasture for their livestock, or their crops have failed repeatedly because of droughts. Such displacement results from the impact of climate change, but could well not be highlighted

as such. It is important to understand the push factors for those who are classed as economic migrants. It is not always just the pull of perceived better economic opportunities in urban areas. Often critical contributing factors can be linked to climate change.

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**The UNOCHA Humanitarian Needs Overview 2020 states, “Conflict remains the main driver of displacement, however natural hazards (both slow and sudden onset) also contribute to, and trigger, population movements...in affected locations. Afghanistan is highly prone to natural disasters, whose frequency and intensity are exacerbated by the effects of climate change.”<sup>94</sup>**

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The overview reports that drought was a major driver of humanitarian need in 2018 and early 2019, while heavy rainfall caused unseasonal flooding in atypical locations in 2019, affecting 280,000 people.<sup>95</sup> It is predicted that 200,000 people will need humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan in 2020 to respond to sudden-onset disasters.<sup>96</sup>

While the number of people displaced has not changed significantly in recent years, the geographical patterns of displacement have. Now the north, north-east and east of the country account for 81 percent of all displacement.<sup>97</sup> The number of Afghans involved in international migration—particularly, the number of refugees and returnees—is so large that it is critical to the population figures in national estimates.

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94. UNOCHA (2019), *Humanitarian Needs Overview Afghanistan 2020*, Kabul, p.10.

95. Ibid.

96. Ibid.

97. Ibid.



Field research with women from Shaiday IDP camp, Herat.  
PHOTO: TCRO

## 6. PARTICIPATORY RESEARCH FINDINGS

Khalyan in Chahab district of Takhar province is a rural village, where the people depend on agriculture for their food, income and livelihood. Khalyan village has been affected by regular floods in the past 10 years. These have resulted in the deaths of people and livestock, the loss of homes and assets, and the migration of people to IDP camps in Herat, other parts of Afghanistan and even across the border.

Shaiday IDP camp in Herat is the host destination for some of those displaced from Khalyan. It is one of three IDP camps on the outskirts of Herat city that host those displaced by drought, floods and insecurity.


Collecting qualitative data from both the place of origin (of migration and displacement) and the host area has enabled a comparison between the circumstances of the people in the two locations. This has highlighted the differences in challenges, needs and priorities of communities, as well as the different variables that

factor into decisions about whether to migrate and where to migrate.


### 6.1 Group Discussion Findings

The problem-tree analysis in Khalyan village revealed a variety of causes of migration (see Figures 5 and 6). These can be grouped according to security, livelihoods and services (health/education) or infrastructure (roads/energy). The livelihoods component illustrated the causes of migration resulting from climate change. These causes were the decrease in agricultural production, including livestock, and the destruction of agricultural land and pastures, resulting from floods, drought, soil erosion and untimely rain. Shrinking water resources—the lowering of the water table and the drying of springs—was another factor contributing to the livelihood crisis.

Figure 5: Problem tree analysis with men's group in Khalyan village, Chahab district, Takhar, Afghanistan



**Figure 6:** Problem Tree Analysis with a Female group in Khalyan village, Chahab District, Takhar, Afghanistan




None of the consequences of migration were positive. The people did not find a better job, more income or better opportunities on migrating. All of the consequences were negative: no jobs, separation from family, dangerous journeys, debt and continued hardship.


The root causes of migration provided by those who participated in this exercise from Shaiday IDP camp included those directly related to climate change (see

Figures 7 and 8). They identified increasing floods and droughts. In Khalyan, the root cause had primarily been the loss of agricultural land, with floods and droughts as secondary causes, although these are both contributing factors to the loss of land. Insecurity was a root cause, but the IDPs did not mention health or education services. All the root causes were linked to poverty, lost livelihoods, natural disasters and insecurity.

Figure 7: Problem tree analysis with women's group in Shaiday IDP camp, Herat Province, Herat, Afghanistan



**Figure 8:** Problem tree analysis with men’s group in Shaiday IDP camp, Herat Province, Herat, Afghanistan



The participants at Shaiday camp who had directly experienced displacement and migration provided more responses to the causes and consequences of migration. Once again, none of the consequences was positive.

A mobility-mapping exercise was used in both the research locations to assess how and where individuals or groups of people moved to meet their needs to survive. This was followed by a matrix-scoring exercise, also in each research location, to help assess the basis on which people choose to move.

In Khalyan, the mobility-mapping exercise covered the locations where the people would go to, if they migrate away from Khalyan. In contrast, mobility mapping in Shaiday included the locations from where the

residents of the IDP camp had originally come from. The locations captured at the two locations are given in the mobility maps in Annexes 1 and 2.

Shaiday residents, who were a part of the matrix-scoring exercise, identified fewer, six, preferences for migration, in comparison to Khalyan residents who identified 11 preferences.

The matrix-scoring exercise for Shaiday was not directly linked to mobility mapping, as it focused on the places the Shaiday residents would go to if they had the means to leave the displacement camp. As a result, it included a lower number of places, with four out of six being cross-border locations (Iran, Turkmenistan, Turkey and Karachi in Pakistan) and two being in Afghanistan (Herat province and Kabul).

**Table 2:** Matrix scoring for the residents of Shaiday IDP camp, Herat province

Migration destinations	Preference					
	Security and safety	Job opportunity	Income opportunity	Relationships	Knowledge of local languages	Access to protection and support from Govt. and NGOs
Herat province	•••••••• •••	•	•	••	••••••••	••••••
Karachi, Pakistan	••••••	••••••••	••••••	•	••••••	•
Iran	••••••	••••••••	••••••	•	••••••	•
Kabul	••••••••	•••	••	••	••••••••••	••••••
Turkmenistan	••••••••	••••••	••••••	•	•	•
Turkey	••••••	••••••••	••••••••	•	•	••

In the case of Table 2, in Shaiday IDP camp, security and safety were the main reasons people gave for migration. It is interesting to note that along with security and safety, income generation from employment scored high as one of the factors they also chose cross-border migration to Pakistan, Iran, Turkey and Turkmenistan, even when they did not speak the local language or had no established relationships or access to any government or NGO support at the destination site.

Matrix scoring for Khalyan used the information from the mobility map drawn for the village. As shown in the

Table 3 below, the migration destinations considered in Khalyan for the matrix-scoring exercise included a couple of other districts in Takhar province, and eight other provinces in Afghanistan, as well as Turkey and Iran.

Job opportunities, security and family or social relationships were preferences expressed by groups in both locations. In Khalyan, the residents also considered health and education services, as well as the potential availability of agricultural land, when deciding to move.



**Table 3:** Matrix scoring for the residents of Khalyan Village, Takhar province

Migration destinations	Preference										
	Job opportunity	Family and social relations	Business opportunity	Better education	Irrigated agricultural land	Permanent job	Better health services	Proximity	Low travel costs	Can stay with relatives	Security
Taloqan district	•••••	••••••	••••••	•••••• •••	••••	•••••	••••••	•••••	•••••	••••• •••	••••
Khwaja Bahauddin district	•••••	•••	••••	••••	•••••	•	••	••••• •••	••••••	••••••	•
Rustaq district	••	•••	••••	•••••	••••	•	•••	••••• •••	••••••	••••••	•••• ••
Chahab district	••	•••••• •••	••	•••••	•	••	•••	••••• •••	••••••	••••• •••	•
Badakhshan province	•	•	•	•••	•	•	••	•••••	••••	•	•••••
Nimroz province	••••	•	••	•	•	•	•	••	••••	•	•
Kabul province	••••••	•••	••••••	•••••• •••	•	••••• •••	••••• •••	••••	••	••••	•••• ••
Kunduz province	••••	•••	••••	••••	••••	••	••••••	•••••	••••	••••	•
Baghlan province	•	•	••	••••	••••	•	••••	••••	••••	••	•
Balkh province	•••	••	••	••••••	•	••	••••••	••••	••••	••	••
Khost province	•••	•	••	••	•	•	••••	••	••	•	•
Turkey	••••• •••	•	••	••	•	•	••••• •••	•	•	•	••••
Iran	••••• •••	•	••	•	•	••	•••	•	•	•	••••
Dasht Shirazi village	•	•••••• •••	•	•••	•	•	•	•••••• ••••	••••• •••	•••	••••
Herat province	••	••	••	••••	•	•	•••••	••	••	••	••••

A paired-comparison matrix was developed in each research location to understand people’s priorities in terms of the life-building support they aspired to get when they migrated. The findings of this matrix in Khalyan showed that the participants gave a higher priority to non-agricultural support. Drinking water and job opportunities took precedence over flood protection, high-value crops and agricultural projects.

For the female participants, health and education services were also a priority. In Shaiday, the immediate essential needs of shelter, food and drinking water were the priorities. The residents there prioritised their basic unmet needs and did not consider the support they would need to return to their areas of origin. For detailed findings of the group discussions refer to Annexes 1 and 2.



Case study collection with men from Khalyan village.  
PHOTO: TCRO

## 6.2 Case studies

### 6.2.1 Khalyan Village, Chahab District, Takhar Province

#### The experience of the village community in a flood-affected area.

The overarching issue presented in this case study is the effect of flooding on community members and their livelihoods.

Thirty eight villagers took part in a discussion. Khair Mohammad and his son, Mohammad Rahim, were interviewed in Khalyan, and Rahmatullah, a displaced resident from Khalyan, was interviewed in Taloqan, the capital of Takhar province.

Takhar province is located in the north-east of Afghanistan. It shares an international border with Tajikistan to its north and neighbours the provinces of Badakhshan to its east and Kunduz to its west. Khalyan is the most populous village in Chahab district, about 80 km from Taloqan. The district is on the border with Tajikistan and Badakhshan. Nearly 15,000 people live in Khalyan, which has a primary, secondary and high school, as well as a health clinic. Weekly market at Khalyan attracts buyers and sellers from neighbouring villages and districts.

The main source of livelihood in the village is rainfed agriculture and livestock rearing. The villagers spoke with pride about having been the biggest agricultural

producers in the district, growing wheat, barley, peas, flax, melons and watermelons. At one time, the village prospered with its productive land. *“People from other villages called us the ‘bread basket of Chahab’. That made us feel good and we were happy people came from across the district to buy our produce, because it was the best. People still come today, but they don’t buy much and complain about the quality of our produce,”* said a resident of Khalyan.

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#### Since around 2010, the agricultural output has decreased significantly due to more regular and larger floods and longer droughts.

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The community highlighted the drought in 2001-2002, but said the droughts are now occurring more regularly, with one in 2011 and then in 2018. The Hindukush mountains run through the south of Takhar province, but Chahab district is located at its northern end, so it does not suffer from river swell and flooding when the snow melts in spring. The flood is caused by the substantial increase in rainfall. It occurs after periods of heavy rainfall when the flood channels overflow and wash through the village. The villagers said floods had swept through the village in 2012, 2015, 2017 and 2018, so they were now almost an annual occurrence. Chahab suffered its worst flood in 2012, after heavy rainfall. The water rushed down the hillsides devoid of vegetation, accumulating mud, and swept through the village. The flood partially destroyed the village, damaging 400 homes, killing 12 people and displacing an estimated 1,500 people, none of whom have returned.

Since 2012, several floods have claimed the lives of 10 more people and caused further displacement and migration. The community estimates that an additional 2,500 people have either been displaced or have migrated since the major flood of 2012.

The combination of drought and flood has severely reduced the productivity of the agricultural land. Droughts have hardened the ground and floods have removed the topsoil. The village's vulnerability to flooding increased with the conversion of pastureland to agricultural land and the felling of trees that surrounded the village for firewood and building material. The prosperity of the village depends on a good harvest, so the farmers have had to adapt to the changing conditions and try new crops, such as fruit and nuts, which are more suited to the new conditions. With the land becoming less productive, farmers have also chosen to invest more in poultry, for broilers and eggs. Many households rely on the remittances sent by family members in Iran, but recent devaluation of the Iranian currency has reduced the amount of remittances received.

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**Floods have taken the lives of people and livestock, destroyed homes, assets and businesses, and have devastated agricultural land that was the lifeblood of this agrarian community.**

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With productivity reduced, poverty and debt have increased significantly for the villagers who have stayed in the community. Farmers borrowed money to buy seeds and fertiliser, but when their crops failed, they could not repay the loans and the interest kept accumulating. Increasing debt has also prompted migration to Iran in the hope of earning money.

Khair Mohammad is 49 years old and is responsible for an extended family of 16 people, four of whom are children. He used to own a small flour mill and produce vegetable oil. It was considered a successful enterprise, which, Khair Mohammad said, gave him "excellent earnings". His sons were studying at the school. Then, he lost his home and business in the 2012 flood. He was left with nothing. Natural disasters can drive relatively prosperous families to the brink of poverty, or make them vulnerable if there are not enough members in the family to earn money. Khair Mohammad had no choice but to take his children out of school so that they could work and support him in providing for the household. The sons were young and had not even learned to read and write at that time. The

three children currently attending school are the only literate members of the household of 16.

After the flood, the only assistance Khair Mohammad received was a tent and some kitchen utensils. He sold his livestock to support the family for a few months and rebuild his house. He did not have sufficient resources for both, so he sent his two sons, Mohammad Rahim and his brother, to Khwaja Bahauddin, a neighbouring district, in search of work. The sons worked as farm labourers for about USD 70 a month. The conditions were very poor and the sons were unable to provide financial support to the family in Khalyan and a suitable accommodation to themselves. They said they had to survive in temporary shelters and could not afford healthcare when they fell sick because of poor living and working conditions.

Mohammad Rahim and his brother decided to go to Iran in search of better employment. He said had they known the risks and hardship they would endure on the way, they would never have undertaken the journey to Iran. They first had to travel to Nimroz, the province in the far south-west of Afghanistan, bordering Iran. It was considered the easiest crossing route because of the surrounding desert. But the journey through Afghanistan and across the border was fraught with the risks of robbery, safety hazards and detention by border guards. They paid USD 300 to a human trafficker, who filled the back of his small truck with 20 people. The journey was claustrophobic, with so many people confined in a small space travelling across rugged desert terrain. "I have never been so afraid as I was that night. I couldn't move and could hardly breathe because there were so many people in the back of the truck. I was frightened that I would suffocate and die, or we would be attacked by criminals or insurgents, or we would be discovered by the border patrols and sent back," Mohammad Rahim said.

Once in Iran, it took the brothers six months to repay the money they had borrowed from friends in Iran to pay the trafficker and bear the other costs involved in the journey. The living conditions were better and so were the salaries, although it took them some time to get familiar with the new environment and establish a network to learn about the better-paid opportunities. Mohammad Rahim eventually earned \$400 a month as a construction worker. He has now returned to Khalyan and plans to buy a new flour mill with the saved money and re-establish the family business. The experience of Mohammad Rahim is a successful example of migration as a coping strategy, in spite of the challenges the family faced under difficult circumstances.



The community has received some support through the Government of Afghanistan's National Solidarity Programme, which provided a grant to the community so that it could build flood-protection walls. An international NGO has also established and rehabilitated a number of watersheds to control the runoff. It has also supported the village in planting more trees and establishing a green cover. The NGO has set up a village committee for disaster response and provided training on ways to reduce the impact of natural disasters.

The village, however, did not receive any support for rebuilding houses and recovering from floods. The people who lost their houses either tried rebuilding them on their own or relocated somewhere else. One such person is Rahmatullah, who relocated to Taloqan after the 2018 flood in Khalyan. The 40-year-old now lives in Taloqan with his wife and six children. He described his life in Khalyan, as normal, rather than high quality, but he had a house, a sustainable income as a labourer, and his children were attending school. Rahmatullah smiled as he said that in Khalyan he could at least buy his wife some jewellery and his children new clothes on Eid. In 2018, he lost his house and all the family's belongings in the flood. Left with nothing, he had no choice but to move to Taloqan, where he had some relatives. The relatives were unable to accommodate Rahmatullah and his family in their house, so the family lived in a tent in the compound for

two months before Rahmatullah started to earn some money selling fruit and could rent an accommodation. However, the family could not survive on the small income he earned by selling fruit.

Rahmatullah said the early days in Taloqan were particularly hard, first in the tent and then in the poor accommodation. His children fell sick and had to be taken out of school. Their treatment added to the financial constraint. Rahmatullah said this took a mental toll on his wife and himself, and they both struggled with depression. He approached a number of departments and aid organisations in Taloqan when he first arrived, seeking support for his family, but, he said, he received no help. Life in the provincial capital is very different to the life in Khalyan. The cost of living is much higher, particularly when one has to pay the rent, which is the largest expenditure. Rahmatullah estimates he incurs an expense of at least USD 250 a month on accommodation, food, firewood and school fees. If anyone falls sick, Rahmatullah has to borrow money to pay the medical expenses.

Rahmatullah now has a mobile food stall, where he sells "ash", a traditional Afghan noodle soup. His business is growing and he believes his customers are satisfied with the quality of his food. He cooks the "ash" at home and moves around Taloqan, selling it from his cart. He is happy with his enterprise and earns enough to support the family, outside of any shocks. His main

priority is the education of his five children. He has no plans to return to Khalyan, as his house has gone and his agricultural land is no longer productive. He prefers to remain in Taloqan, where there are better health and education services, as well as better opportunities to grow his business. Rahmatullah thinks more should be done to prevent the shocks resulting from climate change and provide flood protection to villages. However, after surviving the flood in Khalyan and rebuilding his life in Taloqan, he feels more optimistic about the future of his children.

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**“For now we have enough to survive, but with my children going to school, I hope they will be able to get good jobs in the future and live a much more comfortable life,” he said.**

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The Khalyan community has not received support to recover its agricultural land, or enough support for sufficient flood protection. After losing their homes, land and assets in the floods, they are unable to rebuild their lives on their own. The villagers believe that with the right support they might return to similar levels of agricultural production they enjoyed before the floods. Without additional support, however, they continue to live life on the margins, where they are vulnerable to further floods and to losing the most productive members of the community who migrate in search of opportunities elsewhere.

## 6.2.2 Shaiday Camp, Herat City, Herat Province

### Life in an IDP camp.

The overarching issue presented in this case study is the challenges faced by the residents living in an IDP camp, with the focus provided by two residents of the camp, Noor Bibi and Ali Mohammad.

Shaiday IDP camp houses nearly 30,000 people, mostly from Herat province and the neighbouring provinces of Badghis and Ghor.<sup>98</sup> It was established in 1994 to temporarily accommodate IDPs, but has continued to house the displaced people over the years.<sup>99</sup> The camp remains a testimony to Afghanistan’s protracted IDP crisis. The majority of its current residents were displaced during the drought in 2017-18. Many were also displaced by floods in the western and north-western provinces. It should be noted that some of the camp’s residents who were displaced due to drought or flood did not return in order to avoid conflict in their original location.

Emergency humanitarian assistance is provided to the camp residents by UN agencies, including the World Food Programme (WFP), UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), together with NGOs active in the area. This encompasses support for basic needs, such as tents and food, as well as health, education, nutrition and protection services. The challenge facing the government and the international community is that the camp is intended to provide temporary emergency



Shaiday IDP camp, Herat.  
PHOTO: TCRO

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98. Number provided by the Norwegian Refugee Council, Shaiday IDP Camp Manager, based on internal profile mapping data, December 2019. Personal communication with Abdul Ghafar Sediqi, NRC Camp Management Project Manager, 11 May, 2020.

99. UNHCR (2008), *National Profile of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Afghanistan*, Kabul.

relief, with the view that the residents will return to their areas of origin within a year, but the residents are staying longer. This means the support they receive is inadequate. Protracted displacement affects the host population as well, where the resource-constrained local government is responsible to support them.

Ali Mohammad is a 50-year-old Kuchi nomad, who used to seasonally move around Afghanistan and neighbouring countries to find pastures for his livestock. He is originally from Gula Chisma village of Bala Murghab district in Badghis province. Each year he would spend time in his native district with his son and three daughters after the death of his wife. Ali Mohammad had 100 sheep, but this number started to decline as drought reduced available pastures. By the time the drought in the western provinces peaked in 2018, Ali Mohammad had lost 70 of his sheep. He sold the remaining animals because he could no longer find pasture or afford food for them. In 2019, a flood went through Bala Murghab district and his village. He lost his son and two of his daughters, together with all of his belongings. He sought refuge with his remaining 15-year-old daughter in Shaiday IDP camp. Both Ali Mohammad and his daughter are suffering from the trauma of the flood and deaths of their close family members. His daughter does not want to leave their tent and Ali Mohammad is unable to think about finding regular work.

Ali Mohammad survives on the support from WFP and NGOs. A number of NGOs provide tents, health and hygiene kits, tools, vocational training and limited cash assistance to those registered as an IDP. In the time Ali Mohammad has been at Shaiday, he has received USD

200 in cash support. He tries to find work as a labourer to supplement this limited support, but it is not easy. Herat now has a large number of IDPs, all looking for work. When he does not get hired as a daily-wage labourer, he sells the scrap metal he finds in rubbish, which usually provides only a dollar a day.

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**“I am very grateful for the support I have received, but it’s not enough to cover the most basic human needs of my daughter and mine. We’re cold and hungry, and my daughter cannot go to school,”**

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Ali Mohammad said. Even though he lost everything, Ali Mohammad would like to return to his village and rebuild his herd of sheep.

Noor Bibi, another resident of the camp, thinks she is about 40 years old and is from Khoshab village in Kishk district of Herat. She never attended school and so cannot read or write. She stayed in her village, got married and had two sons and a daughter. They had a mud house, 10 goats and enough land on which to survive. Noor Bibi said she was happy with her life and they managed with their livestock and agricultural produce.

In 2018, after heavy rains, a flood went through their village in the middle of the night, destroying their home and washing away their land. Noor Bibi and her daughter were the only ones to survive the flood, which killed her husband and both the sons. The trauma of the flood still weighs heavily on Noor Bibi, who cried throughout her narration of her ordeal.



Ali Mohammad, Herat.  
PHOTO: TCRO

Noor Bibi and her two-year-old daughter arrived with nothing at Shaiday. They live with a cousin in her tent, who also lost her home and family members in the same flood. Noor Bibi said she did not receive any form of assistance from the government or the international community, which is why she shared a tent with her cousin. ***"I lack even the most basic means for life. I weave 4 kg of wool for 200 Afghanis (USD 4) and have only this to survive on each week. That's not enough and I'm finding it very hard," she explained.***

Noor Bibi is not alone in this misfortune. She shares the same tragedy as many women at Shaiday, who have lost husbands and children in floods. In a neighbouring tent, Noor Bibi introduced Shahr Bano from Ghormach district in Badghis province. Shahr Bano lost her son and husband in a flood and stays at Shaiday with her two remaining children. As a young woman, without relatives to help her, Shahr Bano is unable to leave her children and look for work outside of the camp. Even if she could, Shahr Bano said, she would be fearful of the harassment she could face as an unaccompanied woman. Shahr Bano also weaves wool to earn money, but struggles to meet the basic needs. ***"I can only buy a small amount of food. My children cry because they are hungry and if they get sick, I cannot afford to see a doctor, which makes me afraid they might not get better,"*** Shahr Bano said. Her children go to the city and scavenge for food from garbage bins.

Noor Bibi and Shahr Bano do not know what the future holds for them and how long they will stay in Shaiday.

They cannot see how they can move away from the camp and start a new life. They have no home or husband to return to and no means to support their children. Noor Bibi dreams of going back to Khoshab, so her daughter can go to school, something she never did. ***"I want the government to help rebuild my village. I hope my daughter can go to school and then to university. I want her to become a doctor, so she can help people when they are sick," she said.***

IDPs must decide whether they can return to their areas of origin and begin life afresh. Those displaced by natural disasters have often lost their homes and land, so there is little to return to. Many think they will have more opportunities in their current locations, which puts pressure on the host community, many of whom are struggling themselves. Tensions between communities can also increase when the IDPs receive support and the local population does not. This puts pressure on the local government, which does not have the resources to support all those in need.

Noor Bibi and Shahr Bano are much more vulnerable than Ali Mohammad. He at least can leave the camp and look for work. Noor Bibi and Shahr Bano do not feel safe enough to leave and also have to care for their young children. They are entirely dependent on the assistance provided by the government and the international community. The number of IDPs in Herat is so large that available resources are not sufficient to support everyone, so some, like Noor Bibi, fall through the cracks.



Noor Bibi, Herat.  
PHOTO: TCRO



Field research with women and children from Shaiday IDP camp, Herat. PHOTO: TCRO

## 7. THE IMPACT OF MIGRATION AND DISPLACEMENT ON WOMEN AND CHILDREN

Discussions with groups of women in both Khalyan village and Shaiday IDP camp revealed that women and children are particularly vulnerable as a result of migration or displacement resulting from natural disasters.

In Khalyan, floods that wiped away assets and reduced agricultural productivity have forced many men to migrate to urban areas in search of employment. Some have moved within Afghanistan, but a number of them have gone to Iran. The women are left behind to look after the family and have to wait for money to be sent back to them, or find employment within the village. Rural Afghanistan is conservative and women there usually do not leave the house without a male member of the family accompanying them. In the absence of male family members, women have no choice but to leave the house to buy food and look for work. Women participating in data collection in Khalyan described their fear and discomfort at having to leave the house alone. They talked about the problems they

encountered in the marketplace, where they were often abused and harassed for being without a male chaperone. They said income opportunities were few and they were forced to work longer hours for lower pay, in comparison to the daily-wage labour rate paid to men. Communication was limited with male family members who had migrated and some had not heard anything from them for months. There was no regularity or certainty of receiving remittances.

Women in Shaiday were in a worse situation. As highlighted in the stories of Noor Bibi and Shahr Bano in the case studies,

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**many were widowed after losing their husbands in severe floods and continued to suffer mental trauma from the disasters. Some had lost their elder sons as well, leaving them with no male family member, apart from young children.**

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Few employment opportunities were available in the camp itself, other than knitting wool. Male IDPs go to Herat in search of work as daily labourers, but none of the women felt safe to do so on their own. They also talked about the dishonour they felt on having to leave the IDP camp. All the women have children to care for and feed. A number of women had become second wives to men in the camp who had lost their wives in natural disasters or for lack of adequate healthcare. This increased the number of children they had to look after, but they believed this was a better option, as it at least gave them some security with a husband to look after them. Early marriage of young daughters is also common as a coping mechanism, with the bride price used to provide some income to the family.

In Shaiday, the women said their children as young as 10 were going to Herat to wash cars, collect metal and plastic waste, or beg. Child exploitation for labour is very high and the children face many risks living this way. The residents of Herat have a negative perception of IDPs, so they are reluctant to provide any work to them, and if they do, the wage rates are always much lower for harder work. Since many women rely on their young sons to earn income, the children do not go to school.

A report on the challenges faced by displaced women highlighted how traditional crafts women sold in their areas of origin had no market in their areas of displacement, so the skills they utilised at home were no longer viable once displaced.<sup>100</sup> The report, brought out by the Women's Regional Network, gave an example of a young woman, Spina, and her family in an IDP camp on the outskirts of Kabul. While her circumstances differ, the overall scenario is one that is familiar to the women at Shaiday IDP camp.

*"Spina from Helmand is a widow at barely 24 years old. She has four daughters and three sons. Her eldest son, 12-years old, is the main breadwinner. He works on the streets like other children selling plastics and washing cars. Her eldest daughter, eight-years old, is psychologically traumatized. She has stopped talking since the trauma of being caught under a collapsed shelter wall that fell on her and her family. She works in a neighborhood nearby as a housemaid. Spina promised two of her daughters (ages seven and four) in marriage to another family in order to earn money in dower price for their father's medical treatment, where nobody was ready to give her a loan."<sup>101</sup>*

The report further highlights the resilience of displaced women and the opportunities they have found or created to boost their coping mechanisms. This included finding work that challenges the culturally conservative views—for example, as security guards for the Department of Women's Affairs. In Shaiday, the situation appeared much less optimistic to the field researchers, since the women did not feel safe to leave the camp in search of work. There was a sense of helplessness, as they struggled to survive on the income from weaving wool and with limited to no external assistance.

With the limited support provided to the IDP camps not even reaching all the residents, households headed by women struggle to make ends meet. They have to decide whether they buy food, clothes, fuel for heating and cooking, or medical supplies with the meagre income they receive.

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100. Women's Regional Network (2015), *Afghanistan's Internally Displaced Women: Complex Realities*, Denver.

101. *Ibid.* p.17.

## 8. PEOPLE'S SOLUTIONS

In Khalyan, the people who had not been displaced and remained in the village proposed a number of solutions to prevent flooding. The suggestions included flood-protection and mitigation measures, as well as restrictions on the use of available natural resources. The other solutions included possible ways the community could diversify its livelihoods to reduce its vulnerability to climatic hazards and shocks and to increase resilience.

The primary solution was participatory water management, through the establishment of a network of check dams to reduce the speed of the water flow. This would serve the dual purpose of reducing soil erosion as well as the risk of flooding. The villagers also suggested the need to establish a proper watershed to collect the precipitation and water flow in a controlled area. The watershed could then be used to divert water into irrigation channels. The other protective measures the community members highlighted were planting more trees and vegetative cover, and preventing further felling of trees for firewood or building material. They also wished the local authorities protected the state-owned pastureland, since pastures not only sustained the livestock, but also served as a protection measure. Pastures are shrinking as land is diverted for growing crops, and the authorities do not reinforce allocation of land as pastureland.

The village has a disaster-risk reduction and emergency response committee. It has received training from an NGO to assess the risks the village faces from natural disasters and consider ways to reduce those risks. The committee is also responsible for providing initial immediate support when a disaster strikes the village, as an interim measure before government support arrives.

Since the village has been affected by regular floods in the past decade, the majority of the solutions addressed ways to offer more protection from floods. However, people also considered diversifying their livelihoods in the context of climate change. They emphasised the need to look beyond subsistence, rainfed agriculture and use the increased precipitation for higher-value cash crops. The community is also trying to establish small enterprises, particularly poultry, to supplement its agricultural income. The people wished they received support for seeds for cash crops, more livestock, beekeeping and horticulture projects, so that they could pursue a more commercial approach to agriculture. They would like to see opportunities for value addition, such as food processing.

The paired comparison in Khalyan prioritised job and income opportunities over agricultural projects. The community understands that there needs to be far more business and enterprise in the village to provide employment to the people and reduce the need for migration. The community members pointed out that they also needed drinking water, better access to health and education services, together with improved road connectivity to keep the people in their place of origin. The community faces the double challenge of a daily struggle to survive with limited employment and income opportunities, and cope with regular floods that destroy lives, homes, and livestock. They need solutions to both the challenges and are acutely aware of the increased risks the village faces as the floods become more severe and regular.

In Shaiday, as illustrated through the paired comparison, the priority for the people is to meet their most basic needs: shelter, food, drinking water and access to health services.



Discussions with men from Shaiday IDP camp, Herat. PHOTO: TCRO

## 9. INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR CLIMATE-INDUCED MIGRATION IN THE COUNTRY

Two government institutions are responsible for addressing displacement in Afghanistan: The Office of the State Minister for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Affairs, and the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation (MoRR). The Office of the State Minister for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Affairs provides the initial emergency response. It is responsible for those displaced by natural disasters for the first 72 hours of their displacement. The Ministry has highlighted the increase in migration by farmers and rural residents due to climate change, drought and other natural disasters.<sup>102</sup> Once three days have passed, the responsibility for all those displaced passes to MoRR. This ministry is responsible for internal displacement and the return and reintegration of refugees. The responsibility for internal migration is shared by the sectoral ministries that have the mandate for the particular issues raised. For example,

the Ministry of Urban Development and Housing is responsible for creating the infrastructure to support the growing urban populations resulting from rural-urban migration.

Afghanistan has a National Disaster Management Strategy (2015) and a National Disaster Management Plan (2010), neither of which mention climate change, or climate-induced migration outside of disaster displacement. A Law on Disaster Response Management and Preparedness, passed in 2012, mandated the Afghanistan Natural Disaster Management Authority as the lead agency to address the short-term, emergency needs of those affected and displaced by natural disasters.

The Office of the State Minister for Disaster Management has adopted the Sendai Framework for

<sup>102</sup>. Key Informant Interview with Mr. Abdul Zahir Noorzai, Department of Disaster Management and Humanitarian Affairs, Herat.

Disaster Risk Reduction and has established a National Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction throughout Afghanistan, bringing together government and civil society representatives. Consultations have taken place at the national and provincial levels to have national and local strategies in place for disaster risk reduction. However, a review of the Sendai Framework monitoring analytics shows very little data for Afghanistan against the various Sendai Framework targets.<sup>103</sup> Certain challenges were highlighted in this regard by Najib Aga Fahim, the State Minister for Disaster Management, at the 2018 Asian Ministerial Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction. These were the lack of a centralised database for loss and damage resulting from disasters and the limited capacity for modelling and analysing information related to disaster risk reduction and disaster risk management.<sup>104</sup>

Earlier, the Strategic National Action Plan (SNAP) was prepared as part of Afghanistan's commitment to the Hyogo Framework Agreement, the precursor to the Sendai Framework. The two goals of SNAP were:<sup>105</sup>

1. To develop the linkages between disaster risk-reduction strategies, climate change adaptation processes and invulnerable development paradigms, with focus on social protection measures and inclusiveness; and
2. To minimise the losses caused by disasters and climate change.

Afghanistan does not have an overall regulatory framework specifically addressing climate change, although it has a number of laws for the environment, with related policies and strategies.

In 2008, the Working Group on Climate Change and Disaster Preparedness prepared a thematic report, which was a technical output of the National Capacity Needs Self-Assessment (NCSA) and National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) for Climate Change projects. Regarding Afghanistan's ability to address

the requirements under UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, it concluded that there were "low levels of knowledge concerning climate change and its potential impacts, both amongst technical persons and policy/decision makers". It also stated that "adaptation to climate change [is] not considered in national or specific sector development plans" and "climate change is currently not considered a national priority and therefore is being little addressed."<sup>106</sup>

NAPA includes migration resulting from insecurity, poverty, drought and desertification that has led to overexploitation of natural resources and disruption of local practices. But there is no mention of displacement resulting from climatic hazards—floods, avalanches, landslides, etc.—in NAPA. Displacement is mentioned only in the Foreword to NAPA, by UNEP, where it is suggested as a cause of the degradation of Afghanistan's natural resources.<sup>107</sup>

The Afghanistan NAPA aims to identify priority projects that can help communities adapt to adverse effects of climate change.<sup>108</sup>

Afghanistan receives funding on the basis of its NAPA from the Global Environment Facility and the Least Developed Countries Fund. The projects address a number of issues, such as combating land degradation and biodiversity loss, community-based sustainable land and forest management, enabling communities to adapt to climate-induced disaster risks and building their resilience. These projects, implemented by UN agencies (UNDP & FAO), seek to prevent displacement resulting from climate-induced disasters.

Afghanistan has an Inter-Ministerial Coordination Committee on Refugees, Returnees and IDPs, to ensure displacement-specific needs are included in sectoral laws, policies, plans and programmes of relevant ministries at the national, provincial and municipal levels. In 2013, the Government of Afghanistan approved MoRR's National Policy on Internally Displaced Persons. The policy includes IDPs who are displaced as

103. <https://sendaimonitor.unisdr.org/analytics/country-global-targets/14?countries=1>

104. State Ministry for Disaster Management, Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority (2018), Country Statement AMCDRR 2018, Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia.

105. Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority (2011), *Afghanistan Strategic National Action Plan (SNAP) for Disaster Risk Reduction: Towards Peace and Stable Development*, Kabul.

106. Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2008), *Climate Change and Disaster Preparedness Working Group, Final Thematic Report*, UNEP, Kabul, pp.30-32.

107. National Environmental Protection Agency (2009), *Afghanistan National Capacity Needs Self-Assessment for Global Environmental Management (NCSA) and National Adaptation Programme of Action for Climate Change (NAPA)*, Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Kabul.

108. Ibid.

a result of national disasters, but it does not mention climate change at all. The IDP Policy adopts a rights-based approach to displacement, which is based on and consistent with the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (1998). It recognises the rights of IDPs in Afghanistan accorded by the Constitution, and the government's obligation under international human rights and humanitarian laws.

The policy includes the requirement for actions to be taken during the three phases of displacement, which include:<sup>109</sup>

1. Preventing displacement;
2. Protecting and assisting during displacement; and
3. Ending displacement with durable solutions.

In 2016, a Displacement and Returnees Executive Committee was established "to coordinate national and international humanitarian efforts on short-term responses to the challenges faced by returnees and IDPs and to facilitate durable solutions and the provision of basic services".<sup>110</sup> The policy also includes a detailed road map for action that integrates Provincial Action Plans and a National Implementation Plan. However, the implementation of the policy has been constrained by a lack of resources, even as the number of IDPs has continued to increase.

The literature review did not uncover any reports or studies on progress on durable solutions. Given protracted displacement in Afghanistan, a possible conclusion is that durable solutions have not yet been found. Many people from Shaiday IDP settlement who took part in data collection said they could not return to their areas of origin after their assets and livelihoods had been wiped out. The support provided at the IDP camp responded to immediate needs, rather than building resilience, or developing skills and knowledge that would support people once they returned to their communities.

Afghanistan's plans for development have been guided by the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) (2008-13) and currently by the Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework (ANPDF) (2017-2021), which will be superseded by ANPDF II (2021-2025). Climate change was not included at all in ANDS. In ANPDF, it is mentioned three times: in references to the agricultural development and energy programmes, as well as in the context of regional integration. Migration is mentioned three times, all in the context of out-migration as a consequence of poverty, unemployment and demography, with Afghanistan's demography standing out because of the "rapidly rising rate of out-migration".<sup>111</sup> ANPDF II, however, acknowledges climate change as a serious and present threat, which aims to be addressed in a stronger way than before through this strategy.

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109. Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation, Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, (2013), *National Policy on Internally Displaced Persons*, Kabul.

110. Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2019), *Comprehensive Migration Policy*, Kabul.

111. Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2017), *Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework (ANPDF) 2017-21*, Kabul.



Problem tree analysis with Khalyan village community. PHOTO: TCRO

# 10. POLICY GAPS AND OPPORTUNITIES

The 2020 Global Report on Internal Displacement mentions Afghanistan as one of the countries showing increased political commitment, with displacement incorporated into development plans.<sup>112</sup> IDPs are included in the Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework and are included as a vulnerable group in Afghanistan’s alignment framework for the SDGs. IDPs are also specifically targeted in the delivery of the Citizens’ Charter, Afghanistan’s flagship development programme with the largest budget. Areas of high return of refugees and displacement have been prioritised in the rollout of this new programme, and participation of IDPs is emphasised. However, no distinction is made between those displaced by conflict and those displaced because of climate change, and the targeting of support to IDPs excludes those in IDP camps. All policies in relation to displacement include IDPs as a generic population group, making it difficult to discern how much attention is paid to climate migration and what action might be taken to address climate-related issues that result in displacement.

Afghanistan has a number of policies for migration, disaster response and the environment. However, the link between climate change and migration is not developed, outside of displacement caused by natural disasters. For example, the IDP policy, developed and approved in 2013, does not mention climate change.

However, policy responses to IDPs will benefit those displaced by climate-induced disasters, as well as those displaced by conflict. SNAP for Disaster Risk Reduction does not mention migration. Following the IDP Policy, in 2017 a Policy Framework for Returnees and IDPs (PFRI) was launched and is now considered the guiding policy on migration for the Government of Afghanistan. In the overview to the Policy Framework, where it provides information about the number of returnees and IDPs, only those displaced due to conflict are included. There is no mention or consideration of people displaced by climate-induced natural disaster.

In 2019, the Comprehensive Migration Policy (CMP) was developed with EU support and the assistance of the International Centre for Migration Policy Development. This policy builds on PFRI, with a focus on return and reintegration from a long-term development perspective, moving beyond the humanitarian and immediate assistance aspects covered by PFRI. CMP has a section on migration and climate-induced migration, where it states, “With the income of more than 60% of the Afghan population depending on agriculture, the combined effects of environmental degradation, decreasing ground water levels, deteriorating soil fertility, recurrent drought and extreme weather events are an important driver of rural-to-urban migration.”<sup>113</sup> CMP states that the majority of

112. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (2020), *Global Report on Internal Displacement 2020*, Geneva.

113. Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2019), *Comprehensive Migration Policy*, Kabul (p.95).

environmental migration takes place within Afghanistan. It details a number of policy responses, which include undertaking a national assessment of migration and the environment. This will assess the interlinkages between environmental degradation, climate change impacts, migration and displacement. Relevant legal and policy frameworks will be developed, and vulnerable populations will be identified to prioritise the most urgent institutional and planning gaps. The policy also commits to enhance the capacity of NEPA to support environmentally sustainable migration governance. The CMP is the first national policy on migration to specifically include climate-induced migration.

It is difficult to develop and introduce policies on climate-induced migration, when there is limited information on how much migration is caused by climate change. The key area of focus is climate-induced displacement as a result of natural disaster. When people move away from rural areas in search of improved livelihood, many of the underlying reasons such as reduced agricultural productivity, competition over water resources and reduction in pastures, would be related to climate change. However, other reasons that are not climate-induced can also prompt migration. Currently, outside of internal displacement, it is difficult to gauge the rate of climate-induced migration.

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## 10.1 Social Protection: Gaps and Opportunities

Social assistance programmes in Afghanistan consist of social welfare programmes for children, orphans and very poor families; food supply programmes, such as food for work or education; and disaster relief and assistance. The disaster relief and assistance support focuses on victims of rapid-onset natural disasters, such as floods and earthquakes. It addresses the immediate needs, including shelter, blankets, food and kitchen utensils. An analysis of the 2009 annual expenditure on social protection showed that 0.4 percent of the total was spent on disaster assistance and relief.<sup>114</sup>

ANPDF states, “Afghanistan cannot yet afford large-scale national safety nets or tax-based transfer programs.”<sup>115</sup>

Instead the government aims to reduce poverty by increasing the skills and productivity of poor people. It will also increase access to labour-intensive, social protection programmes, like the government’s Jobs for Peace programme. This programme was launched in 2016 and has provided over two million paid days of work to repair and maintain village infrastructure.

ANPDF states the government’s intention to progressively improve safety-net operations such as pensions, entitlements and other forms of transfer. It highlights weak targeting systems, embedded corruption and poor management structures as the main challenges.

Due to constrained government capacity and resources, social protection programmes have been provided by the international community. The World Bank funds the Afghanistan Social Protection Programme and the Pension Administration and Safety Net Project. UNICEF and WFP also support social protection projects in the country.

Social assistance and protection schemes focus on support to the poorest and most vulnerable in their places of origin. Food-for-work activities have included building flood-protection walls and other rural infrastructure. As soon as the people are displaced by climatic hazards and natural disaster, they fall under the mandate of emergency relief and disaster assistance. The IDP policy does state that IDPs are eligible to receive support from the government’s national development programmes in their areas of displacement. However, there is no social protection scheme in the context of climate-induced migration. The lack of resources for social-safety nets and protection, highlighted in the ANPDF, means the government would be unable to expand its social protection support to specifically support those migrating as a result of climate change.

Climate-induced migration must be considered and included in agricultural and rural development policies, so that programmes are targeted in areas where climate projections show most impact on agricultural production. Farmers need to diversify the crops they produce, and they also need to diversify their skills to broaden their livelihood opportunities. Climate-induced migration should also be considered in urban planning and programme development because many migrants move to urban areas in search of better employment and services.

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114. Labib, A. M. (2012), *The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Updating and Improving the Social Protection Index*, Asian Development Bank.

115. *Ibid.* p.27



Shaiday IDP Camp, Herat.  
PHOTO: TCRO

## 11. COVID-19 IN AFGHANISTAN

In February 2020, Afghanistan reported its first confirmed case of COVID-19.<sup>116</sup> Since then the country has registered over 39,000 cases.<sup>117</sup> Even though the government has put several measures in place to limit its transmission, COVID-19 continues to spread across the country. In August 2020, the country's acting health minister said that "31.5 percent of Afghans have been infected with the coronavirus, which is about 10 million people". He added that 37 percent of the infected cases were from cities. Of those infected, 32 percent were women, and 29 percent were men, according to a survey by the Ministry of Public Health.<sup>118</sup>

Since April 2020, several cities in Afghanistan have undergone phased lockdowns due to COVID-19, restricting opportunities for daily wage earners in the informal sector. Indications are that the economic situation in Afghanistan will further deteriorate, giving rise to large-scale unemployment. During the lockdown schools were closed and access to health facilities was limited. This further increased women's unpaid

domestic responsibilities, including caring for the sick and looking after children. The COVID-19 crisis drove up food prices in the first half of 2020. In some cases the price was up by 20 percent. The recent World Bank Report "Surviving the Storm" predicts the poverty rate may increase by up to 72 percent in 2020 due to COVID-19.<sup>119</sup>

Agriculture and livestock are the backbone of the rural economy in Afghanistan. According to the World Food Programme, "The COVID-19 situation in Afghanistan is quickly turning from a health emergency to a food and livelihood crisis."<sup>120</sup>

Even before the pandemic, Afghanistan's IPC (Integrated Food Security Phase Classification) analysis, which classifies areas of high food insecurity and malnutrition, registered that the majority of its 34 provinces had very high food insecurity and malnutrition, and that the country was experiencing a major livelihood crisis.<sup>121</sup>

116. <https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/covid-19-creates-new-challenges-migrants-afghanistan-and-abroad>

117. <https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/afghanistan/>

118. <https://tolonews.com/health/10m-covid-19-cases-afghanistan-health-ministry>

119. <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/34092/Afghanistan-Development-Update-Surviving-the-Storm.pdf?sequence=4&isAllowed=y>

120. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-afghanistan-food-idUSKBN22H1A4>

121. <http://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1151733/>



The livelihoods and food security of the most marginalised people, such as women, children and the elderly, are most affected by the lack of work and increased prices of essential commodities. Afghanistan's labour department estimates that of the 15 million people eligible for employment, 8 million were unemployed and another 2 million (a 25 percent increase) were added to the list of unemployed due to COVID-19.<sup>122</sup>

Given the precarious livelihoods of the majority of the people in Afghanistan, more food security, agriculture and safety net programmes are required to cope with the virus.

The February FEWSNET (Famine Early Warning Systems Network) outlook indicated that the already vulnerable parts of Afghanistan would become more food-insecure during the pandemic.<sup>123</sup> Although food security has improved a bit due to relief measures and gifts (zakat), unless employment opportunities improve and labour migration resumes, or longer-term relief measures are instituted, many urban poor are expected to face significant consumption gaps.

In response to high inflation, the Government initiated a 40-day bread distribution programme that addressed the needs of 250,000 families in Kabul alone. The first phase lasted 40 days and in spite of limitations it prevented the poorest families from starving.<sup>124</sup> However, the programme was stopped after its completion.<sup>125</sup>

COVID-19 has also affected cross-border migration. In March 2020, over 160,000 undocumented migrants from cities across Iran returned home to Afghanistan. If one adds to this the number of migrants who returned from Pakistan, the total comes to over 376,000. The insecurity they have faced since their return has pushed many to consider migrating again in search of peace and stability. Remittances, on which the rural poor depend heavily, have decreased significantly. The World Bank estimated that the remittances amounted to nearly USD 868 million in 2019.<sup>126</sup>

To counter the effects of the pandemic, IOM, UNHCR, WHO and other institutions have been providing equipment, healthcare infrastructure, resources, staff and training to communities. They are also mobilising community health workers, while providing whatever financial assistance they can.<sup>127</sup> But the impact on the country's livelihoods and economy is sure to be long-lasting.

A significant development has been the government's ANPDF II (2021-2025) which not only outlines the government's five-year strategy and plans around the three pillars of market-building, state-building and peace-building, but also includes measures for responding to and addressing COVID-19.<sup>128</sup>

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122. <https://ariananews.af/afghanistans-surging-unemployment-triggered-by-coronavirus-outbreak/>

123. [https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/AFGHANISTAN\\_Food\\_Security\\_Outlook.pdf](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/AFGHANISTAN_Food_Security_Outlook.pdf)

124. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-afghanistan-food-idUSKBN22H1A4>

125. <https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2020/06/08/free-bread-distribution-stopped-kabul>

126. <https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/covid-19-creates-new-challenges-migrants-afghanistan-and-abroad>

127. <https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/covid-19-creates-new-challenges-migrants-afghanistan-and-abroad>

128. <https://unama.unmissions.org/international-community-and-afghanistan-government-discussed-country%E2%80%99s-development-and-reform-agenda>



## 12. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Given the climatic projections for Afghanistan—increased temperature, earlier snowmelt and lower precipitation at critical times—a higher number of people are likely to be displaced or forced to migrate over the years.

The Government of Afghanistan now has a greater awareness of the effects of climate change and is receiving support from the Global Environment Facility and the Least Developed Countries Fund. But the impact of this funding is limited to the areas where projects are implemented.

Climate-induced migration usually does not get the attention it deserves, partly because conflict is seen as the main driver of displacement in Afghanistan. Even in the context of climate-induced migration, most of the attention is focused on displacement that results from rapid-onset natural disasters, such as floods. Less attention is paid to migration resulting from the long-term implications of a changing climate such as lower agricultural productivity. This would erode rural communities' resilience, thus, increasing poverty and vulnerability.

Adapting to the projected changes in rainfall will require a more urgent and concerted investment in water management. Water allocation, distribution and management will become more important as Afghanistan's water supply and distribution becomes more precarious.

The severity of the drought in 2017-18, resulting in the displacement of thousands of people, many of whom remain in displacement camps in Herat, demonstrated the lasting impact of drought as a climatic shock. The qualitative research that informs this report shows it is too late to address climate change once people have lost everything and moved away. The solutions put forward by the communities that participated in the research include ways to protect their village, as well as

suggestions to strengthen livelihoods in rural areas to prevent migration as a result of climate change.

These solutions require funding and a policy framework backed by resources. The 2013 IDP Policy could not have any significant impact because of limited resources. The 2019 Comprehensive Migration Policy provides many appropriate policy responses, but it remains to be seen whether these will receive the necessary funding for implementation. Afghanistan depends heavily on loans and foreign development assistance, and social protection and safety-net programmes are under-resourced and receive less donor interest.

Afghanistan will have to make climate change a priority. The past two national strategies for the country's development have shown a distinct lack of focus on climate change, though the next one seems promising. The National Environment Protection Authority is primarily engaged in raising awareness, which is necessary, but NEPA could address a greater need. Recently, rather than creating a Ministry of Climate Change, a climate change department was created under NEPA.

Afghanistan lacks comprehensive assessments of the interrelations between climate change, environmental degradation and displacement. This impedes the development of evidence-based solutions to counter climate-induced displacement and to manage the resettlement of returning migrants and IDPs in an environmentally sustainable manner. Resettled people and host communities generally have little awareness of environmental sustainability, as well as insufficient resources to use alternative sources of energy for heating. A comprehensive plan to sensitise them to environmental protection through community-based resource management projects has so far not been developed.

In the light of the above observations, the following recommendations are made:

## LOCAL

1. Raise community awareness of the impact of climate change and future projections, and ensure climate change mitigation and adaptation measures are tailored to the context of specific communities.
2. Educate communities on environmental sustainability and community-based resource management as ways of preserving and managing natural resources.
3. Provide consistent capacity development support to Cluster Community Development Councils through the Citizens' Charter national programme to help communities with disaster risk reduction and resilience-building activities, and explore channelling funds to Cluster Community Development Councils post-disaster, for rebuilding lives and livelihoods.

## NATIONAL

4. Government policies and development strategies should establish a clearer link between climate change and migration, with a focus on migration resulting from the long-term effects of climate change, rather than only displacement as a result of natural disaster.
5. Broaden the 2017 Policy Framework for Returnees and IDPs to include climate-induced displacement, as well as conflict-induced.
6. Develop social protection schemes and effective safety nets in areas likely to be most affected according to climatic projections, thereby preventing or reducing protracted displacement from natural disasters. Expand long-term protection measures such as planting trees and vegetative cover, and protecting pastureland, to reduce the impact of natural disasters.
7. Develop a new strategy for natural resource management, which includes the use of water resources, to respond to the forecast climatic changes for the remainder of the century, and support the capacity development of the local-level water-user associations.

8. Develop the capacity of the Office of the State Minister for Disaster Management to model and analyse information with regard to hazards and risks.
9. Create a network of weather stations to inform early warning systems that can be accessed at all levels, down to the village, in local language, and can inform people in advance of extreme weather events and slow-onset changes.
10. Increase investment in programmes for sustainable agriculture that boost commercial opportunities for farmers, and support farmers in developing small businesses and in diversifying income opportunities.
11. Consider the creation of a Ministry of Climate Change to address the likely impacts of climatic projections, as well as strengthen the focus and potentially increase the allocation of dedicated resources to the issue, or at the very least, support the capacity development of and resource allocation to the Climate Change Department under the National Environmental Protection Authority.

## DATA, RESEARCH AND INFORMATION

12. Create a centralised system for collecting, managing and analysing climate data and modelling, including climate-induced disasters and the number of people affected. Develop technical capacity to monitor and assess the current and future impacts of climate change, including vulnerability analyses by age and gender.
13. Complete the national assessment of migration and the environment, as stated in the Comprehensive Migration Policy, including an assessment of the interlinkages between climate change, environmental degradation and displacement.
14. Prepare vulnerability profiles of both the disaster-prone areas and the areas that will be most affected by the long-term climatic effects to help communities prepare and adapt.
15. Support the Office of the State Minister for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Affairs in establishing and maintaining a centralised database for loss and damage resulting from climate-induced disasters.

# REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL

16. Introduce, or provide a more prominent role to, climate-induced migration in regional cooperation agreements and fora, including the Budapest Process and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Regional fora should develop, agree on and implement common policies, codes and responses to address climate migration, and support the displaced.
17. Share data collection and analysis of climate change and population movement across borders between regional partners to increase knowledge, understanding and evidence.
18. Strengthen regional cooperation and initiatives, including the South Asia Co-operative Environment Programme and the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development. Consider the model of regional cooperation between Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan for water distribution and energy production. Share weather station data across the region.
19. International (and national) media should broaden the coverage of displacement in Afghanistan to include climate-induced displacement, and not just displacement resulting from conflict, in order to increase global awareness of the issue.
20. International donors should increase funding commitments to the Government of Afghanistan for enhanced social protection and safety net programmes, particularly those linked to climate impacts.

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# ANNEXES

## Annex 1: Takhar qualitative data

### Mobility Mapping

Hardships faced by migrants:

1. Dangerous journey with risk to life, for migrants
2. No access to shelter and house
3. Lack of income and jobs
4. Unfamiliarity with new places
5. Bearing the burden of heavy costs of migrating
6. Diseases among women, children and elders
7. Lack of food and healthy drinking water
8. Harassment by the police


9. Deception and bait trafficking
10. Debt from borrowing
11. Sinking in the sea
12. Deprivation of education

Notes

1. Khalyan is a village of Chahab district
2. Rustaq and Khwaja Bahauddin districts are neighbouring to Chahab district
3. Badakhshan and Kunduz provinces are neighbour of Takhar province
4. N.B. Numbers above the boxes indicate the approximate number of people from the village migrating to that location.
5. The number of dots below the boxes indicate the relative degree of hardship: the greater the hardship, the bigger the score.

### Facilitating Mobility Mapping

Khalyan Village, Chahab District, Takhar Province  
Afghanistan  
Date: January 01, 2020



**Note:** Dasht Shirazi Village is established after a part of Khalyan village destroyed by flood in 2012

Output of Matrix-Scoring Exercise: Khalyan Village, Chahab District, Takhar Province, Afghanistan. Date: January 03, 2020

Migration destinations	Preference										
	Job opportunity	Family and social relations	Business opportunity	Better education	Irrigated agricultural land	Permanent job (jobs in all seasons)	Better health services	Proximity to Khalyan	Low cost of journey	Shelter (relatives who have a home)	Security
Taloqan district	•••••	••••••	••••••	•••••• •••	••••	•••••	••••••	•••••	•••••	••••• •••	••••
Khwaja Bahauddin district	•••••	•••	••••	••••	•••••	•	••	••••• •••	••••••	••••••	•
Rustaq district	••	•••	••••	•••••	••••	•	•••	••••• •••	••••••	••••••	•••• ••
Chahab district	••	•••••• •••	••	•••••	•	••	•••	••••• •••	••••••	••••• •••	•
Badakhshan province	•	•	•	•••	•	•	••	•••••	••••	•	•••••
Nimroz province	••••	•	••	•	•	•	•	••	••••	•	•
Kabul province	••••••	•••	••••••	•••••• •••	•	••••• •••	••••• •••	••••	••	••••	•••• ••
Kunduz province	••••	•••	••••	••••	••••	••	••••••	•••••	••••	••••	•
Baghlan province	•	•	••	••••	••••	•	••••	••••	••••	••	•
Balkh province	•••	••	••	••••••	•	••	••••••	••••	••••	••	••
Khost province	•••	•	••	••	•	•	••••	••	••	•	•
Turkey	••••• •••	•	••	••	•	•	••••• •••	•	•	•	••••
Iran	••••• •••	•	••	•	•	••	•••	•	•	•	••••
Dasht Shirazi village	•	•••••• •••	•	•••	•	•	•	•••••• ••••	•••••• •••	•••	••••
Herat province	••	••	••	••••	•	•	•••••	••	••	••	••••

The No. of dots inside the cells indicate scoring. Ten dots indicate the best or most desirable scenario, while one dot depicts the least preferred scenario.

## Output of Paired-Comparison Matrix

### Male group

Khalyan Village, Chahab District, Takhar Province,

Afghanistan

Date: January 02, 2020

	Job opportunity	Water sheet for green cover	Roads	Healthy drinking water	Education	Protection wall	Health services	Electricity	Agriculture projects	Shelter	Foods	Tents and warm clothing	Score	Rank
Job opportunity		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	11	1
Water sheet for green cover	0		1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	5	7
Roads	0	0		0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	6	6
Healthy drinking water	0	1	1		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	10	2
Education	0	1	1	0		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	9	3
Protection wall	0	1	0	0	0		1	1	1	1	1	1	7	5
Health services	0	1	1	0	0	0		1	1	1	1	1	8	4
Electricity	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		1	0	1	1	3	9
Agriculture projects	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		1	0	0	1	11
Shelter	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0		1	1	4	8
Foods	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0		1	2	10
Tents and warm clothing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.5	0	0		0	12



## Output of Paired-Comparison Matrix

### Female group

	Job opportunity	Water sheet for green cover	Roads	Healthy drinking water	Edducation	Protec-tion wall	Health services	Electricity	Agri-culture projects	Shelter	Foods	Tents and warm clothing	Score	Rank
Job opportunity		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	11	1
Water sheet for green cover	0		1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	5	7
Roads	0	0		0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	6	6
Healthy drinking water	0	1	1		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	10	2
Education	0	1	1	0		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	9	3
Protection wall	0	1	0	0	0		1	1	1	1	1	1	7	5
Health services	0	1	1	0	0	0		1	1	1	1	1	8	4
Electricity	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		1	0	1	1	3	9
Agriculture projects	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		1	0	0	1	11
Shelter	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0		1	1	4	8
Foods	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0		1	2	10
Tents and warm clothing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.5	0	0		0	12

### Results of Paired-Comparison Matrix - Male Group

	Rank
Healthy drinking water	1
Job opportunity	2
Income opportunity	3
Protection wall	4
Education	5
Health services	6
Introducing high-value agricultural crops	7
Agriculture projects	8
Vet clinic	9
Roads	10
Electricity	11
Shelter	12
Foods	13

### Results of Paired-Comparison Matrix - Female Group

	Rank
Job opportunity	1
Healthy drinking water	2
Education	3
Health services	4
Protection wall	5
Roads	6
Water sheet for green cover	7
Shelter	8
Electricity	9
Foods	10
Agricultural projects	11
Tents and warm clothing	12
Foods	13

## Annex 2: Herat Qualitative Data

### Mobility Mapping

Hardships faced by migrants:

1. No access to health services
2. No access to education
3. No access to Shelter
4. No access to enough food
5. No access to health drinking water
6. Sale of livestock and property to cover the cost of migration
7. No familiarity to the new place
8. No circumcision of children
9. Risk of death
10. Children's death due to no access to healthcare and vaccine, cold weather and not enough food
11. People have no land in the new place. They also do not have money to rent a house, so they camp on the land of local people, who often kick them out. This causes conflict between local people and IDPs.
12. Hatred, intolerance and malice between the local people and IDPs.

### Notes

1. The exercise conducted is contrary to the exercise in previous location (Takhar province hotspot). The Takhar hotspot was the source of migration and people from there migrated to other places. They were asked: where do migrants go to fulfil their needs; how many people migrated; what hardships are faced by migrants in accessing vital needs; and how are various trajectories of migration different from each other? But in the Herat hotspot the case is opposite. This is a destination for migrants from other areas. They were asked: how many people migrated, what hardships are faced by migrants in accessing vital needs and how are various trajectories of migration different from each other?
2. N.B. Numbers above the boxes indicate the approximate number of people from other areas migrating to this location.


The number of dots below the boxes indicate the relative degree of hardship: the greater the hardship, the bigger the score.

### Facilitating Mobility Mapping

Shaiday Camp, Herat City, Herat Province

Afghanistan

Date: January 23, 2020



Output of Matrix-Scoring Exercise: Shaiday Camp, Herat City, Herat Province, Afghanistan. Date: January 24, 2020

Migration destinations	Preference					
	Security and life safety	Job opportunity	Income opportunity	Relationships exist	Knowledge of local language	Access to protection and support from Gov and NGOs
Herat province	••••••••••	•	•	••	••••••••	••••••
Karachi state of Pakistan	•••••	••••••	••••	••••	•••••	•
Iran	•••••	••••••	••••	•••••	••••	•
Kabul	••••••	•••	••	•••••	••••••••	••••
Turkmenistan	••••••	•••••	•	•••	•	•
Turkey	•••••	••••••	••	•	•	••

The No. of dots inside the cells indicate scoring. Ten dots indicate the best or most desirable scenario, while one dot depicts the least preferred scenario.

Output of Paired-Comparison Matrix: Shaiday Camp, Herat City, Herat Province, Afghanistan Date: January 24, 2020

**Male group**

	Shelter	Food	Healthy drinking water	School/ education	Health clinic/ services	Bath, toilet and sanitation	Fuel and heating material	Job opportunities	Clothes	Vocational/ skill development, support for agriculture, livestock and poultry	Income opportunities	Permanent housing / residential settlement	Score	Rank
Shelter		1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	10	2
Food	0		0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	9	3
Healthy drinking water	1	1		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	11	1
School/ education	0	0	0		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	8	4
Health clinic/ services	0	0	0	0		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	7	5
Bath, toilet and sanitation	0	0	0	0	0		1	1	1	1	1	1	6	6
Fuel and heating material	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	12
Job opportunities	0	0	0	0	0	0	1		1	1	1	1	5	7
Clothes	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0		0	0	0	1	11
Vocational/ skill development, support for agriculture, livestock and poultry	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1		1	1	4	8
Income opportunities	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0		1	3	9
Permanent housing / residential settlement	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0		2	10

Output of Paired-Comparison Matrix: Shaiday Camp, Herat City, Herat Province, Afghanistan Date: January 26, 2020

**Female group**

	Food	Shelter	Clothes	Money/ cash	Health clinic/ services	Healthy drinking water	School / education	Life safety/ security	Income opportunities	Score	Rank
Food		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	8	1
Shelter	0		1	0	1	0	1	1	1	5	4
Clothes	0	0		0	1	0	1	1	1	4	5
Money/ cash	0	1	1		1	0	1	1	1	6	3
Health clinic/ services	0	0	0	0		0	1	0	1	2	7
Healthy drinking water	0	1	1	1	1		1	0.5	1	6.5	2
School / education	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	1	1	8
Life safety/ security	0	0	0	0	1	1	1		0	3	6
Income opportunities	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.5		0.5	9

**Results of Paired-Comparison Matrix - Male Group**

	Rank
Healthy drinking water	1
Shelter	2
Food	3
School / education	4
Health clinic/services	5
Bath, toilet and sanitation	6
Job opportunities	7
Vocational/ skill development, support for agriculture, livestock and poultry	8
Income opportunities	9
Permanent housing / residential settlement	10
Clothes	11
Fuel and heating material	12

**Results of Paired-Comparison Matrix - Female Group**

	Rank
Food	1
Healthy drinking water	2
Money/ cash	3
Shelter	4
Clothes	5
Life safety/security	6
Health clinic/services	7
School / education	8
Income opportunities	9

### Annex 3: Impacts of Afghanistan’s Climatic Hazards

The table below provides information on the variety of climatic hazards affecting Afghanistan and their impact. (Source: Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran & UNEP, Climate Change and Disaster Preparedness Working Group, Final Thematic Report, February 2008.)

The variety and impact of Afghanistan's climatic hazards:

Climatic hazards	Description	Loss of life and livelihoods	Human health	Duration	Food security and agriculture	Environmental effects (Biological diversity, forestry)	Water availability, quality and accessibility	Trends
<b>Periodic drought</b>	Decrease in productivity of crops; forced migration; changes in livelihood; decrease in amount of exports; and financial losses.	Livestock herders, including Kuchis, irrigated agriculturalists and dryland farmers are affected; and around 10,000 casualties per year from severe drought are reported.	Malnutrition, spread of diseases such as malaria, sishnaia, cholera, typhoid, Tainia saginata infection, ascariasis and diarrhoea.	Up to 8 years	Drought has caused an estimated loss in production of: 75% wheat, 85% rice, 85% maize, 50% potato and 60% of overall farm production, between 1998 and 2005.	Pistachio, pine nut, wild almond and conifer forest production negatively affected. Waterfowl sanctuaries, such as Dasht-i-Nawar, Ab-i-Estada and Kol-i-Hashmat Khan, have dried up. Wildlife being displaced.	Decreased availability of underground water, springs and karezes dry up, flow of major rivers collapses, degradation of watersheds and drop in the level of water in reservoirs and dams.	Increasing frequency and intensity.
<b>Floods due to untimely and heavy rainfall</b>	Collapse and sedimentation of irrigation canals; destruction of agricultural lands; loss of crops and livestock; collapse of dwellings; spread of epidemic diseases; destruction of infrastructure, such as roads and bridges; and damage to the national economy.	Approximately 750 casualties per year.	Increased incidence of cholera, typhoid, diarrhoea and malaria.	3 months	Loss of 10% of agricultural production and gardens located alongside rivers and in high-risk areas.	Soil degradation; loss of natural forest (riverine forest being particularly affected); increased levels of water siltation and sedimentation; and displacement of wildlife.	Infrastructure damage around USD 300 million as a result of severe flood.	Increasing frequency and intensity.
<b>Flooding due to thawing of snow and ice</b>	River levels rise; destruction of riverside agricultural and non-agricultural (forest, range, etc.) lands; landslides; soil erosion; destruction of infrastructure, such as bridges and gabions.	Around 100 casualties per year.	Increased incidence of cholera, typhoid, diarrhoea and malaria.	4 months	2% damage of agricultural land alongside rivers.	Soil degradation; loss of natural forest (riverine forest being particularly affected); increased levels of water siltation and sedimentation; and displacement of wildlife.	Destruction of river banks, associated agricultural land and infrastructure worth around USD 400 million, as a result of severe flood.	Increasing frequency
<b>Rise in temperature</b>	Increase in incidence of diseases that affect humans, crops and livestock; habitat changes affect wildlife; changes in vegetation cover and associated grazing patterns.	Around 1,000 casualties per year	Increased incidence of malaria, leishmania, typhoid and diarrhoea.	3 months	Decreased agricultural, livestock and horticultural production.	Less productivity of natural system, displacement and changing of wildlife habitat.	Increasing evapotranspiration rates; reduction in water level.	Increasing frequency and intensity.
<b>Frost and cold spells</b>	Degradation of fruits, crops and vegetables; increase in diseases; poor economy and increase in poverty.	Approximately 300 indirect casualties per year	Illnesses associated with cold weather.	2 months	Loss of fruits and potatoes. 20% of gardeners in the country are affected, particularly those with horticultural crops.	Affects forest rehabilitation and afforestation programmes (particularly nurseries and saplings).	Low impact.	Increasing frequency and intensity.
<b>Hail, thunder and lightning</b>	Destruction of crops (particularly horticultural crops); human and livestock losses; and outflow/gush from floods.	Approximately 150 casualties per year.	Illnesses associated with cold weather.	Around 20 days	Up to 20% loss in horticultural and crop production.	Low impact.	Low impact.	Increasing frequency and intensity.
<b>Monsoon and 120-day winds</b>	Desertification; degradation of agricultural land and crops; destruction of infrastructure; air pollution; spread and transmission of diseases and respiratory problems; sedimentation of irrigation systems and springs; local and national economy negatively affected.	Around 10 casualties per year.	Eyes, respiratory and skin diseases.	120 days	Decrease in horticultural and crop production, degradation of range land and reduced livestock production	Desertification; decreased plant cover.	Losses (temporary and more permanent) of infrastructure, siltation of water bodies, decreased quality of water	Increasing frequency and intensity.

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